

— SPACE PROBE EXPLODES— NISSING: PLUTTONION

by KARL GROSSMAN

Peru's New Conquistadors: Pizarro's Toxic Trail
by Pratap Chatterjee

Guerrilla U.: In the Jungle with Peru's Tupac Amaru

by Jeremy bigwood

Peru's Japanese Connections

by NIKOLAS KOZLOFF

Labor Slaps the Smug New Face of Unionbusting

by DAVID BACON

Captive Labor: US Business Goes to Jail by PAUL WRIGHT

Phi Beta Capitalism: Universities in Service to Business by LAWRENCE SOLEY


Colombia's Gringo Invasion
by Frank Smyth & Winifred Tate

Law Enforcement and Intelligence: The New National Security Measure

by LOUIS WOLF

Sudan: Social Engineering, Slavery, and War





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http://mediafilter.org/caq

CovertAction Quarterly, Number 60, Spring 1997. Published quarterly by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation @1997. Indexed by Alternative Press Index, University Microfilms, ISSN 0275-309X. All rights reserved. Printed in the USA. Subscriptions are \$22/year in the U.S.; \$27 in Canada; \$35 in all other areas. Back issues are \$8 per copy; add \$2 in Canada/ Mexico: add \$4 other.



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The Real Dope

The adminstration dubbed it a serious "blip" in the overall scheme. When Mexico's drug czar, Jesús Gutiérrez Rebello, visited the White House, he was roundly embraced by high-level officials of the Justice and Treasury Departments and made privy to top secret US information on the drug war. His US counterpart, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, effused over him as a man of "tremendous integrity. ... We are not unaware of the progress they have made at enormous personal sacrifice." Three weeks later, after guarding the information for a week, Mexico admitted that Gutiérrez was in jail, charged with being on the take from Mexico's drug cartels.

The timing was terrible. The US decision was due on whether to decertify Mexico and trigger withdrawal of US aid and loans from multinational lending agencies such as the IMF. Washington, meanwhile, continued to support the reeling Mexican economy and the fiction that Mexico was merrily recovering and repaying the US bailout. In fact, Mexico simply borrowed from Peter (Europe) to pay Paul (the US) while the economy remained in the toilet. When the piled-up contradictions finally toppled, the chief casualty was the farce of the drug war as a serious

policy rather than simply an expedient tool for disciplining uncooperative Third World countries. Even the Washington Post took note with the headline: "US-Mexico Trade May Outweigh Anti-Drug Concerns."

How Do You Say "Neat Idea" in Hebrew?

Israel reportedly flooded Egypt with tons of cheap Lebanese hashish so that Egypt's soldiers would be too stoned to shoot straight. A report in the Sunday Times (London) quotes Israeli officers who admitted participating in the program that began as a way of undermining Egypt's military buildup to the 1967 Six Day War and continued for 20 years, because it was clearly a neat idea. Codenamed Operation Lahav ("blade" in Hebrew), the operation was started by Israel to control one of the biggest sources of hashish in the world, the traditional smuggling routes out of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, 20 miles from the Israeli border. According to the Sunday Times, "IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) officers soon realized they were missing a golden opportunity: they could run the drug shipments themselves, flooding Egypt with


cut-price narcotics and weakening the Egyptian army. The proposal is said to have been passed up the military chain of command and given official sanction."

A former IDF colonel who was in charge of shipments in the early 1970s, had "no regrets. It allowed us to control and practi-

cally avoid drug smuggling into Israel, and increase the use of drugs within the Egyptian army. Sometimes they [the units in charge of the smuggling] said they had too much so I authorized them to dump the drugs in the sea west of Tel Aviv." He was one of the eight Israeli officers who independently confirmed a carefully staged two-decade-long program and detailed both land and sea routes over which the smuggled cargoes were escorted

trucks. At the Egyptian border, IDF officers instructed Egyptian drug dealers to sell the hashish to the hundreds of thousands of Egyptian

by Israeli military ships or



soldiers posted between Sinai and Cairo. In December, the Egyptian military admitted that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, drug consumption in the ranks rose by 50%, with almost two out of three soldiers regularly toking hash.

Operation Lahav, financed with secret funds, had the added benefit of being lucrative: The drug profits were channeled into a secret IDF fund to pay for other covert operations.

Egyptian military officials were outraged and blamed Israel for planting the "stupid fiction."

"The Israelis are propagating lies and treachery and this is part of a psychological campaign aiming at casting doubt over the combat capacity of the Egyptian army," said Gen. Mohammed Fawzi, who was Egypt's war minister between 1968 and 1971.

Israel also denied the Sunday Times story, calling it "false and malicious" and blaming rogue elements: "Officers of the IDF do not engage in drug traffic," it said. Those who have admitted their part, however, deny they acted independently or for personal gain. "What I have done was authorized by my superiors," said one.

Guns Don't

"Telephone systems are routinely used by the worst and most violent criminals to commit the worst and most violent crimes." - from the FBI website.

If the Hair Shirt Fits

Explaining why his Christian Broadcasting Network was going to begin producing soap operas and game shows, Pat Robertson admitted: "Frankly, only a masochist would want to watch religious shows all day long."

One Man's Right, Another Woman's Political Activity

After education reporter Sandy Nelson became involved in a fight against a local anti-gay housing initiative, the Takoma, Washington News Tribune transferred her to a copy editing job. Management claimed it was protecting the paper's credibility by prohibiting employees from participation in political activism. Nelson sued, arguing that a reporter need not check her conscience, constitutional rights, and obligations of good citizenship at the door.

This February, after a sixyear legal struggle, the Washington state Supreme Court disagreed and found that newspapers can indeed require their reporters to remain politically neutral because the papers' credibility is at stake. "Editorial integrity and credibility are core objectives of editorial control and thus merit protection," Justice Richard Sanders wrote for the majority. "The notion of reasonable newsroom ethical codes is strongly reaffirmed," crowed News Tribune attorney Cameron DeVore. Dave Zeeck, the paper's executive editor chimed in, "Some degree of community involvement is good. But there's a difference to me between political activity and belonging to the PTA."

These defenders of credibility and objectivity might want to have a little chat with the journalists and media executives for whom political activity is a bit more refined. Instead, acting as friends of the poor and oppressed, they court the powerful and maintain their neutrality by tossing money at candidates, going on junkets paid for by tobacco com-

panies, and attending pajama parties in the Lincoln bedroom.

Among the 938 overnight guests at the Clinton White House were two network executives, a network founder, a newspaper president, a magazine editor, and a prominent commentator. Richard Kaplan, executive producer for special projects at ABC, stayed at the White House with his wife in the summer of 1993. Kaplan was then executive producer of ABC's "World News Tonight." Calling Clinton a longtime "friend," Kaplan said there was no conflict of interest because his friendship had no impact on his work. Nor did the close ties and overnight visits create an appearance problem because it was never made public until now. (Although by that logic, now it does, because it has been — are you with me?)

Ted Turner, CNN founder and now vice chair of Time Warner, was another for whom friendship had an onoff switch. After it was revealed that he and his wife Jane Fonda slept in the Lincoln bedroom, CNN president Tom Johnson rushed to Turner's defense. "He does not let friendships influence editorial content"


at CNN." Leslie Moonves, president of CBS Entertainment, has stayed at the White House, contributed the maximum \$1,000 to the Clinton-Gore campaign, and gave \$5,000 to the Democratic National Committee. Giving cash, it seems, as opposed to time or energy, is not political activism but a protected liberty. "He has the right to give political contributions as much as any American," said CBS spokesperson Gil Schwartz. "Mr. Moonves is a friend of the president. He has participated in some of the Renaissance Weekends and played golf with the president. The invitation was extended as a friend to a friend and was accepted in that spirit."

Another overnight White House guest was author and PBS NewsHour commentator Doris Kearns Goodwin. "I don't feel it makes me unable to criticize when I need to," she said. "I wasn't up there as a journalist. I was up there as a historian."

gathering and news making, between community activity and political activism. The executives just crossed palms.

Trickle Down Environmentalism

When "Jim Bob" Moffet, CEO of Freeport-McMoRan —a mining company charged with massive pollution (see. p. 43)— was asked about the 120,000 tons of toxic waste dumped into the major river in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, he replied: "The environmental impact of our mine is the equivalent of me pissing in the Arafura Sea."





What would happen if plutonium fell from the sky and nobody heard? These Bolivians may find out.

Space Probe Explodes, Plutonium Missing

In November, a Russian probe crashed to Earth along the Bolivia/Chile border.
US officials admit they don't have a clue what happened to the deadly plutonium it carried.

by Karl Grossman

t was brighter than the brightest star, said John Van der Brink, and had a tail about 12 times the width of the full moon with "sparkling bits sort of coming off the back of it. This was an extraordinarily spectacular event."

Karl Grossman won the "Project Censored" 1997 first prize for his CAQ article, "Risking the World, Nuclear Proliferation of Space" (Summer 1996). A professor of journalism at the State University of New York/College at Old Westbury, his investigative reporting focuses on environ mental issues, especially nuclear power in space. He wrote the WorldFest Gold Award-winning 1995 TV documentary: Nukes In Space: The Nuclearization and Weaponization of the Heavens. His book, The Wrong Stuff, will soon be published by Common Courage Press.

Photo: Sean Sprague/Impact Visuals, near Cochabamba.

1. David L. Chandler, "Eyewitnesses In Chile Shed Light

From his vantage point in the mountains of northern Chile where he and his wife had gone to watch meteors, he had "no illusions that it was anything other than a piece of space debris" falling to Earth through the ink black night sky. Van der Brink recently retired as an electronics specialist from the European Southern Observatory in Chile.

Leo Alvarado, a postgraduate student of geology from Chile's Universidad Católica del Norte, who had been driving with four colleagues across the

On Russian Probe's Spectacular Fall," Boston Globe, Dec. 5, 1996, p. A2.

Atacama Desert in northern Chile, saw it too, changing brilliant colors as it came down. "We watched it break up into many pieces and burn," he recounted.²

What they and other eyewitnesses saw last November 16 was Russia's Mars 96 space probe descending along a swath of Chile and Bolivia and scattering its remains across a 10,000 square mile area. The probe carried about a half pound of deadly plutonium divided into four battery canisters that were to serve as electricity sources for Mars

2. Chris Bryson, "How Safe Are Nuclear-Powered Space Missions?" Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 17, 1996, p. 12.

rovers. Like their US counterparts, the containers were touted as sufficiently strong and heat resistant to remain intact, no matter what. The US is now admitting that may not have been the case.

"There are two possibilities," said Gordon Bendick, director of legislative affairs of the National Security Council, about the fate of the canisters. "One, they were destroyed coming through the atmosphere [and the plutonium dispersed]. Two, they survived and impacted the earth and drove through penetrating the surface ... or could have hit rock and bounced off like an agate marble. ... I don't give any credence for any one [possibility] because I don't know." 3

"Named after Pluto, god of the underworld, [plutonium] is so toxic that less than one-millionth of a gram, an invisible particle, is a carcinogenic dose," emphasized Dr. Helen Caldicott, president emeritus of Physicians for Social Responsibility. "One pound, if uniformly distributed, could hypothetically induce lung cancer in every person on Earth."

If the probe "burned up and formed fine plutonium oxide particles...[t]here would be an increased hazard of lung cancer," commented Dr. John Gofman, professor emeritus of radiological physics at the University of California at Berkeley, who investigated the 1964 crash back to Earth of a US SNAP-9A (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power). When its plutonium-fueled space power system burned up in the atmosphere, 2.1 pounds of plutonium vaporized and dispersed worldwide. Dr. Gofman has long linked that accident with an increased level of lung cancer.⁵

If the battery canisters somehow landed intact, there is also the question of nuclear proliferation. The US displays concern over the spread of nuclear material that could be used by "rogue" states, terrorist groups, and the like. Although the probe's plutonium-238 could not be used to make bombs — it does not fission (split) like the plutonium-239 used in nuclear weapons it could still be extremely dangerous in the wrong hands. Plutonium-238's relatively shorter half-life of 87.8 years, compared to a half-life of 24,500 years for plutonium-239, is why it is used in $space\ probes -- its comparatively rapid$

disintegration produces heat which is translated into electricity. The quick decay also makes plutonium-238 some 280 times more radioactive than plutonium-239, and thus a more extraordinarily toxic nuclear poison if inhaled as vapor or small particles that become lodged in the lung.

Hot Pants and Cool Responses

Bendick discounts the dangers. "If [the canisters] burned up in the atmosphere, bottom line here, if they weren't heat resistant enough to stand what I would call a non-standard reentry pattern, the release was maybe up to 200 grams of plutonium, which is like a drop of blood in the Pacific Ocean. There is no environmental problem with a couple of

Australia got a phone call from Clinton; Chile "got a two-week-old fax."

hundred grams. ... If in fact this thing survived reentry into the atmosphere and these things came down and crashimpacted on the earth — they were meant to penetrate the earth, much as the containers with the plutonium-238 were meant to penetrate Mars, their original target - they'll never be found. And even if they did and were found, people could walk around with them in their pants pockets for the rest of their lives and never be bothered.... If it became particulate matter after diffusing in the atmosphere, burned plutonium would be much similar to open air testing that the French did in the Pacific as recently as a few years ago." Nor was that possibility dangerous, since "we can find no positive causal link" between radioactivity released in atomic bomb testing done by the US in Utah, for example, and cancer, the NSC director of legislative affairs claimed.⁶

Such serenity did not always reign. When the US Space Command announced on November 17, 1996, that the wayward Russian probe "will reenter the Earth's atmosphere ... with a predicted impact point ... in east-central Australia" in a matter of hours, President Bill Clinton telephoned Aus-

tralian Prime Minister John Howard. He offered the "assets we have in the Department of Energy" to deal with any radioactive contamination.⁷ (Clinton was planning to fly to Australia the following day for a state visit, the first stop before an Asia tour.)

Howard placed the Australian military and government on full alert. He held a press conference to inform the Australian people of the potential danger and called on them to remain calm. "I can't tell you where it is going to land. I can't tell you when," the prime minister declared. He thanked Clinton for his call and warned Australians to use "extreme caution" if they come in contact with remnants of the Russian space probe. 9 The US television networks all featured stories on their Sunday eve-

ning news programs. "Mars probe expected to fall within hours," reported CNN. 10

Russian Space Agency spokesman Vladimir Ananyev admitted: "We've got a problem." Russian NTV television reported: "Unburned bits of the station could hit the

Earth. To make matters worse the station has four thermoelectric generators fueled by radioactive plutonium."¹² The global media attention made "the danger of a disaster involving a plutonium space project real ... to people of the world," commented Bruce Gagnon, co-coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. ¹³

Back in Australia, some people "hit the panic button when President Clinton rang the Prime Minister," reported the *Irish Times* from Adelaide: A "national crisis" had been "sparked by this interplanetary ballistic bungle." Others hit the bottle: "A barkeeper in the tiny outback town of Tibooburra offered his customers free beer after officials announced the probe might land in a nearby swamp. A bookmaker in central

^{3.} Interview, Feb. 1997.

^{4.} Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Madness (New York: Norton, 1994), p. 81.

^{5.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{6.} Interview, Feb. 1997.

^{7. &}quot;Reentry of Russian Space Probe," Statement by The Press Secretary, White House, Nov. 17, 1996.

^{8.} Associated Press, "Crippled Mars Probe Crashes Harmlessly to Earth in South Pacific Waters," Nov. 18, 1996.
9. Cable News Network (CNN), Nov. 18, 1996.


^{10.} CNN, Nov. 17, 1996.

^{11.} Reuters, "Russians Try To Put Space Probe Back On Course," Nov. 17, 1996.

^{12.} Reuters, "Parts Of Space Probe Could Hit Earth---TV," Nov. 17, 1996.

^{13.} Interview, Nov. 1996. The Global Network (PO Box 90035, Gainesville, FL 32607, 352-468-3295) is leading the challenge to the Cassini launch in October and other planned space projects using nuclear power.

^{14.} Brian Donaghy, "Mars Probe Crash Puts Australia on Red Alert," *Irish Times*, Nov. 18, 1996, p. l.



Mars 96 had fallen in the Pacific just west of South America — between Easter Island and the coast of Chile. ¹⁸ Meanwhile, Russia's Rossiiskiye Vesti news announced the probe had "crashed to its doom in the Pacific Ocean west of Australia," [sic] ¹⁹ and then put the site in another patch of

Prime Minister Howard went before Australia's House of Representatives: "It does appear that what we all have is a happy ending to the saga of the Russian spacecraft." The Washington Post ran the headline: "Errant Russian Spacecraft Crashes Harmlessly After Scaring Australia." 23

Borderline Scandalous

They were all wrong. On November 29,

11 days later, the US Space Command completely revised its account yet again: It changed not only where but also when the probe fell not off South America but on Chile and Bolivia, and not on November 17 but the night before. "We now believe that the object that reentered on November 17, which we first thought to be the Mars 96 probe, was in fact the fourth stage of the booster rocket [rather than the probe itself and the batteries]. Confusion has surrounded key events and times in this mission, including the last stages of the rocket burn, the separation of the Mars 96 probe from the rocket, and the final reentry into the Earth's atmosphere of the booster and the probe. USSPACECOM has now completed an extensive postevent analysis that has led to this new conclusion which supports Russian statements about when their Mars 96 probe reentered the atmosphere. The area where any debris surviving this reentry could have fallen is lo-

cated along an approximately 50-mile-wide and 200-mile-long path, oriented southwest to northeast. This path is centered approximately 20 miles east of the Chilean city of Iquique and includes Chilean territory, the border area of Bolivia and the Pacific Ocean."²⁴

"The fact that the U.S. government initially missed the reentry of the Mars

If all goes well, Cassini
(artist's conception above),
will float down to Saturn's surface. If there is
an accident, as in the
case of Mars 96 or Delta
II (right), it could spread
seventy pounds of
plutonium on Earth.

Australia's Alice Springs said dozens of gamblers tried to place bets on where the Russian probe would crash."¹⁵


In fact, belying its motto "Masters of Space," the US Space Command (USSPACE-COM) — the arm of the US Air Force charged with space warfare and tracking manmade objects in space — had made the first of a series of blunders. Through November 17, the day after the Mars 96 space probe had already fallen

on South America, the Space Command remained focused down under.

The succession of errors caused "a government source" to tell *Space News*: "I think it's a real black eye for the U.S. Space Command and their space tracking capabilities." ¹⁶

In fact, on November 17, the Space Command made another not-so-masterly prediction: The probe would fall not on Australia, but to the east, in the Pacific. ¹⁷ It then updated this report with news that

15. Associated Press, op. cit., Nov. 18, 1996. 16. Leonard David, "Mars 96 Mishap Highlights Weak Coordination," Space News, Jan. 20-26, 1997, p. 18. 17. CNN, Nov. 17, 1996.



"The thing both agree on is that the Mars '96 probe landed in the water," heralded *USA Today*. "That means the radioactive batteries in its lander vehicles with their ... ounces of potentially lethal plutonium, lie at the bottom of the ocean."²¹

^{18.} Associated Press, "Russian Mars Probe Falls, Australians Were Ready To Duck, But It Hit Pacific," Nov. 18, 1996.

^{19. &}quot;Russian Space Probe Crashes Near Australia," Rossiiskiye Vesti, Nov. 19, 1996.

^{20.} Veronika Romanenkova, "Russia Says Probe's Debris Pose No Threat To Any State," *ITAR-TASS*, Nov. 19, 1996. 21. Paul Hoverstein, "U.S., Russia Differ By A Day On Crash Of Mars '96 Probe," *USA Today*, Nov. 19, 1996.

^{22.} Xinhua News Agency, "Australia Calls Russian Rocket Crash 'Happy Ending," Nov. 18, 1996.

^{23.} David Hoffman and Peter Baker, "Errant Russian Spacecraft Crashes Harmlessly After Scaring Australia," Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1996, p. A18.

^{24. &}quot;Update on Russian Space Probe," Directorate of Public Affairs, United States Space Command, Release No. 41-96, Nov. 29, 1996.

96 space probe is embarrassing and worse," commented Steven Aftergood, a senior research analyst for the Federation of American Scientists. "It calls into question the quality of our space tracking abilities. When you consider that this issue reached all the way up to the White House and had the president contacting the prime minister of Australia over a re-entry that already occurred, it's borderline scandalous."25

Racism and Spacism

But the problem went beyond simple technical incompetence. "You can clearly see the double standard," charged Houston aerospace engineer James Oberg, who specializes in following Russian space missions. "Australia got a phone call from the President, and [Chile] got a twoweek-old fax from somebody." Manuel Baquedano, director of the Institute for Ecological Policy in Chile, asked, "Are the lives of Australians worth more than the lives [of Chileans]?"26

Months later, the fate of the probe and the plutonium it carried remains unclear. The US, which gave a presidential-level pledge of "assets" to Australia to deal with any radioactive contamination when it looked like the probe was falling on Australia, was not providing any major assistance to Chile or Bolivia.²⁷ Dr. Luis Barrera, an astrophysicist and director of the Astronomy Institute at the Universidad Catolica del Norte, said that NASA officials had e-mailed him early on and congratulated him for gathering eyewitness accounts of the probe's disintegration. Then the agency's interest subsided. He suspects NASA doesn't want too much attention paid because bad publicity might impact on NASA's already controversial plan to launch a record 72.3 pounds of plutonium on its Cassini probe scheduled for October. 28 The Russian government has been "uncooperative," said Barrera, still not giving Chile a description of the canisters so that searchers would know what to look for if the batteries remained intact.

The US news media were similarly blasé about the implications for Latin America. The New York Times relegated the story to a five-paragraph Reuters dispatch under "World News Briefs" buried inside its December 14 edition.²⁹

As to why the US was not providing the "assets we have in the Department of Energy" that Clinton promised Australia, Space News reported in January that it was told by a "U.S. government source" that "specially-equipped Department of Energy aircraft capable of spotting from the air the nuclear material carried in the Russian spacecraft ... were not deployed as the aircraft cannot operate at the altitudes and terrain where Mars 96 may have hit Earth."30 According to Bendick at the NSC, "It's not the United States' responsibility to protect the world from this. ... We told Bolivia and Chile that we would provide technical assistance, but they haven't requested any. They asked for

The plutonium canisters will "never be found. And even if ... found, people could walk around with them in their pants pockets for the rest of their lives and never be bothered." --- Gordon Bendick, NSC

technical data and we provided [information on the radioactive combination of the air, the ground and the water, and we said it is negligible."31

There did not, however, seem to be any hard evidence for that optimistic assessment. In January, the Chilean government asked its ministries of Defense and Interior and the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission to conduct a study "to determine with absolute certainty [if there was] radioactive contamination."32 "The impacts on health are not clear," said Barrera, but there is concern because the water source for several cities is in the impacted region. Scientists from his university, Barrera explained, have gone to the approximate scene to test water for plutonium.

Also, Bolivian officials reported that a police unit had found debris of the Mars 96 space probe in Bolivia near the Chilean border, but that report was later called "unofficial" and is not supported by other reports.³³

Accidents Happen

While the Mars 96 accident was an embarrassment to the Russian space program and the US Space Command, as well as a potential nightmare for the region affected, it "is a gift to those who would challenge the Cassini mission and other nuclear-powered space missions," commented Aftergood. "It reminds us all that not only can accidents happen, but they do happen with disturbing regularity."34

Bringing that message home in a spectacular way was the January 17 explosion of a Delta II rocket lofting a \$40 million Air Force navigational sat-

> ellite. The 12-story, \$55 million rocket blew up 13 seconds after launch, turning the winter sky over the Cape Canaveral Air Station into a distinctly unpatriotic Fourth of July-style fireworks display. "Take cover im-

mediately from falling debris," announced an Air Force officer over the public address system at the launch site. "I say again, take cover immediately from falling debris." As the burning fragments descended over a wide area, a cloud of toxic chemicals formed above the site and began drifting out to sea, then back to land and then south along Florida's Atlantic Coast.35 It contained nitrogen tetroxide and monomethylhydrazine, components of the rocket's fuel - both described by NASA documents as "deadly if a person comes into contact" with them. Residents as far south as Vero Beach, 100 miles away, were told by the Cape Canaveral officials to stay inside, close all windows and doors, and turn off air conditioning and heating units. At the Cape Canaveral Elementary School, Brad Smith, a fourth- and fifth-grade teacher, described the cloud as having

^{25.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{26.} David L. Chandler, "U.S. Said To Fumble Space Debris Alert," Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 1996, p. 1.

^{27.} Interviews with Barrera, Jan. 1997; and Gordon Bendick, Feb. 1997.

^{28.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{29.} Reuters, "Russian Mars Craft Said To Have Fallen in Bolivia," New York Times, Dec. 14, 1996, p. 7.

^{30.} David, op. cit.

^{31.} Interview, Feb. 1997.

^{32.} Sergio Velásquez, "Por Eventual Caida de Sonda Rusa: Piden Investigar Posible Radiactividad en Norte", El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), Jan. 3, 1997, p. CO5; and Kristi Coale, "Chile Investigates Plutonium Threat," Wired News Stories, Jan. 3, 1997.

^{33.} Sergio Monivero Brunz, "Se Informo En Iquique: Sonda Rusa Cayo En Suelo Boliviano, "El Mercurio, Dec. 13, 1996, p. CO8; and interviews with Franklin Bustillos, press at taché, Bolivian Embassy, Washington, DC, Feb. 1997. 34. Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{35.} Todd Halvorson, "Delta 2 Rocket Explodes," Florida Today, Jan. 18, 1997.

"weird purples and blues and reds." He said he pushed wet paper towels under the door to his classroom to keep the rocket fumes away from his students.³⁶

The accident occurred just where a Titan IV rocket is scheduled in October to launch the Cassini probe that will be carrying 72.3 pounds of plutonium. The Delta II blowup further demonstrates that "space technology can fail and accidents can happen," said Bruce Gagnon of the the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space.37 Said Global Network co-coordinator Bill Sulzman, also director of the Colorado-based Citizens for Peace in Space: "They show that launch and flight failures are routine and that any claims that there is no real danger from Cassini is false. In fact, adding nuclear cargo to the situation is a setup for catastrophe."38

In the wake of the Mars 96 and Delta II accidents, and with Cassini and other US space projects involving nuclear material planned, the Florida-based organization is stepping up its fight against nuclear power in space. In March, it plans a series of gatherings in Europe to rally support and will hold a protest at Florida's Kennedy Space Station on October 4, two days before the proposed Cassini launch. A sit-in on the launch pad to physically prevent the Cassini launch is one of the actions planned, said Gagnon. Said Gagnon, who is also coordinator of the Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice, "We're talking about attempting to get onto the launch pad through whatever nonviolent means are necessary. We think it's important to try to stop this launch."39

Dispersing Danger

Whether or not Cassini explodes or is even launched, its use of radioactive material has already done damage. In July 1996, Los Alamos National Laboratory reported increased contamination of workers and equipment and cited work on Cassini's plutonium-fueled systems as the primary cause. 40 Plutonium, stresses Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group, is inherently dan-

36. Frank Oliveri, "Residents Take Shelter From Toxic Cloud," *Florida Today,* Jan. 18, 1997, p. 1; and interview with Gagnon, Jan. 1997.

gerous to work with and "increased work with plutonium will cause increases in worker exposure."41

If the Cassini mission goes forward, many more people could be impacted. The initial danger is that a blowup on launch could break open or melt the plutonium-carrying canisters and spread radioactivity. The second potential flashpoint is the "slingshot maneuver" planned for 1999. In this "flyby" scheme, 22 months after launch, NASA will swing Cassini back toward Earth in order to use the planet's gravitational force to gain enough velocity to propel the probe on to Saturn, its final destination. During that passover, Cassini is to fly just 312 miles above the Earth's surface. But if there is a miscalculation or malfunction and it comes in too close and undergoes what NASA calls an "inadvertent reentry," it could burn up upon hitting the 75-mile high atmosphere, spreading plutonium over a wide

NASA PR material gives the impression that even then, the plutonium would not be dispersed as cancer-causing vapor and respirable particles. But, in fact, the space agency's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission totally contradicts that, saying, if the Cassini probe dips into the Earth's atmosphere during the "flyby," a sizeable portion of the plutonium fuel would be released, including much of it as "vapor or respirable particles."

The NASA Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission also says that if there is such an "inadvertent reentry" during the planned Earth "flyby" of Cassini on August 16, 1999, and the probe breaks up dispersing plutonium, "approximately five billion of the estimated seven to eight

billion world population ... could receive 99 percent or more of the radiation exposure. $^{"43}$

Despite the danger signs with which Mars 96 and Delta II lit the sky, the Clinton administration is pushing ahead not only with Cassini, but with other nukes in space. In September, the administration announced a national space policy that included the development of nuclear-propelled rockets for military and civilian uses. The Defense Special Weapons Agency will work on "multiple nuclear propulsion concepts" for military missions, while NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center's Advanced Concepts Division, along with Los Alamos National Laboratory, will develop nuclear propulsion for civilian uses.44

Meanwhile, at the 14th Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion in Albuquerque in January, scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory recycled a plan to rocket high-level nuclear waste into space. ⁴⁵ The US government had proposed this same scheme decades ago, but rejected it out of fear that an accident on launch or a fall back to Earth would douse the planet with atomic waste.

Recent events, says Gagnon, "show that despite all the claims by NASA and others, technology can fail, that spacecraft can fall out of the sky and burn up on reentry. The Mars probe accident followed by the Delta II explosion gives us two clear examples of what can happen with Cassini. ... And Cassini, meanwhile, is one of many nuclear space missions to come — lethal undertakings which we must stop."

US acknowledgment that radiation may well have been released over Chile and Bolivia when the Mars probe nosedived back to Earth is tacit admission that safety systems are not foolproof.

Says John Pike, director of the Space Policy Project of the Federation of American Scientists: "If you liked Mars '96 you'll love Cassini." 47

^{37.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{38.} Interview, Feb. 1997.

^{39.} Interview, Jan. 1997; Todd Halverson, "Anti-Nuke Group Plans to Stop Titan Launch of Probe to Saturn," Florida Today, Nov. 20, 1996, p. 7.

^{40.} Keith Easthouse, "Radioactive Mishaps Rising at LANL," New Mexican, July 29, 1996, p. 1.

^{41.} Ibid.

^{42.} For example, a NASA PR flier about Cassini asserts that in an accident, because the plutonium "primarily fractures into large, non-respirable particles and chunks ... the potential health effects from accidents involving the release of this fuel [would be mitigated]." (NASA Fact Sheet, "Safety Design," Feb. 1996) NASA, on the other hand, calculates the percentage of debris that would be released and how much of that would be car cinogenic "vapor or respirable particles": "For all the reentry cases studied, about 32 to 34 percent of the fuel from the three RTGs is expected to be released at high altitude. ... [T]he expected initial particle size distribution of the fuel released during reentry was calculated as a function of the reentry angle. The fraction of the fuel particles released during reentry estimated to be reduced to vapor or respirable particles less than 10 mi crons ranges from 66 percent for very shallow reentries (8 degrees) to about 20 percent for steep (90 degree) reentries." (Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission, Solar System Exploration Division, Office of Space Science, NASA, June 1995, p. 4-51.)

^{43.} Ibid., p. 4-76.

^{44.} Anne Eisele, "Nuclear Research Initiated, NASA's Marshall, Pentagon Advance Propulsion Concepts," Space News, Oct. 14-20, 1996, p. 1.

^{45.} Hiroshi Takahashi and An Yu, "Use of Ion Thruster for Disposal of Type II Long Lived Fission Products into Outer Space," presentation at 14th Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion, co-sponsored by Defense Special Weapons Agency, NASA, and the Department of Energy, Jan. 28, 1997.

^{46.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{47.} Bryson, op. cit.

Pizarro's Toxic Trail

Peru's New Conquistadors

The path that shines for transnational corporations in Peru is lined with gold, both black and glittering yellow.

But most Peruvians, like this woman in the mining town of Morococha, are driven into deeper poverty.

by Pratap Chatterjee


said the rider, pointing to the horizon where the unnaturally straight-edge line of a distant gray plateau rose out of the grassy hills. The plateau is the work of man and machine at the largest gold mine in South America. It is waste left behind by heap-leaching: the process in which miners pour toxic cyanide over porous ore piled high on thin plastic sheets to extract the gold. Named Yanacocha (black lake), the mine is run by Newmont, a Denver, Colorado-based company, in a joint venture with the Peruvian company Buenaventura. Last year, Yanacocha produced 811,400 ounces of gold. The roughly \$87 million in production cost was less than half

1. Field trip with David Cueva, Dec. 1996.

that of most of the world's major gold mines. If all this gold had been sold in international markets at the 1996 average price of \$390 an ounce, the company would have made \$317 million, or a gross profit of \$230 million.²

The mine is changing the landscape not only of Cajamarca, but of the Peruvian economy. The vast amount of new capital spent to develop and open it in late 1993 contributed heavily to the country's dizzying 12.8 percent growth rate the following year. The surge was also fueled by President Alberto Fujimori's liberalization of the economy after he took dictatorial powers in his 1992 "self-coup" (see p. 23). In 1994,

2. PR Newswire, "Newmont Achieved Record Production Of 2.28 Million Ounces In 1996," Jan. 29, 1997.



AJAMARCA, Peru. Splashing across a stream high in the Andes of northern Peru, the horse bends to sip some water, but his rider — an old bearded man wrapped in a deep red poncho — tugs at the reins, jerking up the horse's head. As they forded the stream to reach the peak, some 4,000 meters above sea-level, the man took off his cream-colored cowboy hat and wiped his brow. They had ridden for four hours beginning at dawn when the dew was still frozen on the grass.

"The horse must not drink the water. It is poisoned by the waste over there,"

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surpassing even China and Malaysia, Peru became the fastest growing economy on the planet. Its image was transformed: In the 1980s Peru was seen as a bankrupt nation trying to default on its debts, riddled with drug smugglers, and plagued by guerrillas. Suddenly, it became a darling of the international investment community. Although the crisis surrounding the December 17 takeover of the Japanese ambassador's residence by Túpac Amaru rebels has temporarily tarnished that image, most experts expect the interruption to be brief.

Gold Doesn't Trickle Down

Some things, however have not changed, especially for the poor. Despite Peru's impressive showing in 1994 and a pretty strong performance in 1995, it ranked a dismal 91 on the 1996 United Nations Development Program Human Development Index, roughly halfway down the ladder of this highly regarded measure of social well-being. This standing was well behind Mexico (ranked 48), which suffered a financial collapse in 1995 that was just as spectacular as Peru's explosive growth the previous year, or Cuba (ranked 79) which endures an economy stunted by the US embargo.³

The simple explanation is that little of Peru's new money — from either the gold or the wave of privatizations — has trickled down to local communities. Not even in Cajamarca has the wealth stayed put. In 1995, by Newmont's own admission, it put a mere \$4 million into the local communities with the bulk spent on building roads to the mine site. None of the villages surrounding the mine — Combayo, Yanacancha Grande, or Negritos Altos — has running water or sewage facilities, let alone telephones or regular electricity.

Instead, the wealth from the mine has poured out of the country and back to the US, where Newmont declared a \$94 million profit for 1996.⁶ What money stayed in Peru flowed south into central government coffers and into Lima's wealthy suburbs, where shopping malls and US chain stores from Domino's Pizza and Kentucky Fried Chicken to Mailboxes Etc. and Dunkin'Donuts dot the landscape.

3. Human Development Report (New York: UN Development Programme, 1996), World Wide Web version: http://www.undp.org/news/hdr96.html.

It is this unequal distribution of the wealth and the environmental impact of these new ventures that are beginning to polarize Peruvians in a manner unprecedented since Pizarro. The Spanish conquistador arrived in the capital of this very province in 1532 to trick the King Atahualpa into an ambush that led to the collapse of the Incan empire. Ironically, one of Atahualpa's last acts was an attempt to buy off the Spanish with a room full of gold and two rooms of silver. The Spanish took him up on the offer but then murdered him and razed the city to the ground. Today, the ransom room is the only surviving monument to the Inca presence.

Last year alone, Yanacocha mined roughly one and a half times as much gold as the Incas turned over to Pizarro more than 460 years before. Like the Spanish before it, Yanacocha has considerable financial support from abroad. The money for the mining venture came from the International Finance Corp. (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, and from private banks including the Union Bank of Switzerland. Also like the Spanish before it, Newmont exported all the gold to Europe — half to Britain and half to Switzerland.

But unlike Pizarro, the new conquistadors have not needed cannons or cavalry to rout angry natives or secure their investment. Instead, the natives, powerless and often bound to the cash economy, have few options. As for Newmont's financial security, World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the US government-run Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC) have insured the mine for hundreds of millions of dollars against political risks such as nationalization. 11

Blood of the Dragon

Across the Andes of northern Peru, where mountains plunge down into the spectacular emerald-green rainforests of the Amazon Basin, another region is tasting the bitter fruits of foreign capi-

7. Peter Lourie, Sweat of the Sun, Tears of the Moon (New York: Atheneum, 1991), pp. 11-22.

tal. Deep in the core of this Marañon region, an Aguaruna youth draws his machete silently and swiftly across the white bark of a tree. At once, a thick frothy liquid the color of blood trickles down the blade.

"Put this on a cut and it will heal quickly," he says as he catches the sap in a plastic bottle. Called "sangre de grado" or "sangre de drago" (translated loosely as "blood of the dragon"), the sap is found throughout the Andean countries today. ¹² It is one of the possible "miracle" medicines that has drawn the covetous eye of drug companies such as Monsanto of St. Louis, Missouri.

Two years ago, Walter Lewis, a scientist from Washington University in St. Louis, was unceremoniously thrown out by the Aguaruna indigenous peoples when they discovered that he had a secret contract with Monsanto to ship potential medicines back to its US laboratories.¹³ But last November, Lewis was back in the country after signing a new contract with a different group of Aguaruna that allows Monsanto to exploit their knowledge of the medical values of the forests. 14 Typically, drug companies takes advantage of thousands of years of medicinal knowledge without adequately compensating those who discovered and tested the drug in the rainforest.

River of the Moon

If you flew south from the Marañon over the Amazon to the Urabamba Valley in the center of the country, it would be easy to miss a small clearing close to the village of Cashiriari ("river of the moon" in the Machiguengan language) and a cluster of white tents perched near the jungle's edge. But if you watched long enough, you would see that this small brown scar is one of the most visited spots in the region. From a landing pad in the main clearing, helicopters take off and land with a regularity unknown as recently as six months ago.

In the center of the clearing sits a small orange pump. This is the first of four wells that Shell, the Anglo-Dutch multinational based in London and The Hague, plans to open this year as part of its plan to develop one of the biggest natural gas fields on the conti-

^{4.} Described in documents published on Newmont World Wide Web site: http://www.newmont.com/annual/samerica.html.

^{5.} Based on field research, Dec. 1996.

^{6.} PR Newswire, op. cit.

Calculated from Newmont year-end production fig ures and statistics provided in Lourie, op. cit., p. 17.
 Interview with IFC press officer, Feb. 1997.

^{10.} Sally Bowen, "Latin America yields golden opportunities --- Newmont's project in Peru has exceeded all its expectations," Financial Times (London), Feb. 5, 1995, p. 3.

11. Overseas Private Investment Corp., 1996 Annual Report, also MIGA (World Bank) 1996 Annual Report; Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency 1994 Annual Report.

^{12.} Field trip, Jan. 1997.

^{13.} Telephone interview with Edward Hammond of Rural Advancement Fund International, Sept. 1995.

^{14.} Telephone interview with Walter Lewis, Feb. 1997.



A small sector of Peru benefits from foreign investment; most live in poverty.

nent. 15 Shell has already begun spending an estimated \$3 billion. This field is known as Camisea because of its proximity to the eponymous tributary of the Urabamba River which originates near Cuzco, the ancient Inca capital on the eastern flank of the Andes. These rivers flow through a region that hosts the highest recorded number of animal, bird, plant, and insect species in the world, and forms one of the vital headwaters of the Amazon Basin.¹⁶


Shell's new project, which is expected to eventually dump as much as \$6 billion into Peru's national treasury, has already sparked fears about the possible impact of the new visitors on the region's people and environment. If past projects on this scale are any guide, the Urabamba Valley can expect widespread pollution, deforestation, and cultural devastation. The scheme has already divided the indigenous Machiguenga people. Even more worrisome is the possible impact on the "uncontacted" Nahua and Kugapakori peoples who live a few hours away by boat. Just a decade ago, some Nahua died from the introduction of common diseases such as colds and whooping cough. These plagues were ugly reminders of the invasion of the Americas by conquistadors who wiped out millions, deliberately as well as inadvertently, with Old World diseases for which New World people had no immunity.17

violent clash where indigenous people fired arrows at an exploratory team. There are rumors that up to three workers have been killed in such battles reports firmly denied by Mobil.¹⁸

The company, which first refused to negotiate with either local or international advocacy groups, gave in and met with Conservation International, a US environmental group, after a British television crew arrived to document the matter. Today, it is paying that environmental group to monitor its work.¹⁹

Fecal Attraction

New conquistadors have been avidly adding branches to Pizarro's poisoned trail now half a millennium long. Cajamarca,



Still further south, in Peru's Amazon forests near the border with Bolivia, Mobil has built some 60 helicopter pads in the Madre de Dios jungle. After signing a contract with the government in May 1996, the Houston-based multinational began exploring in the remote jungle area for oil and natural gas.

FENAMAD, the organization that represents the indigenous peoples of this region, says that last year, exploration crews from Grant Geophysical, a company contracted by Mobil, frightened people by flying their helicopters low over an uncontacted group, the Mashco-Piro. Other incidents include a

17. Rainforest Action Network action alert, n. 126, Jan./Feb. 1997.

the Marañon, Cashiriari, and Madre de Dios are but a few of the places where foreign interests have grown rich exporting the country's resources. There are now 240 sites being explored for gold,²⁰ and some 20 foreign companies looking for oil and natural gas.21

In the 19th century, that trail widened into a well-traveled - albeit slimy - road. Two decades after José

18. Michael Streeter, "Oil search 'will kill' Amazonnatives," The Independent (London), Oct. 11, 1996, p. 3. 19. Interview with Conservation International official, Lima, Peru, Jan. 1997.

20. Lynn Monhan, Associated Press, "Gold Fever Strikes Again In Fabled Peruvian Hills,"Los Angeles Times, Aug. 28, 1996, p. B6.

21. Tiffany Woods, "Mobil set to drill in Peruvian jungle; Government must give final OK," Houston Chronicle, July 18, 1996.

^{15.} Country Commercial Guide, Peru, Country Commercial Guide (Washington, D.C.: Trade Promotion Co ordinating Committee, 1996-97). http://usiahq.usis. usemb.se/abtusia/posts/PE1/wwwhcmr.html.

^{16.} Environmental Impact Assessment, "Camisea Appraisal Drilling Campaign" (Lima, Peru: ERM Consultants, July 1996)

de San Martín led an army to liberate Peru from the Spanish in 1821, scientists in Britain discovered that guano (bird excrement) could fertilize the soils of Europe, exhausted by the intensive agriculture needed to feed the continent's rapidly growing population. Tons of guano, deposited by pelicans and seagulls after feeding on the rich fisheries in the coastal currents, had accumulated for centuries in an almost untouched state on Peru's rainless coastal desert and offshore islands.

In perhaps the first major foreign mining interest in Peru, Britain quickly began buying guano from the state and advancing loans - guaranteed by future sales — to Peru's small elite. "The uncommonly arrogant Lima oligarchy continued enriching itself and amassing symbols of its power in the palaces and Carrara (Italian marble) mausoleums which sprouted amid the sandy deserts," wrote Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano. The wealth of these guano deposits and the similar value of saltpeter (sodium nitrate) as fertilizer, however, attracted other foreign interests. In 1883, in the War of the Pacific, Chile seized what was once southern Peru and western Bolivia.²²

22. Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 154-56.

Workin' for the Yankee Dollar

Soon minerals far outweighed bird droppings in economic importance, but that trade made the earlier exports seem pristine by comparison. The mining, oil, and gas operations the 20th century conquistadors favor tend to be grotesquely polluting — especially without strict regulation — and foreign firms operating in Peru were constrained by nothing but the limits of their capital and the extent of their greed.

The US began investing seriously in Peru after World War I, and by the end of World War II had displaced Britain as the major investor. From 1924 to 1950, US investment rose from \$124 million to \$295 million. By 1967, the figure had reached \$605 million with more than half (\$340 million) in mining, and another \$38 million in oil. Over the same period, the amount of money that US companies were taking out of Peru was also steadily rising. Between 1950 and 1967, US firms repatriated \$628 million, \$23 million more than they had put into the country.²³

During that period, US mining interests expanded. On the other side of the Andes from the Madre de Dios is a mine operated by Southern Peru Copper Corp., controlled by US-based Asarco (Newmont was also a major share-

23. Victor Alba, *Peru* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 128-29.

holder in this mine until it recently sold its stake). Located in the southern coastal desert town of Ilo since 1960, Southern Peru's mines and smelter have contaminated the valleys of Tambo, Ensenada, and Mejia. Local crops such as alfalfa, maize, rice, sugar, and olives are fast disappearing because of the heavy air and water pollution. ²⁴ The Cerro Verde mine in Arequipa, set up around the same time with help from a subsidiary of US-based Anaconda Mining, has caused similar environmental problems. ²⁵

During this period, Mobil and Shell got involved, but despite major discoveries - Mobil of the Aguatia gas reserve in 1962 and Shell of the Camisea field in the mid-1980s²⁶ — neither corporation found it economical to begin immediate exploitation because of low prices and lack of government cooperation. Through the 1980s, they and other foreign investors were also deterred by the power of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla insurgency, which controlled substantial areas of the country. All this was changed by two events at the beginning of this decade. The first was the election of Fujimori, who promptly threw the country open to foreign investment; the second was the decimation of the Shining Path after the September 1992 capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán.

Within four years of Fujimori taking power, some \$6 billion in new money poured into Peru. A full third came from Telefonica, the Spanish government telephone company, which paid \$2 billion to buy the recently privatized Peruvian telephone company. Then Cyprus Amax, a US company, purchased the Cerro Verde mine, while China's Shougang Corp. paid for the previously stateowned Hierro Peru iron ore mine.27 Japan, seeking a base in Latin America, increased its investments and poured aid into the country. It also sparked public resentment that the country's other insurgency, the Túpac Amaru, or MRTA, tapped with its December seizure of hostages (see pp. 23-25).

Today, as in the time of Pizarro and the days of the British guano trade,

Not Quite the Real Thing

Even though the company prefers not to admit any association with the dread cocaine-yielding coca leaf, Coca-Cola's distinctive flavor comes in part from the infamous plant. The company does not import the leaf directly, but buys it through a Maywood, New Jersey factory owned by Stepan, the only importer authorized to traffic legally in the substance.

The Illinois-based company is just as shy about the trade as Coca-Cola, but its spokespeople do not deny that the ultra-secret "Building 2" in Maywood synthesizes active cocaine for medical purposes and then ships the inert remains to Atlanta to make "Coke." Stepan imports an estimated 385,000 pounds of the leaves.¹

Another of the household names that has long exploited Peru's resources is Nestlé. Back in the heart of the mountains of Cajamarca, it is Nestlé that holds sway over the lives of local people. The company buys milk produced by the Dutch and Swiss cows that the local people graze on "icchu." This high mountain grass is the only source of income for the people of Combayo, Negrito Altos, and Yanacancha Grande, but not a very good one. Gil Paisic, the mayor of Yanacancha Grande, estimates that the average family in his village makes two dollars a day from milk sales.²

^{24.} Dr. Fortunato, "Contamination of the Environment and Violation of Human Rights" (Arequipa, Peru: Legal Commission of the Integration Peoples Tawantinsuy ana, July 1992).

^{25.} Galeano, op. cit., p. 111.

^{26.} Mobil Press Release, "Facts About Mobil in Peru," Lima, Peru, July 19, 1996; and ERM Consultants, op. cit. 27. "Peru Is Poised," *The Mining Journal*, May 27, 1994, p. 391.

^{1.} Michael Miller, "Things go better with coca extract," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 22, 1994.

^{2.} Interview, Dec. 1996.



FRAN ANTMANN

With few opportunities, rural people hire themselves out as beasts of burden.

These cargadores carry great burdens over long distances for pennies.

mineral exports are still the main legal source of wealth in this country. (The multibillion dollar cocaine trade is the main illegal source of foreign currency.) In 1993, mineral exports (including oil) were worth \$3.45 billion or 48 percent of total export revenues. By 1995, the share of mineral exports in foreign income had risen to 51.3 percent. At the same time, 1995 imports rose to \$7.7 billion, creating a \$2.1 billion deficit, twice that of the previous year. With almost everything already sold off, privatization revenues have dropped to \$638 million, a third of the 1994 figure. By the source of the sour

Land for a Pittance

The two rising stars in the economic firmament of mineral extraction are Newmont and Shell. As the first major developer under Fujimori, Newmont paved the way for the hundreds of international corporations which have rushed in to take advantage of the corporate-friendly neoliberal reforms. Shell now leads the pack as the biggest

28. *Ibid.*29. Country Commercial Guide, op. cit.

of the new conquistadors. Neither company has enriched local communities; instead they have paid a pittance in compensation to farmers and funded token community programs.

As Newmont stepped up operations in Yanacocha, it started scooping up land. In November 1992, the mining giant bought up Nicholas Cruzado's 332 hectares. While raking in a \$630,000 daily profit, it paid him 109 soles (\$42) a hectare. Some farmers have managed to squeeze out a little more. Last August, Frederico Carrasco, a villager from Negritos Altos, got \$540 a hectare for a 42-hectare plot. The problem is that his new wealth will soon evaporate if Carrasco can't reinvest it into farming — the only way of life he knows. But the real value of land in his village has skyrocketed to more than \$2,000 a hectare on the open market. Cruzado fared little better. He traded the money he got for a small 12-hectare plot. Today, to support a family of 13 and survive, he has had to sell off some 250 cows and pigs; his son Mario works on nearby farms for \$1.40 a day.

"There is very little I can do," says Jorge Malca, a lawyer who works for the Catholic Church to help represent local people. "Yanacocha has bought legal title to the land. The farmers should have come to me before they sold their property." So far, only seven of the 50 plus farmers who have sold their land have asked for legal help to sue the company. Others seem to have little hope and less luck. David Cueva, a farmer in neighboring Yanacancha Grande, says that the company simply took 26 hectares of his 211-hectare property without paying. Despite living on top of a potential fortune in gold that is being extracted by foreign banks and mining companies, he is too poor even to buy cows.³⁰

Poisoned Waters

Profiteering on land is only one of the complaints farmers have leveled against Newmont. Dozens of communities scattered across the districts of Cajamarca, La Encanada, and Yanacancha fear that cyanide and other

30. Above information from interviews, Dec. 1996.

chemicals used in massive quantities to extract gold from ore have contaminated their water. Just three years ago, says Yanacancha Mayor Gil Paisic, villagers were catching thousands of trout in rivers that are now lifeless. "When the rains come the water runs off the tailings into the rivers making them turbid. If the horses and cows drink ... they get stomach problems and sometimes die," he says.

Hiriberto Ventura, a leader of Rondas Campesinos (Farmer Patrol) in Negritos Altos, says that company operations have had even more disastrous consequences. Last August, he charges, Rosa Castrejón and four others died after drinking water from discarded plastic containers apparently used by the company to store cyanide.

Adding insult to injury, local mayors charge that Newmont employs almost no local residents. What few jobs it doles out pay \$5.60 a day. Four mayors wrote to the company repeatedly asking for a meeting to discuss problems — without results.³¹

While unresponsive to locals, Nicholas Cotts, manager of environmental affairs for Minera Yanacocha, replied to questions for CAQ. The company recognizes "fair value prices" for all land transactions, he contended. "Approximately 95 percent of the land purchases conducted by Minera have been conducted under full knowledge and in direct negotiation with the land owner. In other cases, expropriation was used at the request of, and in complete cooperation with, the landowner." Nor is there a problem with pollution, he wrote. Yanacocha regularly monitors approximately 120 water sources and maintains a herd of 60 sheep and alpaca at the site which have never displayed any signs of heavy metal contamination. A 1994 investigation conducted by Newmont into deaths of local cattle showed that the animals had died of "liver fluke and related indigenous diseases." The company also maintains an "open door policy" for "any and all" requests from local people and interested groups to visit the site. In addition, Yanacocha says that it spent \$3 million in 1995 to help the local community by building roads, schools, and providing free hot lunches to local children. 32

Some remain skeptical. Ephrain Castillo, a Catholic priest who has been helping the local villagers with agricultural services, food, and legal help, doubts that the company will create a sustainable future for the local people. "People here are very poor. The mine promises to change things but the problem is that one naturally excludes the other," he says. 33



The capture of Incan King Túpac Amaru, seized in 1572, 40 years after his uncle Atahualpa was overthrown by Pizarro.

Green Spin Cycle

Nor is the situation much different for the Machiguenga peoples who had hunted and fished around the Urabamba river for 5,000 years before Shell arrived to drill for gas. Like Newmont, Shell promises to take great pains designing a model of environmental management and local participation. But on closer inspection, the company appears to be creating problems for the people in this village and surrounding communities without offering much by way of compensation or security against pollution.

Shell estimates that Camisea contains 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 600 million barrels of natural gas liquids, enough fuel to meet a century of energy needs for the capital city of Lima, some 500 kilometers to the

east.³⁴ With a fortune at stake, Shell is vigorously promoting itself as a good corporate neighbor and recently signed an agreement with locals for the use of two hectares of land (Shell admits that it has used more than agreed initially). The contract does not guarantee any compensation in case of accident, contamination of the local rivers, or destruction of the forests. Many locals have not been won over; they remember an oil drilling project Shell launched a decade ago. Then, according to human rights activists and environmentalists, the project divided local leadership, disrupted the economy and undermined the culture. They also charged that Shell contract workers abused local women³⁵ and brought diseases that killed a major part of another indigenous community of Nahua peoples who have lived in isolation for centuries.36

Today, to avoid such mistakes, Shell has hired a leading expert on the local communities, Peruvian anthropologist Alonso Zarzar. He has drawn up detailed guidelines for Shell and conducted workshops for the company's 360 local and expatriate contract workers to ensure that they do not violate local customs or bring in disruptive practices. Shell is trying to vaccinate all its workers and visitors to deter the importation of new diseases. It has also drawn up extensive plans to protect surrounding forests and, instead of building roads, is bringing in all supplies by air or boat. Staff who hunt or fish or simply wander outside the drilling area are to be fired immediately.³⁷

But Peruvian activists say that Shell has overlooked its impact on local peoples who have no idea what is happening at the drilling site or what the future operations might involve. Doris Balvin, an environmental lawyer from Ilo who spent the last decade tracking the impact of Asarco, is not convinced by the efforts. "If Shell really wanted to work with the communities," she noted, "why have they not provided them with enough information? The agreement was signed in a hurry and the local people had no chance to consult a lawyer." As for the compensation, she called it nothing more than a Christmas present.

^{31.} Above information from interviews, Dec. 1996. Paisic says that not one of the 1,800 people in Yana cancha Grande has been able to get a job with the company. Francisco Llanos, the mayor of Combayo, says that a mere 10 people in his village of 4,936 have jobs with Yanacocha.

^{32.} Fax from Cotts, Jan. 1997.

^{33.} Interview, Dec. 1996.

^{34.} Shell Prospecting and Development, "The Camisea Project, Peru," (Lima), 1996.

^{35.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{36.} Rainforest Action Network, op. cit.

^{37.} Shell Prospecting and Development, "Community Relations Guidelines for Shell and Contract Workers" (Lima), Nov. 1996.

Zarzar defends the company's behavior and his role. "It's my job to ensure that Shell provides appropriate benefits to the community," the anthropologist adds. "We have made sure that all the compensation will help the community as a whole and to make sure that we develop social capital for the long term." And while acknowledging that the community has a right to a lawyer, he says it is up to their representatives to get such help. "I have even attended the regional meetings of the Machiguenga organizations to tell them about our plans months before this agreement was signed," he points out.

Meanwhile, Shell's activities have exacerbated existing divisions among the Machiguenga. Factions have hardened and the "indigenous council" Shell created to unite locals behind the project quickly fell apart. "We wanted to work with the communities in devising a mediation system to settle any complaints, but so far, we have not succeeded," admits Murray Jones, the environmental chief for Shell's operations in Peru, who says he is willing to consider any alternatives.³⁸

Back to the Future

If copper, gold, and oil continue to make up half of Peru's revenues, the nation's future looks as bleak as that of Inca leader Atahualpa. When the resources are exhausted, the companies will move on and the communities will be left with little money and much environmental and cultural devastation.

Throughout the Americas and the rest of the world, similar resource extraction operations have devastated agriculture and health and left a legacy of disaster. Two years ago in Guyana, a massive cyanide spill from what was once the largest gold mine on the conti-

38. Above information from interviews, Jan. 1997.

nent, destroyed the local river system. Like Yanacocha, the mine had political risk insurance from the World Bank. It covered the companies' financial losses but failed to compensate the people affected for the health, financial, and social consequences, some of which will endure for generations.³⁹

Newmont's US operations have paralleled those in Guyana. In 1990, its right to mine uranium on land near Spokane, Washington, was withdrawn after it ignored repeated government demands to clean up 15.5 billion liters of acidic water in pits that threatened to leak into the Columbia River.⁴⁰

And last year, Bopp van Dessel, Shell's former environment chief in Nigeria, exposed as an abject sham his employers' well-promoted corporate concern for the environment. He revealed that Shell executives had ignored his repeated warnings that operations in Ogoni territory were violating international standards and causing widespread pollution. Some 82 communities that make up Ogoniland have been affected. The pollution, including at least 111 oil spills between 1985 and 1993, has destroyed farmland and forced landowners to grow food in tiny plots. For its part, Shell claims that 77 of the Ogoni spills resulted from sabotage and says that rapid population growth has shrunk the people's farmland.41

But for the flora, fauna, and peoples of Peru, it may not be too late. Although Newmont is well into commercial development, Shell, together with many of the other new companies in the country, have yet to begin full-scale exploita-

tion of resources they hope to extract, and may withdraw yet if there is sufficient public pressure. There is a precedent for this — just five years ago, environmentalists were able to kill a plan by Houston-based Texas Crude to drill in a nature preserve considered one of the last refuges of the nearly extinct Amazon manatee. Conservationists took the company to court here over the environmental impact and won. 42

The environmentalists may just have been lucky so far. Stories of the exploitation of the natural resources of Peru—be they gold or guano—have never ended happily. Certainly not in Cajamarca where the conquistadors, as well as the small miners who have followed their footsteps for the last four centuries, have always left destruction behind.

Atahualpa and the Inca army are good examples. In 1533 the Spanish massacred most of the unarmed Inca soldiers, converted their suspicious king to Christianity, found him guilty of having too many wives and then proceeded to kill him. Today most of Peru's indigenous peoples are being fleeced of their land while some have skeptically accepted the new religion of the market. But if they are found guilty of having too many resources, they may soon discover an environmental knife at their throats.

42. Woods, op. cit.

CORRECTION OF EDITING ERROR: Nathaniel S. Lehrman's letter, "Whose AIDS Conspiracy?" in the Winter 1996-97 issue should have read: "[David Gilbert's] support of official AIDS doctrine, while ignoring fundamental still-unanswered questions about it, leads to his endorsing "safe sex" and the administration of dangerously toxic, but accepted, drugs to clinically healthy HIV seropositive people."

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^{39.} See Nazim Baksh, "The Guyana Gold Mining Disaster: Poison in the Lifeline," CAQ, n. 56, Spring 1996.
40. Thea Schwartz, "Newmont Mining Corporation; Mining Report Card," Mineral Policy Center (Washington, D.C., Sept. 1991).

^{41.} World in Action, ITV (London), May 13, 1996.

In the Jungle with Peru's Túpac Amaru UE by Jeremy Bigwood

Istopped short as dozens of biting ants showered down from a branch high in the jungle canopy. When I tried to brush off the centimeter-long bugs sticking straight out like pins from my uncovered skin, my guide stopped me. "Pull them off one-by-one," he said. I had traveled to this remote upper-Amazonian jungle in Peru's San Martín department to photograph the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), the smaller of the two insurgencies fighting against the Peruvian government. A few weeks before, in early August 1992 in Lima, Néstor Cerpa Cartolini, the group's top comandante, had approved the trip. He warned me to be prepared for longer treks and rougher conditions than I had ever experienced as a photojournalist covering the Central American wars. He was right.

"Welcome to MRTA territory, cumpa (slang for compañero)," someone called, as I huffed past two unseen Túpac guards. Ahead were three men and two women with AKMS rifles slung over their shoulders. They were clothed in olive-drab long-sleeved T-shirts, blue jeans, knee-high rubber boots, and topped with handmade peaked caps. Beyond them lay the heart of the three-acre guerrilla camp. Chairs and tables made from tree limbs painstakingly lashed together with vines dotted the weedy ground; clusters of hand-sewn cloth hammocks covered by vinyl raincover-roofs hung like giant black carapaces from branches. Slowly moving rays of light filtered down through the dense cover of trees and cast crisscrosses of sunshine. This canopy and the ambient heat shielded the camp from even the most sophisticated satellite surveillance. There was no clearing nearby for landing helicopterborne troops, and any army bent on attack could only reach the camp after a daylong march from the nearest road.

One of the cumpas passed me a water bottle. As I drained it, a man wearing glasses approached. Speaking slowly and thoughtfully in the style of a Lima intellectual, he introduced himself as "Edgardo." He looked about 30, although I later found out that he was a decade older and that his real name was Miguel Rincón Rincón. No. 2 man in the MRTA, he was commander of this zone. Edgardo motioned for me to sit at a table, sizing me up — an overweight, out-of-breath gringo in a sweat-drenched shirt. Then he turned away to tell Pamela, one of the young cumpas, it was time for formation.

At least 50 fighters, mainly campesinos (peasants) with indigenous features lined up facing Edgardo who was flanked by a female comandante and three male subcomandantes. The Túpacs saluted as their flag was raised; it was the triplestriped red and white Peruvian flag emblazoned with a mace and assault rifle forming a "V" around the image of the 19th century revolutionary hero, Túpac Amaru. The cumpas sang mostly out-of-tune — the dirge-like Túpac hymn. "Count off!" ordered the subcomandante. The troops, most ranging from teenage to late 20s, yelled out their numbers one by one. "At ease," replied the subcomandante and read off a list of kitchen and guard duty. Then Edgardo spoke, "We are here in this new camp to start a school. There will be many more of us coming in, both combatants and civilian supporters. We have to make the camp larger and more secure. I will be teaching the following courses on Monday after formation: 'History of the World' and History of Peru'; Comandante Liliana will teach 'Human

Jeremy Bigwood is a photojournalist who spent a decade in Latin America documenting the political and military events. He was in Peru from summer 1992 to early 1993 and made three trips with the MRTA. Photo: Jeremy Bigwood, guerrillas practice silent assault.

Rights and the Geneva Convention,' and 'History of the MRTA.' Medical training, special forces training, and marksmanship will be taught in another camp. T'ai Chi will be before breakfast at the headquarters." Then the subcomandante dismissed the troops.

The Commanders

The comandancia, which housed the leadership and the camp's radio communications, was on a small hill. There, Edgardo, Liliana, and subcomandante Perseo invited me to join them for coffee around a small fire. As Edgardo offered sweets, he told me about himself. In his youth he had been a member of the Peruvian Communist Party, which had splintered during the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s. He had maintained his ties to the pro-Moscow faction, and through the party was educated in many countries, including in the Soviet Union at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University. The intellectual of the group, he had joined MRTA at its inception in 1984.


Comandante "Liliana" (María Lucero Cumpa), on the other hand, was more in the romantic tradition of Che Guevara, with tempering by feminist and almost "New Age" influences. She spent her free time writing poetry and arranging campfire sing-alongs. As soon as she arrived in camp, she organized meetings of the women, who comprised about a quarter of the camp. The first discussion dealt with birth control and sexually transmitted diseases, but also served as a forum for complaints about treatment by male cumpas.

Every day over the next week, MRTA cumpas and civilian supporters arrived until the camp grew to more than 100 people.

Like Victor Polay, the MRTA's top comandante in prison, Liliana was raised in a family with close ties to the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party, which brought Alan García to the presidency in 1985. Self-described as social-democratic and nationalist, APRA proved to be neither, and in fact oversaw a complete pummeling of Peru's economy and the zealous repression of political opposition. At a very early age, Liliana recognized the sellout, and after a brief time with Bandera Roja, another leftist party, she became a founding member of the MRTA.

Perseo, a handsome man in his 30s, considered himself a *Bolivarista*, and like Simón Bolívar, had fought imperialism all over Latin America. He traced his radicalization to the 1973 CIA-orchestrated overthrow of Salvador Allende's democratically elected government in Chile. Five years later, he went to Nicaragua to oppose US-backed dictator Anastasio Somoza and fought with the Sandinistas until their 1979 victory. From there, he went to Colombia, where he took up arms with the Batallón America as an *internacionalista* until he joined the MRTA.

Every day over the next week, MRTA cumpas and civilian supporters arrived until the camp grew to more than 100 people. The largest and most lengthy concentration of guerrillas in a "permanent" camp I had ever seen, it required a Ho Chi



Minh-type supply trail. After the camp became too big to supply safely, another one was established five hours away.

When the courses started, I bounced from one to another, usually waking too late for Edgardo's 5:00 a.m. T'ai Chi class. Liliana's "Human Rights and the Geneva Convention" course was always full. One of the sessions I attended was on interrogation and torture survival. Many of the 20 or so participants, including Liliana herself, had been tortured — most for belonging to the MRTA or to leftist labor unions such as Patria Libre and the Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP). Peruvian government interrogators are well trained and routinely use tortures ranging from the psychological (threats, but not actions), to painful, mutilating, and even fatal ordeals. The survival strategy Liliana taught was to hold out without revealing anything for at least a day, and at the breaking point, to substitute plausible pre-synthesized fiction to mislead the captors. This approach is supposed to give time for cumpas on the outside to make necessary security adjustments, and for the victim to gain a psychological victory over the tormentors.

Another of Liliana's courses was on the history of the movement, an organization that had a reputation for spectacular victories and equally spectacular defeats. It was founded in 1984 by Sorbonne-educated Victor Polay, who had previously been a member of two other Peruvian insurgent groups. In 1987, one year after the MRTA took up arms against the Peruvian government, the movement suffered its most serious blow when the army ambushed by helicopter and ground troops, killing more than 60 combatants as they rode in open trucks to attack the central town of Tarma. The army executed everyone who surrendered, and only 10 cumpas sur-

Cumpas relax between training and classes.

vived by fleeing what became known as the "Los Molinos" massacre. News of this tragedy stunted the movement's growth until 1990, when the MRTA staged a dramatic prison break and caught the world's attention. From a rented house outside Canto Grande, Peru's maximum security prison, 25 MRTA sappers spent three years planning and digging a 330-meter tunnel that bored directly into the cell blocks. They freed 47 MRTA prisoners, including Polay, the organization's leader, and Liliana.

Guerrilla Financing

Despite the sparse conditions within the camp, the cumpas were adequately fed and armed. Like the Peruvian Army, the MRTA fought with Soviet-made arms, the folding metalstocked AKMS assault rifles being the most common. Support weapons included the Dragunov SVD sniper rifle, the PKM machine gun, and the RPG-7 grenade launcher. They used cheap but effective radio communications equipment, as well as computerized codes for inter-front communications. All these require cash, but Túpac Amaru comandantes told me that, unlike most guerrilla movements in the Americas, they received no foreign funding, and there is no evidence to the contrary. In Lima and elsewhere, the organization raises money by kidnapping business executives and holding them for high ransoms in "peoples' jails," which have been criticized for their cramped and inhumane conditions. It also levies "war taxes" on businesses, which not surprisingly view the payments as extortion. In the jungle and hills flanking the eastern side of

the Andes, they also "tax" cocaine and coffee industries as well as any other profitable enterprise within their reach. In the process, the guerrillas have also tried to enforce fair wages for workers, settle disputes, and become a kind of shadow government in the area.

This strategy is in line with the Túpac Amaru's basic political goals and principles. As Edgardo explained at the guerrilla university in the jungle, the MRTA was fighting against a system that had gone from semi-feudal to an exploitative class system dependent on foreign capital and control. Added to this is a racial and class system dominated by people of European, and now Asian, origin. Edgardo's MRTA literature quoted Andrés, a comandante from another zone who defined the group's ideology:

We try to put Peruvian reality ahead of any pre-defined political ideology. ... We're proposing the building of a socialism appropriate to conditions in Peru. We don't want state centrism or the bureaucratization of Peruvian society. We should have a democratic, very participatory society; not an electoral democracy every five years, but a democracy where men and women get involved with their workplace, their community, their neighborhood and decide their own destiny. We want a participatory democracy with the people as the actors. ¹

Nice words, but how does one get there? The strategy is best summarized by Comandante Polay himself:

The goal of the MRTA is to replace the socalled representative democracy with the power of the people. Our organization has three levels: the revolutionary forces, which consist of full-time soldiers; when needed these forces are backed up by part-time militias; then there is the base, in the villages, where there are selfdefense committees whose duties extend well beyond military matters into social, political, and legal fields as well. We don't establish "liberated zones" in the classic sense of the term, rather we support, with military means, the creation of organized bases of popular power. When the guerrilla is successful, the people $\,$ gain confidence in their own strength.2

But Polay was again in prison, as was the movement's second-in-command, Peter Cárdenas. While the MRTA was planning to free them, it was also having to be

ning to free them, it was also having to keep its areas of operation functioning and attract new members at the same time. And expansion was essential. Historically, volunteers came in after military successes, when the organization looked most viable.

From the perspective of the comandantes in the camp, the dilemma was how to organize zones of control in the country-side out of reach of the news media, and at the same time capture popular attention. Too much emphasis on attention-getting raids meant sacrificing combatants through the inevitable mistakes this strategy causes, reducing the size of

the movement. Too much time organizing the civilian population for a "prolonged popular war" in zones far away from Lima meant that the movement could go unnoticed for years by the most important population, the Limeños. I wanted to see how the Túpacs behaved with the general population, how much support they had, and if the "prolonged popular war" concept made sense.

Stopping Traffic

My first trip out of the camp was to photograph an armed propaganda action, a *Toma de Carretera*, or roadblock. A group of cumpas, joined by young militia members (part-time guerrillas called into action as needed), stopped traffic on a main road, handed out leaflets, and painted the stopped cars and trucks with MRTA slogans (using paint that could later be removed with gasoline). One driver joked: "Cumpa, get your spelling right. The last time you painted my car, you misspelled 'Vencerá'!" Three cumpas, standing on the top of a pickup cab gathered the crowd around and gave a speech extolling the MRTA, the memory of Che Guevara, and the need for resistance against both the Fujimori regime and Shining Path, which was organizing a nearby zone. The travelers responded by cheering, perhaps knowing that after the speech they could go. Then it was over. One traveler complained that



A driver jokes: "Cumpa, get your spelling right. The last time you painted my car, you misspelled 'Vencerá!"

the *toma* was a hassle. "Everyone in this region has a shortwave radio," she said, "and the cumpas have transmitters, so why don't they just broadcast this information, instead of endangering us." She added that such actions needlessly expose the MRTA to spies and "guarantee greater persecution of the civilian population by the authorities." The cumpas let the cars continue after distributing propaganda. In the past, the army had responded to such provocations by sending out a convoy which the guerrillas then ambushed, but not today. It was wise to the game. I returned to camp content that the *toma* had been successful and that nobody had been hurt, but I wondered how useful such displays were.

Comandante Andrés, interviewed in Mexico by Barricada Internacional Jan. 19, 1991.
 Comandante Victor Polay, interviewed in Canto Grande Prison by Nina Boschmann Taz (Germany), May 6, 1990.

While tedious to me, camp life for the average combatant was a vacation from the daily hardships of guerrilla life in a combat zone, and the morale in the camp was high. I made four other trips out of the camp, two to a nearby camp containing about 80 combatants who were studying combat medicine and sharpshooting, and two sorties into the civilian population of the region. On these, the better food helped compensate for the danger and rigor of long marches. On one trip, accompanying a group of 12 combatants, we spent about half the time in makeshift camps, and the rest of the trip as

guests of the civilian population - staying in their houses. This hospitality was a great risk for these families, who in many cases had relatives in the movement, and showed the level of support. However, two months later, I learned that the Army and security forces had targeted such supporters, killing three family members in a hamlet where I had stayed because their son was a member of MRTA special forces. Subcomandante Rolando, the leader of that expedition, was later captured alive but wounded by plainclothed security forces members lying in wait for him. He was tortured to death in front of villagers and his girlfriend whom he had gone to visit. The soldiers took her away and she was never heard from again, nor was the disappearance recorded by human rights groups.

The last day in camp it started to rain at about noon, and continued all night. Streams rose and became savage rivers, rerouting themselves, digging out and dropping huge trees. In the morning, I wrapped my cameras in plastic bags and tied them securely into my backpack. I stripped down to T-shirt and swimming shorts, which were now loose after dropping 50 pounds during a two-month stay. Because of the rains, river crossings were treacherous, hard ground had become swamp, and I often had to walk barefoot carrying my pack over my head through neckdeep water. That evening, after shaving and dressing in clean, touristy clothes, a prearranged vehicle drove me and my guide back to Yurimaguas, the military-occupied town on the river Huallaga, where I took a plane to Lima.

In the capital, I met up again with Cerpa, a stocky man with Andean features. Unlike many of the Latin American leftist guerrilla leaders who came from the middle class, Cerpa was from working-class origins. A union leader for years before joining the movement, he had little time for ideological discussions or dogmatic diatribes. While Edgardo was the intellectual, Liliana the romantic, Cerpa was the pragmatist. He asked about the courses, and what I thought of the school. Then he surprised me by saying: "Two months of

school? We are supposed to be a guerrilla army, not a summer camp. We've got Polay and hundreds of our members and supporters in prison, and we have to respond." He asked me what I hadn't photographed, and I replied "combat." "Well, we'll have you come out at a later date for that." Then he told me to keep my eye on the news from San Martín. Only three weeks later did I learn that a Túpac commando had successfully interrupted a large drug deal between army officers and Colombian drug dealers. Army units had taken up positions on the main road to secure it for use as an airstrip. After the

Colombian planes landed, MRTA commandos moved in and "expropriated" goods and money. In response, the military mounted its largest counterinsurgency campaign against the MRTA, found the camp, destroyed it, and after accusing civilians living nearby of being supporters of the insurgency, executed them. The cumpas, who suffered no casualties, soon set up a series of other smaller camps throughout the area.

On the last of two more trips to photograph the Túpacs, I was arrested by the secret police for "apology for terrorism," a law imposed by Fujimori prohibiting press coverage of outlawed movements. After seven grueling days of interrogation, I was released because of pressure brought on Fujimori by the international press.

Over its 12-year history, the



Another Day

MRTA has suffered major losses as it focused on the militarily spectacular but neglected popular organization and the establishment of strong zones of control. While maintaining a limited presence, the movement lost important areas, includ-

limited presence, the movement lost important areas, including much of the region where the guerrilla university was located. However, there remains one large zone where the MRTA has a patchwork of control: the mountains and jungles of "El Centro" in the departments of Junín, Huancavelica, and Pasco.

As for the cumpas, they too have suffered blows. Comandante Liliana was arrested with a group of Túpac at a safe house outside of Tarapoto. Edgardo was arrested with several other cumpas after a firefight in another safe house in Lima in a failed attempt to occupy the Peruvian congress. Many of the combatants who had attended guerrilla school were killed, arrested, or just gave up the struggle. But Cerpa and other cumpas survived to carry out the MRTA's most spectacular action, the December 17 seizure of almost 600 hostages in the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima. No matter what the outcome, the action was successful in bringing international attention to Peru's human rights record, its faceless courts, and inhumane prisons as well as to harsh economic conditions exacerbated by Fujimori's neoliberal policies.



Peru's Japanese Connections

When the Túpac Amaru struck the Japanese ambassador's residence, they were targeting a potent symbol of Japan's growing corporate clout.

by Nikolas Kozloff

ast year while speaking at a roundtable of business leaders from the Pacific region, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori remarked, "As a Latin American leader and the son of Japanese immigrants, I am inescapably a symbolic bridge between cultures. I do not treat this responsibility lightly, it is part of the whole fabric of my life."

Indeed, since taking office in 1990, Fujimori, whose parents came to Peru in 1930 and who is nicknamed "El Chino,"2 has staked his reputation on increasing his impoverished country's economic ties to Japan. Over the last six years, he has made six trips to Japan, and Peru has hosted state visits by prominent Japanese diplomats. From the very beginning, says Henry Dietz, associate director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas, the relationship was conditioned on economic "reform." In 1990, comments Dietz, "Fujimori went to Tokyo, and it was made clear that if he wanted economic assistance, he'd have to put his house in order."3

That meant Peru would have to embrace neoliberalism with its trade liberalization, tariff reductions, and privatization of state-run industry. What the Japa-

Nikolas Kozloff has most recently worked as a Nation intern. Photo: Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru.

1. Mark Allix, "Peru Follows in Asia's Footsteps," Asian Business, July 1996, p. 31.

3. Interview, Feb. 1997.

nese most feared at this point was another Peruvian nationalist president, like Alan García (1985-1990), who would try to challenge the international banking and financial institutions. In the 1980s, in an effort to relieve Peru's crushing \$13.8 billion debt burden, for example, García limited debt service payments - although not to his threatened 10 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Tokyo retaliated by cutting aid to half its 1970s' and early 1980s' level.4 Even today, the Japanese Foreign Ministry refers on its website to the 1980s as Latin America's "lost decade," contrasted to the presumably golden 1990s.5

After Fujimori succeeded Garcia as president in 1990, however, the country's relationship with Japan warmed, owing in part to the cultural affinity between Fujimori and his Japanese benefactors, and perhaps to the presence of several of Peru's 200,000 people of Japanese descent in his cabinet. But likely more important than blood was money.

In 1991, obviously pleased with Fujimori's policy shift and eager to begin investing, Japan extended \$27 million toward Peru's balance of payments. This contribution was particularly significant because Japan's balance of payments support program was originally intended for the poorest nations of Africa, not Latin America. Japan also rescheduled Peru's unserviced debts to the Japanese Export Bank. In fiscal 1991 and 1992, Tokyo became Lima's top ranking donor, filling the vacuum left by the US, which had been reducing foreign aid there and elsewhere. In 1992, the year Fujimori illegally dissolved Congress, Japan's \$154 million aid dwarfed the US contribution of \$32 million.

Warm Relationship

Without Tokyo's diplomatic and economic support, much of the antidemocratic, anti-worker story of the last seven years might have been different. For example, take the November 1992 "self-coup," or "Fujigolpe," when Fujimori, frustrated by congressional opposition to neoliberal "reform," dissolved the legislature. 10 With tanks in the streets, he declared emergency rule. The US protested, and threatened to hold up its share of a \$1.2 billion loan and military aid package until Peru agreed to begin restoring democracy and human rights. By the end of 1992, however, the US Agency for Interna-

8. Bauer, op. cit., p. 18.

^{2.} Literally, "the Chinese," this term is used throughout much of Latin and Central America to refer to anyone with Asian origins.

^{4.} Pablo de la Flor Belaunde, Japon En La Escena Internaciónal: Sus Relaciones Con América Latina y El Peru (Lima, Peru: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1991), p. 239.

^{5.} Japanese Foreign Ministry Website: http://www.2. nttca.com:8010/infomafa/.

^{6.} Richard Bauer, "Peru Looks to Asia," Swiss Review of World Affairs, April 1, 1996, p. 17.

^{7.} Belaunde, op. cit., p. 242.

^{9.} Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995.

^{10.} See Gustavo Goritti, "The Betrayal of Peru's Democracy: Montesinos as Fujimori's Svengali," *CAQ*, n. 49, Summer 1994.

tional Development had restored much of its assistance to Peru and shown Fujimori that he had little to fear from US economic retaliation. Japan, however, made no pretense at all. It went forward with its share of the loan, no strings attached. Having stifled Congress, Fujimori was now free to impose his neoliberal program.

At the same time, Fujimori rewarded the military, which had backed his coup, with broad powers to prosecute the counterinsurgency war and suppress opposition to the new pro-

And Japan's reaction? The Foreign Ministry gave Fujimori a glowing report card following two missions in 1993 and 1995 to investigate security conditions. In a briefing paper, Tokyo stated unequivocally that "the antisubversive policy of President Fujimori has improved public safety."13 Notwithstanding the human rights violations, Japan continues to ship foreign aid in violation of its Overseas Development Aid principles, which condition monies on recipients' full attention to democratization and human rights.14

wave of privatizations resulted in more than 250,000 workers being fired between 1990 and 1996;16 the monthly minimum wage, according to CONCOMIP, a union representing Peruvian miners, now stands at \$82.69 a month, or \$2.75 a day;17 four in ten Peruvians must eke out a living in an informal sector with little job security; and only one in ten Peruvians is fully employed. 18

These reforms decimated organized labor and prompted Ernesto Mora, a Peruvian labor reporter and consultant to the US trade union UNITE, to compare the

> Peru of 1997 to the fictional world portrayed in George Orwell's book, 1984. "The government plans to offer this huge excess labor pool to large corporations," he says, "while promoting a model which crushes the labor movement and boosts profits."19

While Peruvian labor unions denounce this tack, international lending agencies and transnational corporations are clearly delighted. Japanese investors have special reason to celebrate: Fujimori's privatization program allowed foreign interests to scoop up state industries at rock-bottom prices, and Japan made 102 direct investments totaling \$701 million between 1991 and 1994.20 Marubeni was part of a Canadian-led consortium that acquired Cajamarquilla, a Peruvian zinc refinery, for \$193 million, "arguably a cheap sale," according to Manuel Castillo Ochoa of DESCO, an institute in Lima which publishes bulletins on

current events.21 According to Juan José Gorritti, the Secretary of CGTP, a Peruvian federation of unions, workers at Cajamarquilla opposed the sale. Their fears about job security under new ownership were realized when workers, particularly those involved in union activity, were fired. "Now," he comments, "Cajamarquilla has only 500 workers, compared to 1,300 before the



Backed by the military, Fujimori has imposed controversial neoliberal "reforms."

grams. He set up a system of faceless military courts and imposed new antiterrorism laws. Francisco Tudela, the minister of foreign affairs, has admitted that at least 5,000 people have been convicted under the legislation. 11 Most were sentenced to brutal prisons including the hated Yanamayo Prison, located 12,000 feet above sea level in the freezing Andes mountains; hundreds were later acknowledged to be innocent. Meanwhile, Amnesty International reports that under Fujimori, there has been routine torture by the security forces, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. 12

11. Amnesty International, Peru: Government Persists in Retaining Unfair Trial Procedures (London: Al Publications, Dec. 1996), pp. 1-2.

12. Amnesty International Country Report, Peru: Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns 1980-

Labor Not Welcome

Fuilmori gave carte blanche not only to the military, but to foreign investors and under a flood of neoliberal reforms the country was transformed: the number of Peru's 22 million population living in poverty jumped from 9 to 14 million; new measures eliminated legal protections for salaried workers and stamped out job security and workers' rights;15 a

1995 (London: AI Publications, Feb. 1996). 13. Sebastian Rotella, "Japan And Peru: A Test of Ties That Bind," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1997.

14. Judith Randel and Tony German, eds., The Reality of Aid, 1995 (London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 1995), p. 65.

15. Guillermo Rochabrún, "Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori," NACLA Report On The Americas, July/Aug. 1996, p. 17.

21. E-mail, Feb. 1997.

^{16.} Manuel Castillo Ochoa, "Fujimori and the Business Class: A Prickly Partnership," NACLA Report On The Americas, op. cit., p. 28. 17. Fax from CONCOMIP, Feb. 1997.

^{18. &}quot;Privilege And Power In Fujimori's Peru," NACLA Report On The Americas, op. cit., p. 15.

^{19.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{20.} Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, op. cit.

privatization," and key clauses within collective bargaining agreements are being ignored.²²

Although wounded, the labor movement is still struggling, but experts who know Peru are hardly optimistic about the prospects for amicable relations with Japanese firms, given past history. According to Carlos Ivan Degregori, a Peruvian research fellow with Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank, the Japanese "were famous in the 1970s for being tough on labor in Peru, in the auto assembly plants, where it was difficult to form a union or strike."23 Other Peruvian unions are hardly more complimentary. For example, Sabino Ttito Lima, president of CONCOMIP, characterizes Asian investor treatment of Peruvian workers as horrible.24 Gorritti comments, "Labor relations with Japanese businessmen have always been rigid due to lack of respect for labor laws, low salaries, long hours, and physical mistreatment."

Corporations singled out by Gorritti as particularly anti-worker include Nissan and Toyota and, in the mining sector, Mitsui. The auto firms, he says, have systematically ignored Peruvian labor codes, opposed salary increases, and required workers to sing "Japanese company hymns." As for Mitsui, Gorritti says even after a 20-year workers' struggle, the company ignores unions and collective bargaining agreements. ²⁵

What Makes Tokyo Run

Although Japan's investment share still lags behind that of the US, its role is increasingly crucial and controversial. On December 17, when the Túpac Amaru targeted the Japanese ambassador's residence, the hundreds of hostages included 60 Japanese nationals, among them executives from Marubeni, Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsui. The crisis has strained relations and will no doubt increase Tokyo's caution. But since an economic alliance with Peru serves Japan's long-term policy goals, the relationship is likely to survive and — if stability is enforced - to grow. In part, says Ernesto Mora, Japan's cultivation of Fujimori and its role in Peru is a defensive maneuver. "The Japanese purpose," he says, "is to move closer to the US market." This geographical proximity has

22. Fax, Feb. 1997.23. Interview, Jan. 1997.24. Fax, Feb. 1997.25. Fax, Feb. 1997.

become more important since the creation of NAFTA, to which Japan would no doubt like to have easy access in the future.

Another motivation, Mora adds, is cheap Peruvian labor. Lawrence Kraus, a professor at the graduate school of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California San Diego, agrees, but adds that, by the 1990s, Japan was facing economic stagnation and a rising yen and needed to sell more of its products abroad. "Peru's economy has grown," says Kraus, "and this means markets." Indeed, by 1995, Japan was exporting about \$300 million worth of cars and electronic goods to the Andean nation. ²⁶

Strategic and Long-term Interests

Peru also serves a strategic purpose: It is Japan's Pacific gateway to South America. Japan plans to improve Peru's

"The Japanese are saying to the US, 'it may be your backyard, but the Pacific is our pool.' "

roads and infrastructure with loan money and to strengthen ties with Brazil and Bolivia. Among the benefits will be increased access to other Latin American trading blocs such as Mercosur. This Southern Cone common market — which links Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and, most recently, Chile — parallels NAFTA, and like that free trade agreement, drastically reduces tariff barriers on imports from member countries.

Another move that could strengthen Japan's role in Latin America is its apparent backing of Lima's bid to join the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). With aspirations to become the world's largest trade bloc, APEC leaders are looking to the other side of the Pacific while Japan is looking to its friend Peru to join other Latin American APEC members such as Chile and Mexico.²⁷

26. Kevin Sullivan, "In Japan, Lima Crisis Stirs Anxiety and Puzzlement," Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1996, p. A35.
27. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Peru optimistic of joining APEC," Nov. 22, 1996.

Transpacific trade will be facilitated by a Japanese road building program. If Peruvian road links with Bolivia are improved, raw materials from Brazil could travel faster to the Peruvian coast, and from there on to Yokohama, with Japanese exports reaching the interior by the same route. According to Amazon Watch, a Los Angeles-based environmental group, Tokyo has already pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to road projects to link Peru with Bolivia and Brazil and possibly cut through the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazon. Through these highways, the Japanese could circumvent the Panama Canal and evenchallenge US economic tually domination of the hemisphere. "It's a race for the control of these economies," comments Mora, "and the Japanese are saying to the US, 'it may be your backyard, but the Pacific is our pool."28

Sensitive to criticism that it is spending millions on infrastructural

improvements that facilitate its own trade and investment agenda at the expense of the interests of the Peruvian poor, Japan points to its programs aimed at grass roots cooperation. But despite compassionate talk of, and pledges to bolster

"grass roots cooperation," comparatively little aid goes directly to the needy. A look at Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 1995 report reveals that grassroots money for the poor — who according to the OECF newsletter are "hardest hit by structural adjustment" — ranks last in terms of aid projects to the country. 29

Japan's real aim — gaining control over Peru's resources and improving market penetration under the guise of foreign aid — has not been lost on Peru's poor. After its recent takeover of the Japanese Embassy, the Túpac Amaru rebels proclaimed, "Japan's aid is for specific groups in Peru and not for poor Peruvians." In the end, the charge is not overstated, and Japan will undoubtedly have to consider these criticisms if it wishes to increase its profits in Peru while avoiding further crises.

30. Sullivan, op. cit.

^{28.} Interview, Jan. 1997.

^{29.} See "Improving Peru's Medical Services," Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund newsletter, May 1996, p. 8; and Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report 1995, op. cit., pp. 464-65.

Captive Labor US Business Goes to Jail



by Paul Wright

with the repeal of welfare, some political opportunists and right-wing pundits are turning their sights on questions of law and order in general, and prison "reform" in particular. They are starting to push Congress to impose the same solution on prisoners as on welfare recipients: put them to work. In September, candidate Bob Dole promised that if elected president, he would issue an executive order requiring every ablebodied federal prisoner to work a 40-hour week to earn money for victim compensation. "Taking a portion of pris-

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Photo: Prisoners make eyeglasses in New York State.

1. Jeff Nesmith, "Prison Job Expansion Stirs Concern,"

Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Sept. 18, 1996, p.

A7.

oners' earnings to pay their upkeep or reimburse their victims also seems appropriate to many Americans," noted the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*. ¹

Knut A. Rostad, head of the rightwing Enterprise Prison Institute (EPI), which boasts Edwin Meese — Ronald Reagan's ethically challenged attorney general — as chair of its national advisory board, is trying to rally support for the scheme. Citing Republican pollster Frank Luntz, who helped shape the Contract with America, Rostad told a congressional committee that "the American public believes the greatest failure of government on a national level — other than welfare — involves crime and punishment." Luntz's focus

groups, Rostad went on, "reveal a negative emotional response to the prison system which is unlike anything he has seen in recent years." "The bottom line," says Rostad, is that the "state prison system should be changed from the ground up, and that inmate work programs should drive this change."²

Currently more than 90,000 state and federal convicts work in a variety of public and private enterprises while serving time.³ The majority are employed in state-owned enterprises where they make such items as license plates or furniture for government offices. Increasingly though, private businesses have contracted with at least 25 states to set up

^{2.} Knut A. Rostad, president of the Enterprise Prison Institute, testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Sept. 18, 1996.

3. Nesmith, op. cit.

businesses inside prison walls to take advantage of state-supplied facilities and low-wage, non-union workers. The sales from privately operated prison industries totaled \$83 million, a relatively small but growing addition to the \$821 million generated from sales of products and services produced by state agency industries.⁴

Advocates of the expansion of private industry into prisons argue that "legal restrictions, aided by bureaucratic inertia and labor union sensitivities, continue to hamper progress." They propose repealing laws that protect prisoner laborers from the worst exploitation and protect free labor

from unfair competition. In a May Day Wall Street Journal editorial, Meese proposed repealing Depression-era laws that require prisoners to be paid at least the minimum wage if they are making goods that will be transported in interstate commerce. Part of his argument rests on the assertion that if the labor market is opened up for them, prisoners can help pay the costs of their incarceration. The illogic of this posi-

Prison industries represent a Third World labor model in the heart of America.

tion is that if the state really wanted to make money from prison industries, where its "profit" supposedly comes from a portion of the salary paid to the prisoner, it should push for higher wages. On the other hand, in a happy consequence not mentioned by Meese, the lower the wage, the higher the profits for corporations.



JLIO ETCHART/IMPACT VISUALS

With competition from low-paid assembly workers like these in China, US manufacturers turn to prisons for cheap labor and subsidized overhead.

Testifying before Congress, Morgan Reynolds, director of the Criminal Justice Center, National Center for Policy Analysis, was not so circumspect. "State and federal prison systems," he said, "control a huge asset — convict labor — and largely waste its productive potential." He advocated changing the

law to "allow private prison operators to profit from the gainful employment of convict labor. Encourage and publicize private sector proposals for enterprise prisons. Set up procedures for competitive bidding for prison labor. Diminish prisoner litigation against prison work by repealing the

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and the federal *habeas corpus* procedure. ..."⁷

Prison Industries Make Out Like Bandits

EPI's Meese touts Washington state as a model for prison industries. There, Boeing Corp., which has its headquarters in Seattle, is discovering the benefits of a captive work force. Last year, while the world's largest civil aviation manufacturer made more planes and money than ever before, it cut the number of employees on its US payroll. The only significant challenge to its drive to increase profits and executive salaries at workers' expense was a lengthy strike by the machinist union over eroding job security and disappearing pension and health benefits.8 Like most corporations, Boeing has been cutting costs and countering organized labor's threat to its bottom line by moving factories abroad and outsourcing to nonunion subcontractors in the US. Its search for workers who are unable to unionize or demand a decent wage took it to two widely divergent, yet strangely similar places: China and the Washington State Reformatory (WSR) in Monroe, Washington.

In China, which buys almost 10 percent of Boeing's new jets, the company operates at a fraction of its US costs. According to the *Seattle Times*,

Employees live mostly on or next to the factory premises. Workers receive a salary of about \$50 a month.

8. Boeing's 1995 profits rose 66 percent to \$856 million with sales of almost \$20 billion. At \$1.66 million a year, Boeing's Frank Schrontz was the state's highest paid CEO. Meanwhile, from 1989-95, the number of workers fell from 107,000 to 95,000. (Byron Acohido, "Top 5 Revenue Generators Hold onto Their Rankings," Seattle Times, June 11, 1996, p. G5.) This trend continues as Boeing announced its proposed merger with McDonnell Douglas in Dec. 1996.

^{4.} Rostad, op. cit. The figure of 25 states comes from Joyce Price, "License Plates Not All That Inmates Make," Washington Times, April 17, 1996, p. A6.

^{5.} Dr. Morgan O. Reynolds, "The Economics of Prison Industries," testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, on the Economics of Prison Industries, Sept. 18, 1996.

^{6.} Edwin Meese, "Let Prison Inmates Earn Their Keep," Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1996.

^{7.} Reynolds, op. cit. In fact, neither the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act nor the habeas corpus provision has anything to do with the issue of prison laborlitigation.

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They are forbidden to form independent trade unions. For those who step out of line on the shop floors in China, there is the notorious Lao Gai "reeducation through labor" prison work camps.9

The newspaper could have written almost the same story by traveling 25 miles to WSR where MicroJet is employing prison labor to make aircraft components.¹⁰ Among the customers of the recently formed company is none other than Boeing.

MicroJet, which lists its address as 16700 177 Ave. SE — the same as the prison, currently employs eight prisoners. They train for minimum wage and eventually progress to \$7 an hour,11 unlike those pesky machinists at Boeing's Everett plant who earn up to \$30 an hour for the same work. Like all companies employing prison labor, Micro-Jet saves further by not paying benefits such as health insurance, unemployment, workers compensation, etc. Even if a prisoner worker is seriously injured, it is the state, through the prison system, that picks up the tab.

In addition to savings on salaries, prison industries also enjoy subsidized overhead. MicroJet's rent-free factory is in a 56,000-square-foot industrial building built and maintained by Washington state. 12 The

arrangement offers a "just-in-time" inventory of labor: Prisoner workers can simply be left in their cells for weeks on end if there is no work, then called in on short notice. Outside competitors, on the other hand, have to pay overhead and workers even if no production is taking place, and have

makes clothes for Eddie Bauer, Kelly Hanson, Planet Hollywood, Union Bay, and other brands; Elliott Bay, a metals manufacturing company that makes crab pots and fishing industry equipment: A&I Manufacturing, which makes blinds;

and Washington Marketing Group, a telemarketing company that has been used to campaign for Republican congressional candidates, among others.

With these competitive advantages, prison industries can probably underbid any US competitor. The real losers, then, are the free workers, machinists in particular, whose jobs have gone to prisoner slave laborers or Chinese workers.

THE QUESTIONS

ARE YOU

- **Experiencing High Employee Turnover?**
- Getting Hit by Overseas Competition?
- Worried About the Costs of Employee Benefits?
- **Having Trouble Motivating Your Workforce?**
- Unhappy with Offshore or Out-of-State Suppliers?
- Thinking About Expansion Space?

THE ANSWER

Washington State Department of Corrections



Private Sector Partnerships



to maintain a steady production line even when demand drops. Moreover, in prison, any attempt at labor organizing is met with immediate and harsh state repression which generates even less negative publicity than similar moves in China. Not a bad deal - not for Micro-Jet anyway. Nor for the other private employers at the Washington reformatory, including Redwood Outdoors, a garment-making sweatshop that

Wage Slave or Chattel

If the Seattle Times had come to Monroe to describe the setup that these companies enjoy, it could have written:

Employees live right next to the factory premises. They are forbidden to form any type of trade union, much less an independent one. For those who step out of line on the shop floors of Washington prisoners, there is the notorious Intensive Management Unit of "reeducation through sensory deprivation" fame. 13

In prison, the term "wage slavery" takes on a new meaning since prisoners are confined to their cells for much of the day. An industry job "consumes virtually all of your out-of-cell time," said Chris St. Pierre, who is serving a life sentence at WSR, "making you a virtual

9. Stanley Holmes, "Produce a Faulty Part, Be Pun-

ished," Seattle Times, May 26, 1996, p. A15. 10. They utilize a relatively modern technology that

forces water through small nozzles at 55,000 poundsper square inch to precision cut metals, plastics, ceramics, and other materials. (MicroJet promotional materials). 11. MicroJet hiring application

^{12.} Dan Pens, "Microsoft Outcells Competition," Prison Legal News, April 1996, p. 3.

^{13.} Located in Monroe, Washington State Reformatory (WSR) is a medium-security prison built in 1908 which houses about 700 prisoners.

JIM WEST/IMPACT VISUALS

slave, where all your time is spent at work or locked in your cell. This limits your ability to visit with your family and attorneys, do legal research, go to school, exercise, etc."

But while a \$7 an hour wage clearly puts prison workers at a competitive advantage, it does not at first seem to exploit them. In fact, prisoners hired by MicroJet take home only a small fraction of their earnings. Right off the top, the state deducts 20 percent for "cost of corrections"; 10 percent goes into a mandatory savings fund controlled by the Department of Corrections (DoC); and 5 percent to a crime victim compensation fund that is actually used to fund DoC victim notification and awareness programs. 14 In addition, the prisoner pays state and federal taxes, social security, and up to 20 percent more to pay off any victim restitution, child support, trial costs, and other courtordered financial obligations. 15 After Albert Delp works 40 hours a week making carabiners (D-shaped metal rings used by climbers to secure ropes) for Omega Pacific at \$6 an hour, his weekly pay is \$240. After three quarters of that gets eaten up by deductions, he takes \$60 "home" to his cell.16

"I don't support prison industries as they are run now," St. Pierre said. "Due to the deductions, the more you make, the more they take. You pay taxes and can't vote and have no say in how the money is used. You pay for 'room and board' yet you're still subject to the same shit food and conditions. Even with the money you earn, there isn't much you can buy with it due to property limits. The employers treat prisoners poorly because they know the prisoners have limited employment options and aren't going anywhere." ¹⁷

14. Revised Code of Washington, 72.09.111(1) (a) ---- the state law setting forth how much money the authorities take. 15. Revised Code of Washington, 72.11----the state law setting forth the priority in which the kickbacks are taken. 16. Tom Sowa, "Paycheck Deductions Make Inmates Hone Subtraction Skills," Spokesman Review, Feb. 22, 1996, p. A1.

17. Interview, Sept. 1996.

When the city of Detroit organized a "job fair," more than 6,800 people showed up to apply for 350 entry-level jobs. Critics fear that increased use of prison labor will further cut employment opportunities.

"It's not really slave labor because that implies it is compelled," argues a former Redwood Industries employee. "It's more like serfdom, [or like being] a domesticated animal." ¹⁸

Few prisoners are willing to publicly speak against the program for fear of losing their industry jobs, being blacklisted by prison industry employers, or incurring retaliation from prison offi-

After prison-mandated deductions, Albert Delp takes \$60 "home" to his cell for the 40-hour week he puts in for Omega Pacific.

cials. In any case, most of Washington state's 12,000 prisoners would probably say that they support prison industries, regardless of any objective exploitation. Just like on the outside, people in prison work at jobs they dislike because they need the money and there are long waiting lists for the 300 industry jobs available. While food, clothing, and shelter are provided, prisoners are required to pay for such basics as soap and toothbrushes and a \$3 per visit charge for access to medical care. 19 Their situation is similar to that of sweatshop and maquiladora workers in South Asia and Latin America who earn a few dollars a day. While such wages are exploitative and paltry by

18. Interview, Sept. 1996.

First World standards, in the Third World they make the difference between starvation and poverty and are thus highly sought after. Prison industries represent a Third World labor model in the heart of America. And while \$1.50 an hour take-home pay for work that brings \$30 an hour on the outside may not seem like much, it looks pretty good against the 38 to 42

cents an hour Washington convicts earn in prison kitchens, laundries, janitorial services, etc. And even those jobs have eager takers since overcrowding has created a prison "unemployment rate" of more than 50 percent. Like the *maquiladora* workers, the prisoners are objectively exploited but subjectively paid quite well. This disparity creates a relatively (by prison standards

anyway) wealthy class of prisoners: a miniature labor aristocracy.

New Skills for the Work Force

Prisoners also look to these industries for training that will make them more employable on the outside. "Elliott Bay is the best program in this joint," said one prisoner, since it allowed him to hone his welding skills in preparation for a job after he serves his remaining seven years. When reminded that companies like Elliott Bay drive down wages and take jobs out of society, he was blunt: "Fuck society, they locked me up."²⁰

St. Pierre, who has worked at both Redwood Outdoors making clothes, as well as at the prison's print shop, seemed resigned. "I worked in prison industries for several years in order to earn enough money to hire an attorney and challenge my conviction and sentence.

 \dots I learned good skills while working in

20. Interview, Feb. 1996.

^{19.} As part of recent "get tough" legislation, Washington prisoners are charged fees for watching TV (whether they have access to one or not), schooling, family visits, some medical care, etc., as well as such small luxuries as coffee and tobacco. Those too poor to pay either have the fees deducted from monetary gifts or go without.

the prison print shop," he adds, "but because of my sentence there's no way to tell if I'll be able to get out and use it."²¹

His situation is not unusual. Prison industries prefer to hire people serving life terms to avoid the retraining and slow production associated with worker/prisoner turnover. 22 Reynolds tacitly admits that industry favors prisoners with longer terms, but explains it this way: "One of the difficulties of creating jobs for prisoners is that many of them are illiterate or semiliterate, or have low IQs. ... The federal system may have the best prospects for high rates of payback because many of the prisoners are there for crimes typically committed by more intelligent criminals like counterfeiting, kidnapping, and drug smuggling."23 These are also crimes that tend to carry longer sentences.

This pattern of favoring lifers and long-timers calls into question the claim that such programs are intended to provide meaningful job skills. Also debatable is whether the skills are marketable on the outside. How many exprisoners will find work sewing garments in a sweatshop? Most of those jobs go overseas, and those that stay in the US are often filled by undocumented immigrants and, increasingly, by prisoners.²⁴ Ironically, skilled labor jobs such as those at MicroJet and Elliott Bay help ensure that such jobs become scarcer on the outside and the wages paid are forced downward.

Experts Still Agree About Meese

And indeed, the interests of labor and most taxpayers may be ill-served by these programs. In touting the "revolutionary" impact of changing the system so that half of all prisoners could be employed by private industry, Meese cited the example of Lockhart Correctional Facility in Texas, where 180 prisoners are paid minimum wage for assembling circuit boards for Lockhart Technologies, Inc., the manufacturing arm of US Technologies. ²⁵ In fact, they actually take home about 50 cents an hour. The example is indeed illustrative, but of how the system fails, not how it works.

Lockhart Technologies closed its Austin, Texas plant where it paid about 130 workers \$10 an hour to assemble circuit boards and moved the whole manufacturing operation to the prison about 30 miles away. Even if the prisoners were paid minimum wage, as Meese claims, Lockhart essentially cut its labor costs by more than half, and it now pays only \$1 a year in rent. Meese defends this type of operation, saying it will reduce the "cost of incarceration," but says nothing about the social cost of driving down wages.

Another runaway shop that scampered behind bars rather than to Mexico or Indonesia is Omega Pacific. In December 1995, the Redmond, Washington company laid off 30 workers earning \$7 an hour plus benefits and moved to the Airway Heights Corrections Center near Spokane. There, five free employees supervise some 40 prisoners who earn \$6 an hour. Omega Pacific owner Bert Atwater told the Spokane Spokesman Review that he moved to the prison because of the rentfree quarters where "the workers are

The program is attractive not only to industry, but to state governments and penal authorities overburdened by a skyrocketing per capita incarceration rate.

delighted with the pay; [where there are] no workers who don't come in because of rush hour traffic or sick children at home; [and where] workers ... don't take vacations. Where would these guys go on vacation anyway?" Atwater was also pleased that he doesn't "have to deal with employee benefits or workers' compensation."

One Washington prisoner dismissed the program as serving neither prisoners nor the public. The DoC industries program is "nothing more than a dog and pony show. The state spends millions on its prison industries bureaucracy alone just to say 300 prisoners are being employed by Class I industries. That's money that can't be used for educational programs, literacy, and vocational training, etc. The point is they're squandering taxpayer money. It just doesn't make sense."²⁸

More Prisoners, Fatter Wallets

Others find prison industries sensible indeed and see the program as a sophisticated and palatable form of corporate welfare. EPI head Knut Rostad says his institute was formed after discussions "between me and Meese to fill a void in the marketplace that focuses on the management part of prisons. The market was extremely interested in prison industry."²⁹

The program is attractive not only to industry on the make for a good deal, but to state governments and penal authorities overburdened by a skyrocketing incarceration rate. As the number of convicts explodes, so do the costs. "Since 1980, the state and federal prison population has increased from 316,000 to 1.1 million," said Reynolds.

"By the year 2002, the inmate population is expected to increase by another 43 percent....

The expense has reached about \$25 billion a year, or \$250 a year for every household in America. One of the most obvious proposals to reduce the cost of criminal justice is to increase the

amount of productive work by prisoners."³⁰ Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) has proposed that federal prisoners pay half their annual support through prison work.³¹ Rostad predicts that "Up to 60 to 80 percent [of wages paid prisoners in private industries programs] can end up going back to the state."³²

So far that scenario seems largely hype. In 1995, the Washington state legislature, for example, appropriated more than \$19 million to the DoC's correctional industries for the 1995-97 biennium — almost \$10 million a year to ensure that 300 prisoners are employed

^{26. &}quot;Forced Workforce," *Dollars and Sense*, July/Aug. 1995, p. 4.

^{27.} Tom Sowa, "Companies Find Home Inside State Prisons," and "Paycheck Deductions Make Inmates Hone Subtraction Skills," Spokesman Review, Feb. 26, 1996, p. A1.

^{28.} Interview with former industry employee, Sept. 1996. 29. Interview, Oct. 4, 1996. 30. Interview, Oct. 4, 1996.

^{31.} David Frum, "Working for the Man," The American Spectator, Aug. 1995, p. 48. 32. Rostad, op. cit.


^{21.} Interview, Sept. 1996.

^{22.} Although no national figures are available, at WSR, four of the eight MicroJet workers are lifers, as are 12 of the 15 who work for Redwood.

^{23.} Reynolds, op. cit.

^{24.} Liz Szabo, "Sewing For the American Dream," Seattle Times, Aug. 25, 1996, p. A1.

^{25.} Meese, op. cit.



TEXAS STATE LIBRARY — ARCHIVES DIVISION

at minimum wage jobs.³³ The money goes to pay the staff salaries and benefits of the bureaucracy set up to oversee the prison industries program. In essence, the state is spending in excess of \$30,000 a year to ensure that each prisoner earns \$5-7 an hour, with the state getting 20 percent of all paid wages back in the form of its "cost of corrections" deduction. Each prisoner in Class I industries would have to gross at least \$160,000 a year for the state to break even.

Nor does the DoC's prison industries budget include the salaries of the additional guards hired to provide security and supervision of the prisoner workers. Also left out are capital construction costs, such as the \$5 million spent by the DoC to house MicroJet.³⁴ And, in addition to the direct expense to taxpayers, the loss of jobs in the community means a declining tax base of revenues coupled with the loss of property taxes businesses such as MicroJet would otherwise be paying if they were not housed in prisons.

33. 1995-97 State Budget Appropriation, Washington State Legislature. **34**. Pens, op. cit., p. 1.

Texas, 1885. Convicts shape granite and load it on flatcars. The International Association of Granite Cutters boycotted construction of the state capitol building for which the stone was used.

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Prisoners can and should be given the right to perform meaningful work for decent wages and the opportunity to gain job skills and earn money. As ane program that would serve both society's and prisoners' interests would require that:

- prisoners keep the wages they earn, subject to the same deductions as any other citizen;
- prisoners be paid the same wages as free world workers in comparable industries;
- prisoners learn job skills that would help them get decent jobs on release;
- prisoners have the right to unionize and bargain freely;
- product labeling would indicate that prison labor was used;
- the use of prison labor to break strikes or replace striking workers would be outlawed; and

• prisoners could maintain financial responsibilities to those on the outside.

Although such a program would pay off in lower recidivism without driving down wages on the outside, it is unlikely to occur. The rightwing drive to make prisoners pay - while racking up a nice profit for industry — fits well with the continuing transformation of America into a nation of small government, big corporations, and big prisons. And just like the welfare bill, the program gives the public the false sense that meaningful reform is taking place. Meanwhile it takes pressure off a system which cannot provide enough decent jobs and uses incarceration as the remedy of choice for poverty, unemployment, poor education, and racism. If you've lost your job in manufacturing, garment or furniture fabrication, telemarketing or packaging, it could have been sentenced to prison.

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LABOR SLAPS THE SMUG NEW FACE OF UNION-BUSTING

by David Bacon

nionbusting has traditionally been a dirty business, dominated by consultants, law firms, and private guards conducting scorchedearth campaigns against unions in strikes and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections. It still is.

But just as unions have begun a period of transformation, becoming more committed to organizing and better at it, unionbusting has expanded. The state of the art now includes sophisticated efforts to forestall organizing drives by creating company-dominated organizations in the workplace and by manipulating demographics to create a "union-proof" work force. Whole industries are now contracted out, so that workers, in the eyes of the law, are no longer even the direct employees of the corporations that nevertheless control their lives.

David Bacon, an associate editor at Pacific NewsService and a member of the Impact Visuals photographers co-op, is a freelance writer and photojournalist. He was a union organizer and factory worker for 20 years.

Photo: David Bacon. Immigrant workers fired from their jobs at the Lafayette Park Hotel march in California.



Two years ago, the highest profile union organizing group in the country, Justice for Janitors, met some of this new corporate thinking head-on. Having previously organized most janitors in California's Silicon Valley and neighboring Alameda County, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1877, one of the country's fastest-growing unions, moved its organizing crew to Sacramento, the state capital. Its target was Somers Building Maintenance, a key employer with large and

profitable contracts to clean state buildings and the facilities of major corporations, including Hewlett-Packard.

After winning workers' support, Local 1877 asked Somers to recognize the union based on a check of authorization cards. The company refused. Within weeks, an ex-supervisor and the wife of another supervisor began going through Hewlett-Packard buildings at

1. In one of the first steps in forming a union, workers sign cards authorizing the union to represent them, called authorization cards.





night, collecting signatures for the Couriers and Service Employees Local 1, a little-known union not affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Somers quickly recognized Local 1, signed a contract with no wage increases, and began giving preferential treatment to workers affiliated with the company union. Meanwhile, workers claiming to be Local 1 representatives threatened Local 1877 supporters; two workers were attacked and beaten.²

Eventually, the NLRB issued a complaint, calling Local 1 a company union. Somers settled the charge and kicked the organization out.

Somers' company union marked a new and sophisticated effort to defeat one of today's unions most successful strategies — typified by Justice for Janitors' campaigns. Many union observers credit the effort to the West Coast's premier anti-union law firm, Littler, Mendelssohn, Fastiff and Tichy, ranked No. 2 on a national list of union-busters maintained by the AFL-CIO. The firm is the largest specifically anti-labor law firm in the country, with 270 attorneys in 20 cities, and revenues of \$72 million in 1995.

Somers and Littler tried to find a weak point in Justice for Janitors' campaign strategy, which rallies many-sided pressures on building owners. Union organizers build community coalitions to mount boycotts, document violations of worker protection laws, and file barrages of court actions. Union members and supporters conduct rallies, demonstrations, and sit-ins, often using civil disobedience to back up organizing efforts.

2. Interview with janitor Isidro Camarillo, April 1996.

But at Somers, while SEIU Local 1877 mounted pressure from outside the workplace, the company used Local 1 to create a climate of fear among the workers themselves. Those who supported the company union were given better treatment, and some were even chosen as stewards. Somers created a small core of employees who identified strongly with the company, while supporters of Local 1877 had to fight just to keep their jobs.

Somers found another ally in Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.), who held hearings of the House government oversight committee to push a longer-term Republican agenda — entirely barring corporate campaign tactics such as those used by Justice for Janitors. Marlene Somsak, a public relations spokesperson for Hewlett-Packard, referred to the campaign as "the use of neutral parties as battlegrounds."

Off with Its Head


Employers and their political allies want to force union organizing drives back into the legal process of NLRB elections, while the whole Justice for Janitors strategy is an effort to avoid them. That says a lot about how distorted the legal system has become. "Sometimes I think the National Labor Relations Act should be repealed," comments AFL-CIO Organizing Director


Photos from top left: Deputy sheriffs guard a railroad tunnel during a 1914 strike near Edgewater, NJ; Vance guards line up against strikers, Detroit, 1996. Strikebreakers fire on pickets in Ambridge, PA, 1933; Vance guards beat back Detroit newspaper strikers, 1996.

Richard Bensinger bitterly. "What could be worse than this?"³

Joe Uehlein, past secretary of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department and now director of its Department of Strategic Campaigns, points out that classic unionbusting has always been reactive. Employers respond both to the prospect that workers might organize a union and to the specific tactics unions use. "We set the battlefield; they have to react to it," he asserts. "That's why they want to make us deal with the NLRB. They

3. Interview, Sept. 1996.





control that process, and they know how to win using it."4

And win they do. Unions lose about half the NLRB elections, and more in larger companies than smaller ones. Even worse, they win contracts with only half of the companies where workers vote for union representation. Bensinger explains that "NLRB elections force unions into a propaganda war in which they have to convince workers that life can be better in the future if they're organized." Management

4. Interview, Oct. 1996.



has a full array of weapons. Using a barrage of legal tactics, anti-union law firms try to carve out a bargaining unit of workers with a minimum of union support. They delay elections as long as possible to give management a chance to reverse union support through intense, one-on-one conversations with supervisors. In captive audience meetings that workers are forced to attend, management issues threats and promises and asks for "a second chance." Unionbusters show videos depicting violent strikes, while carefully-coached management representatives tell workers they'll have to strike if the union wins.

"In the meantime, the union is excluded from the workplace entirely and has no way of stopping illegal activity before the voting takes place," Bensinger says. "The fact is, workers don't really have the right to organize unions."5

Unionbusting consultants have thrived as the legal process has grown more and more skewed. When Local 2850 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) began its organizing drive at the Lafayette Park Hotel in an upper class San Francisco suburb, hotel managers brought in the American Consulting Group (ACG, No. 31 on the AFL-CIO list).6 In short order, the hotel fired two of the most active union supporters and laid the necessary bedrock of any anti-union campaign: fear. Nationally, the AFL-CIO estimates that one in ten workers participating in a union organizing campaign is fired. "Pre-

5. Interview, Sept. 1996.

6. AFL-CIO Petition Tracking System, List of Top Worst Union Busters, AFL-CIO Field Mobilization Department, Washington, D.C.

emption is the unionbusters' philosophy," explains Local 2850 President Jim Dupont. "Their approach is 'take the head off before it has a chance to grow." "7

When the Lafayette Park fired Socorro Zapien, management undoubtedly knew she was a union supporter. According to Dupont, the hotel had sent a spy to union meetings.8 The hotel denied the charge to the NLRB. She was accused of taking a chocolate bar, a charge she denied, and going early to her coffee break. Zapien had no previous disciplinary record. Nevertheless, the NLRB refused to demand that the hotel rehire her. The board follows the Riteline decision, which says that if there is any business reason unrelated to union activity for a firing, no matter how unlikely, termination is legal. Even if the board does finally order reinstatement, the process can take years and workers have already learned the price for supporting the union.

At the Lafayette Park Hotel, the firings were combined with raises and increases in benefits. Unions suspect that ACG consultants trained supervisors to identify and isolate pro-union workers, pressured the undecided, and helped form anti-union employee committees - standard unionbuster tactics during NLRB election campaigns. "After all that, there was no way we could have a fair election there," Dupont says.9

Local 2850 countered with an increasingly common step among unions that find the NLRB process fails to protect workers or to penalize employers

7. Interview, Aug. 1996.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.



for illegal action: It turned to direct pressure. HERE organized pickets and enlisted immigrant rights activists and religious supporters to march against the hotel. It also announced a boycott. Weddings, parties, and conferences were canceled, either in solidarity or because of the unattractive atmosphere. The union spread its activity to two other northern California hotels owned by the same company. This is just the kind of campaign that Rep. Hoekstra and congressional Republicans are trying to ban through legislation.

ACG responded with extensive public relations work to undermine the boycott. It pressured city council members to pass a city ordinance (later found unconstitutional) against the marches, and tried to restrict the union through injunctions against the union's free speech and direct action tactics. ACG also brought in another consultant, Lupe Cruz, to deal with the mostly Latina, immigrant work force.

The Lafayette Park Hotel campaign is still going on. Unions adopting this approach have to have a long-term commitment. But it often succeeds where the NLRB process fails. After a similar four-year fight by Local 2 at San Francisco's Parc 55 Hotel, management gave in and signed a contract.

Blood & Guts Strikebreakers

The classic strategy for breaking already-organized unions — hiring scabs —received its blessing from the Reagan administration in its handling of the PATCO strike in 1981, when President Ronald Reagan ordered the firing of 7,000 air traffic controllers. It was baptized in fire in 1983 in the bitter Arizona copper miners' strike at Phelps Dodge. That two-year-long strike was "really the start of the modern process of permanent replacement of strikers by scabs," according to Joe Uehlein. "We still haven't, as a movement, understood its impact, much less recovered from it." 10

Since Phelps Dodge, the list of companies hiring scabs to break strikes is a roll call of the major class battles of the 1980s and 1990s: Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, International Paper, Greyhound, Caterpillar, Hormel, Watsonville Canning and Frozen Foods, Diamond Walnut, Pittston, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, USX, and many others.

10. Interview, Oct. 1996.

36

Not all of these battles have been won by employers, but the pattern of attack is basically the same. In 1995, management of the Detroit News, owned by Gannett Publications, and the Detroit Free Press, owned by Knight-Ridder, put demands on the table to replace cost-of-living raises with merit increases and to replace union jobs with non-union positions. Knowing the terms would be unacceptable to unions and hoping for a strike, they made arrangements with national consulting firms and with the local police. Four months before the strike, the Detroit Newspaper Agency, a joint operation of both newspapers to share production and distribution facilities, promised to compensate the Sterling Heights Police Department for overtime costs from shepherding scabs into the plant. By the time the strike was a year old, the newspapers had paid out \$2.1 million. 11

BE&K's data bank has the names of hundreds of potential scabs who travel the country from strike to strike.

The newspapers also lined up hired guns to handle scabs, legal affairs, PR, and security. A good-sized industry of such support institutions exists. One of the largest companies specializing in providing replacement workers, BE&K. maintains a data bank with the names of hundreds of workers who travel the country from strike to strike. The newspapers contracted with one of BE&K's rivals, Alternative Work Force (AWF), for 580 scabs. They also brought in the veteran anti-union law firm of King and Ballow (No. 29 on the AFL-CIO list). 12 This company has masterminded a series of newspaper wars in Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York, and San Francisco, among other cities. Standard legal strategy during strikes rests on convincing friendly judges to issue injunctions to virtually eliminate picketing, so that scabs can pass freely in and out.

To guard the scabs, the newspapers first hired Huffmaster Security, an-

11. Michael Funke, "Goonz in the Hood," *Solidarity* (United Auto Workers), Dec. 1996, p. 8.
12. AFL-CIO Petition Tracking System, *op. cit*.

other company which, like AWF, has made lots of money in the newspaper wars.¹³ In the first four months of the strike, Huffmaster and AWF were paid \$2.3 million for supplying 480 guards and 580 scabs. Huffmaster, which is suing the papers for \$1.6 million more, 14 was replaced by a larger, even more notorious, security firm, Vance International, whose guards sport black uniforms and combat boots. The effect is startling, as Cleveland teachers learned in fall 1996 while they prepared to strike. "When uniformed out-of-state security forces invaded a Cleveland high school ... complete with shields, bulletproof vests, cots, and in some cases sidearms, we now realize that the education of Cleveland children [was] the last thought on the minds of the state officials running strike preparations," commented Ohio State Representative Vermel M. Whalen. 15

Nor is the menacing image purely for show. In Detroit, 20 Vance guards beat striker Vito Sciuto with a stick, breaking his skull. In comments to a reporter afterwards, a Vance employee said the guards wanted "to hurt people." ¹⁶

This reputation makes money for Vance; its 1995 strikebreaking activity grossed \$90 million of the \$25 billion private security industry. The But its real success, according to company founder Chuck Vance, lies in its use of video cameras. During the strike at the Pittston Coal Co., for instance, Vance collected thousands of hours of videotapes. Courts hostile to miners in the coalfields used the tapes to justify \$64 million in fines against the United Mine Workers, fines later overturned by the Supreme Court.

The tapes are also useful after a strike is over to ensure that active union members are not rehired and that "troublemakers" are dealt with. While there is basically no punishment for companies if scabs threaten or injure strikers, the NLRB has held that any striker who threatens scabs, or even insults them, can be fired. When the United

17. Ibid.

^{13. &}quot;Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO Reports Unions Continue the Fight to Protect Jobs," *PR Newswire*, June 30, 1995.

^{14.} Funke, op. cit.

^{15.} Scott Stephans and Patrice Jones, "Teachers Criticize Guards Brought in for Strike," *Plain Dealer*, Sept. 7, 1996. 16. Funke, op. cit.

Auto Workers struck Caterpillar in Peoria, Illinois, Vance's Asset Protection Team pushed and shoved strikers and family members in order to provoke confrontations it could video. Guards followed strikers to their homes. Caterpillar striker Ron Heller monitored a police radio conversation mentioning a list of "troublemakers." In later legal action, he uncovered records that indicate Vance supplied a list of active union members to local police.

The results, so far, have pleased the management of the Detroit papers. Frank Vega, CEO of Detroit Newspaper Agency, said "we would have waited three or four more contracts to get to where this strike has gotten us." ¹⁸

The Modern Company Union

Companies use different tactics in dealing with workers trying to organize than they use to break existing unions like those conducting the newspaper strikes. Not far

from the Lafayette Park, another, larger, hotel chain is implementing a sophisticated strategy to block union organizing before it starts. The Hyatt Hotel in Sacramento has set up peer review committees where workers can go with problems they can't resolve with their supervisors. The committees consist of two supervisors and three employees chosen by the aggrieved worker from a list of employees who have gone through conflict resolution training. The important part of this process, according to HERE 2850's Dupont, is that "it creates the semblance of justice." ¹⁹ In other words, it seems like workers don't need a union to resolve their problems.

After General Electric defeated a union drive at its Mattoon, Illinois plant in 1991, it hired Caras and Associates of Columbia, Maryland, to set up similar peer reviews. The strategy, designed to stave off a second unionizing effort, also insulated the company from discrimination complaints. "Once [government] investigators see the peer re-



Although it is increasingly difficult for workers to win NLRB-administered elections, these Point St. George, California fish packing plant employees get their union, 1989.

view approach," noted GE specialist Jack Hoffman, "they usually don't even go through the paperwork." ²⁰

Peer review committees are only a small part of a much larger picture. Modern personnel practices in large corporations try to inoculate workers against the idea of organizing or taking sides against management. This sophisticated unionbusting strategy is a modern-day version of company unionism.

Much of this strategy was developed in Silicon Valley during the Cold War. ²¹ From the beginning, high-tech workers have faced an industry-wide, anti-union policy. Robert Noyce, who helped invent the transistor and later became a co-founder of Intel Corp., declared that "remaining non-union is an essential for survival for most of our companies. ... This is a very high priority for management here." ²²

Expanding electronics plants were laboratories for personnel-management

techniques for maintaining a "unionfree environment." These techniques, which focused on the team method for organizing workers, were later used against unions in other industries, from auto-manufacturing to steelmaking.

Silicon Valley hearings of the Commission on the Future of Labor Management Relations, the Dunlop Commission, held in January of 1994, gave the public a first-hand look at high-tech labor/management cooperation. According to Pat Hill-Hubbard, senior vice president of the American Electronics Association, "employees have become decision-makers, and management has practically disappeared."23 Doug Henton, representing Joint Venture: Silicon Valley, an industry/government policy group, was even more blunt. "Unions as they have existed in the past are no longer relevant," he said. "Labor law of 40 years ago is not appropriate to 20th century economics."24

^{18.} Thomas Frank, "Killing News In Motor City," $The\ Nation$, Nov. 25, 1996, p. 20. 19. Interview, Aug. 8, 1996.

^{20.} AFL-CIO Report on Union Busters, n. 73, April 1991. 21. Michael Eisenscher, "Silicon Fist in a Velvet Glove," unpublished manuscript, 1992.

^{22.} Everett Rogers and Judith Larsen, Silicon Valley Fever: Growth of High-Technology Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 191.

^{23.} Testimony of Pat Hill-Hubbard before the Commission on the Future of Labor Management Relations, San Jose, Calif., Jan. 1994.
24. Interview, Jan. 1994.

In the high-performance workplace, asserted Phuli Siddiqi, an Intel worker who gave part of her company's presentation, work teams give employees a voice. She described "worker ownership of projects and products," and the company's employee recognition program, "Pat on the Back." ²⁵

In the early years of the electronics industry, companies paid relatively low wages, but they attempted to equal, and sometimes surpass, union benefits, providing medical and dental plans and even sick leave. Hewlett-Packard even promised never to lay off workers.

Today, however, permanent jobs are being abolished. Half the work force in many large electronics plants works for temporary agencies, without any benefits, and at much lower salaries.²⁶

"The company always told us they had to be competitive," said Romie Manan, a worker at National Semiconductor Corp.'s non-union Santa Clara plant:

Increasing the company's profitability, they said, would increase our job security. That was the purpose of our workteams. Then the company took the ideas contributed by the experienced work force in Santa Clara, which they got through the team meetings, and used them to organize new labs with inexperienced workers in Arlington, Texas, where wages are much lower. The experienced workers lost their

jobs. The team meetings stole our experience and ideas, and didn't give us any power to protect our jobs and families.²⁷

Manan lost his own job, as did more than 30,000 semiconductor workers on

25. Testimony of Phuli Siddiqi before the Commission on the Future of Labor Management Relations, op. cit. 26. Interview with Romie Manan, May 5, 1996.

production lines in Silicon Valley in the last 10 years.

Through its 50-year existence, the semiconductor industry has successfully prevented workers from organizing unions by combining the lure of labor-management cooperation with the threat of job loss. This model of union-

Romie Manan, workplace activist in the semiconductor industry and union activist in the Philippines.

busting does not depend on outside consultants, but on the expertise of companies' own human relations departments. The strategy is less reactive than the traditional approach and is in place on a constant basis, whether organizing attempts are in progress or not.

The ideologues of this approach consider union organizing drives a punishment for companies which have failed. Kirby Dyess, Intel's vice president of human relations, says that when work-

ers organize unions, "it is a failure of management." ²⁸

Although many of the new structures for labor/management cooperation are currently illegal, corporations are lobbying hard to change that. After the Republican sweep of the 1994 elections, both the Senate and House

passed the Team Act, which weakens the portion of the NLRA — Section 8(a)(2) — which prohibits company unions. Looking for labor support in 1996, President Clinton vetoed the bill. Congressional observers, however, think that its reintroduction is still possible.

A "Union Proof" Work Force

Modern unionbusting combines the paternalism of the company union with another sophisticated strategy — designing a "union-proof" work force. This is also a spin on old ideas. John Sayles' film *Matewan*, for example, recalls the effort by coal operators in the 1920s to bring immigrants of one nationality or race to scab on the strikes of another.

In Los Angeles, cleaning contractors in office buildings in the mid-1980s dumped their largely African American union work force, shed their union contracts, and hired immigrants.

Today in the Midwest and Southeast, the burgeoning poultry industry is using the same strategy. Some of the largest food corporations in the world,

such as ConAgra, systematically recruit immigrant workers. They believe that an immigrant work force has several advantages: In the eyes of managers, immigrant workers not only have low wage expectations, but are less likely to support unions because they face an unknown and unfriendly environment, immigration problems, and are ignorant of their rights.

28. Interview, Jan. 1994.

^{27.} Testimony of Romie Manan before the Commission on the Future of Labor Management Relations, op. cit.

While profitable in the short run, however, using immigrants as a bulwark against unions may prove to be many companies' undoing. In Los Angeles in 1991, hundreds of immigrant janitors were attacked by police as they marched for the union in Century City. Public outrage was so great that the building owners and contractors were forced to sign new union agreements. The battle put Justice for Janitors on the national labor radar screen.

Immigrant construction workers in southern California were also brought in to replace a higher-wage work force in the 1980s. But a movement organized largely by immigrants themselves first struck drywall contractors in 1992, and then framing contractors in 1995. They won union contracts for thousands of workers in some of the first bottom-up, grassroots organizing drives in the construction industry since the 1930s.²⁹

Many immigrants bring militant traditions with them from their home countries, and have high expectations of social and economic justice. The Los Angeles Manufacturing Action Project has established a new center for immigrant-based organizing, to support mobilizing drives in the largest concentration of industrial workers in the world.

With the new welfare reform bill and preexisting programs to force welfare recipients into the job market, employers have seen another source of a potentially "union-proof" work force. Cities have already begun looking at workfare recipients as a pool of low-cost labor that can replace unionized employees.

Last August, negotiating with a gun to its head, New York's Transit Union was forced to agree that 500 union jobs cleaning subways would be eliminated through attrition, while hundreds of workfare recipients took over those tasks.³⁰ While a few workfare recipients may eventually get permanent jobs, that transition was clearly not what the Metropolitan Transit Authority had in mind. Its goal is a work force of subway cleaners paid the equivalent of minimum wage for doing the same job that union employees now perform for a much higher one.

New York City uses a growing number of workfare recipients and will expand its workfare work force to 60,000 by 1998. Many of the city's unions have criticized the municipal workers' union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District Council 37, for not mounting a more aggressive challenge to the city's growing workfare program. Stung by the criticism, District Executive Director Stanley Hill finally called for a moratorium on expansion beyond the present 35,000 enrollees.³¹

Public employee unions have historically supported jobs for welfare recipients and unemployed people. But workfare, they say, offers no solution, because there's no guarantee of an eventual permanent job paying a liveable wage. "When you flood the labor

"For over 10 years, employers have been ruthless and sophisticated and there have been a lot of seminars given by unionbusters cashing in on their interest."

market with workfare recipients," explains Fran Bernstein from AFSCME's national office, "you see enormous wage depression for the bottom third of the work force. That's intentional."³²

What unions want is a basic bill of rights for workfare recipients, including the right to the same wage and treatment given other employees, the right to organize unions, and protection from unfair and arbitrary discipline.

Private employers are also eyeing the possibilities. Marriott Corp., which made one of the first efforts to bring workfare into its work force, emphasizes that it supports and counsels recipients about problems such as tardiness, rather than simply disciplining or firing them as it does with other workers.

But for workfare recipients, the weekly benefit check is all that stands between them and the streets. That's an advantage to a company like Marriott, which has mounted a scorchedearth fight to keep its regular employees from organizing unions. Employers contend recipients are not workers at all, and have no right to organize or file complaints against health and safety dangers or discrimination.

In September, President Clinton urged expansion of workfare in the private sector. "We cannot create enough public-service jobs to hire these folks," he said, adding that "this has basically got to be a private-sector show."³³

But with no guarantee about maintaining existing wage levels or protecting the rights of workfare recipients, welfare reform pits them against currently-employed workers in a race to the bottom. It promises to transform jobs that can support families into ones that can't, and to rob the people who perform them of security,

job rights, and their dignity as workers.

Can the Busters Be Beaten?

"For over 10 years, employers have been ruthless and sophisticated," Bensinger says, "and there have been a lot of seminars given by unionbusters cashing in on their interest." ³⁴

It's clear that employers have their eyes on unions' most innovative strategies. Following the election of John Sweeney in October 1995, the No. 1 law firm on the AFL-CIO's list, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman, gave seminars to drill employers on the "The AFL-CIO's 'Union Yes' Campaign." The conference prospectus noted the increase in the AFL-CIO's organizing budget, the rising interest in "militant and creative new organizing tactics," including "obstruct the economy" and "go to jail," and advertised sessions on the peer review committee strategy and the Electromation case, which bans modern company unions.³⁵

Like unions, unionbusters learn from experience. After years of seeing the United Farm Workers hold big marches during organizing drives, for instance, last year strawberry growers in Watsonville, California, organized

(continued on p. 65)

^{29.} David Bacon, "Putting L.A. on the Map---- How Immigrant Workers are Revitalizing Labor," *Village Voice*, March 19, 1996.

^{30.} Steven Greenhouse, "New York Union Chief Urges Halt to Expanding Workfare," New York Times, Sept. 23, 1996, p. A1.


^{31.} Ibid.

^{32.} Interview, Oct. 1996.

^{33.} Dana Milbank, "Hiring Welfare People, Hotel Chain Finds, Is Tough But Rewarding," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1996, p. A1.

^{34.} Interviews, Sept. and Oct. 1996.

^{35.} Conference prospectus, Executive Enterprises, Jan. 1996.



Phi Beta Capitalism



Universities in Service to Business

by Lawrence Soley

here has been a "virtual explosion over the past several years in the number and variety of university-industry alliances," concluded the National Academy of Sciences. The "relationship between academe and business is more cordial than it has been for decades," agreed the Chronicle of Higher Education. " ... The sectors are increasingly resembling each other." Thus quietly, while the right wing blows smoke, denouncing universities for harboring radicals, and the media hold up mirrors reflecting fanciful images of left-wing domination, a major change in the role of higher education is taking place: Large corporations, conservative foundations, and well-heeled executives are buying the ivory tower and transforming it into an annex for industry. Across the country, well-funded defense contractors are seducing physics and electrical engineering departments; pharmaceutical and biotech firms are wooing molecular biology, biochemistry, and medicine departments; and IBM and a few high-tech chip makers are bedding down with university computer science departments. Increasingly, industry is creating endowed professorships, funding think tanks and research centers, sponsoring grants, contracting for research, and influencing who is hired as faculty and consultants. Under this cozy arrangement, students, faculty, and universities serve the interests of corporations, not the public, as they sell off academic freedom and intellectual independence.

Lawrence Soley teaches at Marquette University in Milwaukee and is author of Leasing the Ivory Tower (Boston: South End Press, 1995).

1. Quoted in Jeremy Main, "Business Goes to College for a Brain Gain," Fortune, March 16, 1987, p. 80; and Jean Evangelauf, "Academe and Business Tighten Ties," Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 6, 1985, p. 1.

The auctioning of academe to the highest bidder extends from the Midwestern college that adopts a corporate logo for its sports team to the selling off of major research programs at top universities. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for example, a number of elaborate programs serve corporate interests. One of these is MIT's Industrial Liaison Program (ILP), which charges 300 corporations from \$10,000 to \$50,000 per year in membership fees. Like campaign contributions, the fees buy corporations "access" — in this case to research reports by MIT faculty, to 70 symposia and faculty seminars, and to personal attention from MIT academics. As the ILP catalog describes it, MIT places "at the disposal of industry the expertise and resources of all the schools, departments and laboratories of MIT."2

Professors are encouraged to participate in the ILP by an inducement program patterned after the coupons on the top of Betty Crocker cake mixes. They can redeem "points" they accumulate by involvement with member corporations for travel to professional conferences, computer equipment, office furniture, or other prizes. MIT awards each faculty member one point for each unpublished article that is made available to an ILP member, two points for a phone conversation or a brief campus meeting with a corporate member, 12 points for a visit to a company's headquarters or lab, and so forth. Each point is worth about \$35 in prize money.³

Another program that ties MIT to industry is the New Products Program (NPP), a joint project of the mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and management departments. Under it, corporations pay the university \$500,000 to develop a new product within two years. Three faculty members and four graduate students are assigned to work on the product, and the students wind up devoting more than half of their time to it. In effect, students pay big bucks to participate in an internship.⁴

Program Director Woodie Flowers said he is "90 percent sure" that MIT

will shut down NPP by September and open a new program under the School of Engineering. The National Science Foundation, Ford, ITT, Xerox, GM, and Polaroid have already committed \$30 million to be spread out over an 11-year period.⁵

Similarly, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute operated the Center for Product Innovation which conducted research for corporate clients. Its supporters — including Timex, General Dynamics, and Norelco — underwrote the center and funded specific projects. One of the center's most widely heralded projects was redesigning a coffeepot for Norelco. The University of Texas' Center for Technology

conditions of the conditions o

Venturing also works on projects for corporate clients such as 3M, Ford, and Dell Computer Corp.

Pouring Rights & Wrongs

The University of Minnesota (U of M)—described by former National Endowment for the Humanities head Lynne Cheney as a bastion of political correctness⁶—typifies the extent of the alliance between industry and academia. In 1996, for example, U of M signed an exclusive agreement with Coca-Cola, giving the soft drink exclusive "pouring rights" on campus and making it the official sponsor of on-campus promotional events, such as the "Diet Coke Volleyball Classic." Its College of Liberal Arts houses the Personnel Decisions, Inc. Professorship of

Organizational and Counseling Psychology, funded by a firm that develops psychological tests given to prospective employees; the Mithun Land Grant Chair of Advertising, named for an owner of the Twin Cities' largest advertising agency; and the Elmer Andersen Chair in Corporate Responsibility, named for a former Minnesota governor and CEO of the H.B. Fuller Co., a paint and adhesives manufacturer that exports products banned in the United States, including the toxic glue sniffed by street children in Third World countries. U of M's business school is named for the owner of the Carlson Travel Network, the university's preferred travel agency; and professors in the medical school have used their laboratories to conduct research for firms such as Curative Technologies and Endotronics, in which they had financial interests. Within the School of Journalism is a research center called the China Times Center for Media and Social Studies, funded by a Taiwanese newspaper magnate and political leader

that "seeks humbly to promote"
democracy in China, Taiwan's
bête noire. The university
"needs to make no apology
for affiliating with private industry. This is part of our mission; always has been," says retiring U of M President Nils
Hasselmo. Hasselmo.

CEOs and Their Boards

Hasselmo's attitude is similar to that of other university presidents, who increasingly come from corporate board rooms, foundation suites, and smokefilled back rooms. Michigan State University's president is Peter McPherson, a former Bank of America executive who worked in the Ford and Reagan administrations. The new chief of the University of Massachusetts is former state senate leader William F. Bolger, and the new head of Wesleyan College is former Agency for International Development

Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 101st Congress (2nd session), Is Science for Sale? (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 132-36.

^{4.} Glenn Rifkin, "A New Industry Tie with Academia," New York Times, Jan. 3, 1993, p. 7.

^{5.} Interview, Feb. 1997.

^{6.} Suzanne Fields, "Defenders of Free Expression Will Miss Lynne Cheney," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Dec. 8, 1992, p. 25.

^{7.} Faith McGown, "Endowed Chairs Enrich CLA Faculty," *CLA Today* (U of M publication), Winter 1992, pp. 1, 4-6; also Tim Johnson, "Juvenile Glue Sniffers: Pressure Mounts on U.S. Company to Stop Making Solvent Adhesives in Latin America," *Houston Chronicle*, May 30, 1993, p. A26.

^{8.} Maura Lerner, "Despite Rules, 'U' Reluctant to Prevent Conflicts of Interest," Star Tribune, May 31, 1992, p. 8A; and 'Director's Forward," Messenger: Report from the China Times Center for Media and Social Studies, Aug. 1, 1990, p. 1.

^{9.} Joel Rigert and Maura Lerner, "In Courting Industry, 'U' Has Invited Trouble," Star Tribune, Dec. 31, 1992, p. 1A.



Fuller Corp. has refused to make the glue it sells to the Third World "unsniffable," by adding a cheap emetic. Consumers, largely poor children like those pictured above in Guatemala, suffer brain damage from repeated use. The University of Minnesota named its Elmer Andersen Chair in Corporate Responsibility after the Fuller CEO.

and National Public Radio chief Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

One reason why university boards of trustees prefer presidents like McPherson and Bolger is that these individuals promote university-industry ties. As the head of Michigan State University's industrial relations office observed, the institution is now "trying to make an atmosphere where faculty members feel they can be more entrepreneurial. ... I think that with Peter McPherson [as] our president [this will happen], he's had a business background and he's encouraging this kind of thing." ¹⁰

Adding to the happy atmosphere of collegiality, university presidents and chancellors often serve on the boards of directors of corporations that have close ties to the universities. University of Texas (UT) Chancellor William Cunningham sits on the boards of Jefferson-Pilot Corp., John Hancock Fund Management Co., and La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., which established UT's La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. Centennial Professor of Business. And until several conflicts of interest concerning Cunningham were exposed, he was also paid \$40,000 annually as a board member of Freeport-McMoRan Corp., a New Or-

10. Tom Henderson, "The State of Technology Transfer: Michigan State Ranks Sixth Nationally in Royalties from Tech Transfer," *Corporate Detroit*, July 1995, p. 55.

42

leans-based mining company accused of environmental pollution. After the chancellor's ties came under public fire, he resigned his board seat and cashed in his stock options, netting a \$650,422 profit. 11

Some of the fruits of the Cunningham/Freeport relationship remain: For a contribution of less than one-twelfth the cost of the building's construction, UT named its molecular biology building after Freeport's CEO James Robert ("Jim Bob") Moffett and his wife. Freeport had also endowed a professorship in UT's geology department, held by a professor doing geological research for Freeport in Indonesia, where the company collaborates with Suharto's dictatorship. 12 Freeport's contract for this research allowed it to review any academic articles the professor wrote before they were submitted for publication.

Cunningham is one of many university administrators serving on corporate boards. City University of New York Chancellor Ann Reynolds sits on the boards of Abbott Laboratories, Owens-Corning, American Electric Power, Hu-

mana, Inc., and the Maytag Corp. Her \$150,000 annual salary as chancellor is approximately doubled by what she gets as a board member.¹³

President Stephen Trachtenberg of George Washington University is on the boards of Loctite Corp., MNC Financial, and the Security Trust Co.

Universities return the favor. The domination of university boards of trustees by captains of industry further explains why these boards appoint presidents and chancellors with pro-industry biases. New York University's board includes former CBS owner Laurence Tisch, Hartz Mountain chief Leonard Stern, Salomon Brothers brokerage firm founder William B. Salomon, and real estate magnate-turnedpublisher Mortimer Zuckerman. The composition of

boards at smaller colleges is similar. The board of trustees of the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, includes executives from Montgomery Ward & Co., Graco, Inc., 3M, Waldorf Corp., Opus Corp., and Honeywell.

Paying for Secrets

Although universities often claim that corporate monies come without strings attached, this is often not the case. Contracts for research, such as the one between Freeport-McMoRan and the University of Texas, frequently include provisions giving corporations some control over the dissemination of research results. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that the majority of companies entering into biomedical research agreements with universities require that the findings be "kept confidential to protect [their] proprietary value beyond the time required to file a patent."14

According to the National Cancer Institute's Steven Rosenberg, this secrecy is impeding scientific research. He con-

^{11.} Molly Ivins, "Integrity Balks, As Money Still Talks," Austin American-Statesman, April 10, 1996, p. A15; and Jim Phillips, "For UT Geologists, Hefty Price Comes with Freeport Contracts," Austin American-Statesman, Jan. 15, 1996, p. A1.

^{12.} Eyal Press, "Freeport McMoRan At Home & Abroad," *The Nation*, July 31, 1995, pp. 125-30.

^{13.} Maria Newman, "CUNY Chancellor's Time Spent with Corporate Boards at Issue," New York Times, Feb. 22, 1994, pp. 1, 8.

^{14.} David Blumenthal, et al., "Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences ---- An Industry Survey," New England Journal of Medicine, Feb. 8, 1996, p. 371.

tends that "open discussion among scientists, even about the preliminary results of ongoing experiments ... can play an important part in advancing research." Instead of an early and fruitful exchange of ideas, the secrecy agreements have imposed "the ethical and operational rules of business" on scientific researchers. 15

Not all contracts contain language that merely restricts when research findings can be made public. Some contain paragraphs giving the corporate contractor the right to determine whether the results can ever be released. A British pharmaceutical corporation, the Boots Company, gave \$250,000 to the University of California San Francisco for research comparing its hypothyroid drug, Synthroid, with lower-cost alternatives. Instead of demonstrating Synthroid's superiority as Boots had hoped, the study found that the drugs were bioequivalents. Professor Betty Dong, who conducted the study, submitted her findings to the Journal of the American Medical Association, which subjected it to rigorous blind-review. The information could have saved consumers \$356 million if they had switched to a cheaper alternative, but would have undermined Synthroid's domination of the \$600 million synthetic hormone market. 16

When Boots found out about the scheduled article, it stopped publication, citing provisions in the research contract that results "were not to be published or otherwise released without [Boots'] written consent." After Boots announced that the research was badly flawed,

Dong was unable to counter the claim because she could not release the study.

If the Shoe Fits

Even contracts that appear benign can have strings that choke academic freedom. In 1996, the University of Wisconsin signed a multimillion-dollar contract

15. Steven A. Rosenberg, "Secrecy in Medical Research, New England Journal of Medicine, op. cit., pp. 392-93. 16. Ralph T. King, Jr., "How a Drug Firm Paid for University Study, Then Undermined It, Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1996, p. 1.

with Reebok, granting the running shoe manufacturer exclusive rights to make and market athletic apparel bearing the Wisconsin logo. In addition to paying coaches for promotional appearances for Reebok, giving financial

support for the university's athletic program, and providing student internships at Reebok's headquarters, the contract included an Orwellian clause: "The university will not issue any official statement that disparages Reebok [... and] will promptly take all reasonable steps to address any remark by any university employee, including a coach,

that disparages Reebok."17

Although university administrators publicly disclosed many other provisions of the Reebok contract, they kept the speech-restriction clause secret until the last moment. When it was finally disclosed — as the contract was going before the board of trustees for approval — dozens of UW professors signed a letter of opposition. Embarrassed by the flak and the exposure of their willingness to sell out the First

17. "Campus Fight Leads Reebok to Modify Shoe Contract," New York Times, June 28, 1996, p. A16; and Andy Baggot, "Reebok Deal Moves Ahead," Wisconsin State Journal, May 14, 1996, p. 1D.



University of Texas Chancellor William Cunningham with Freeport McMoRan CEO "Jim Bob" Moffett

Amendment and academic freedom. university administrators retreated, asking Reebok to cancel the speech-prohibition paragraph. Facing a public relations disaster, Reebok quickly agreed. 18

Not content with buying specific re-

search projects and athletic programs, corporations have put their stamp on academic departments by endowing chairs. The Carlson Travel, Tour and Hospitality Professorship at U of M, endowed by the owner of the Carlson Travel Network, provides money for the Carlson Chair for research on issues of interest to the travel industry. The executive vice president of the

Minnesota Restaurant, Hotel and Resort Associations praised this research funding, saying, "We'll have data on who comes to Minnesota and why, why people fail to return, and other statistics that we need to make decisions about advertising, marketing and promotion."19 Even when there are no visible strings, says University of New Mexico professor Gilbert Merkx, "there is always a natural inclination to be grateful to the donor."20 Cal Bradford, a former fellow at the U of M's Humphrey Institute for Public Policy, says that outside funds "determine what universities will teach and research, what di-

> rection the university will take. ... If universities would decide that they need an endowed chair in English, and then try to raise the money for it, it would be one thing. But that's not what happens. Corporate donors decide to fund chairs in areas where they want research done. Their decisions decide which topics universities explore and which

CORPORATE EASY CHAIRS

Ronald Reagan Chair of Broadcasting, Alabama Lego Professor of Learning Research, MIT Dow Chemical Co. Research Professor of Chemistry, Northwestern Sears Roebuck Professor of Economics, Chicago Nissan Professor of Economics, Chicago Federal Express Chair of Excellence in Information Technology, Memphis Fuvo Bank Professor of Japanese Law, Columbia Hanes Corp. Foundation Professorship, Duke Bell South Prof. of Education through Telecommunication, So. Carolina Coca-Cola Professor of Marketing, Georgia Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies, Harvard McLamore/Burger King Chair in American Enterprise, Miami Reliance Corp. Prof. of Free Enterprise and Management, Pennsylvania Foley's Federated Professor in Retailing, Texas United Parcel Service Foundation Professor of Logistics, Stanford Republic Bank Professor of Finance, Texas A&M Rockwell International Chair of Engineering, UCLA

^{18. &}quot;Campus Fight Leads ...," op. cit.; and Baggot, op. cit.

^{19.} Maura Lerner, "Endowed Chair for Tourism at 'U' May Be a First," Star Tribune, Feb. 28, 1991, p. B3. 20. Quoted in Tim Golden, "Donations to Universities Sometimes Carry a Price," New York Times, Dec. 9, 1996, p. A1.

Rent-a-Researcher

When animal rights activists protested the "inhumane" practice of preparing lobsters by dropping them alive into boiling water, University of Maine at Orono Professor Robert Bayer was not moved. "You have to have respect for all living things," he commented, "but as far as the humane aspect goes, cooking a lobster is just like swatting a mosquito." Bayer's colleague, Professor Irv Kornfield observed that lobsters have "the same lineage as the mosquito and the fly," adding with uncanny insight that when lobsters are boiled they feel only a "transient, fleeting" sensation.¹

Professors Bayer and Kornfield are not just academic scientists, but associates of the Lobster Institute, an industry-funded research center at the University of Maine at Orono that "identifies practical problems of concern to the industry and seeks solutions to the problems." Clearly, one of those is animal rights protests. But in addition to dismissing these concerns, the institute has worked on other pressing academic issues, such as "claw band testing," lobster marketing, and new product development, including "taste tests."

Appearances by corporate-linked "scholars" in the guise of independent experts are proliferating like algae. When the *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour* needed an "expert" to comment on corporate media mergers, it turned to Everette Dennis, director of the Gannett Center for Media Studies at Columbia University. The center, now called the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, is funded by the Gannett Foundation of former Gannett CEO Al Neuharth who, through mergers and acquisitions, made his company one of the country's two largest newspaper chains.³

Concerning increased media concentration, Dennis told *MacNeil/Lehrer* viewers, "It's been the big companies in this country that have invested over the long-term, that have done the research and development." He added, "Does [media concentration] diminish freedom of expression and the number of voices? Not at all." Dennis has also asserted that corporate media concentration has contributed to the professionalization of the press and reduced ideological biases in news reporting, suggesting that corporations have no ideological agendas of their own.⁴

When Raytheon Corp.'s Patriot missiles came under criticism for failing to intercept incoming missiles during the Gulf War, Tufts University professor and head of the Tufts-affiliated Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert Pfaltzgraff, came to Raytheon's defense in a Washington Post op-ed, "An Unjustly Criticized Patriot." The article examined criticism of the missile in depth, but failed to disclose two important details: Pfaltzgraff's center has been the recipient of Raytheon contributions, and one of the center's directors is Raytheon Corp. executive Charles F. Adams.⁵

In 1993, Washington State University opened its Faulkner Research Center, named after a WSU employee, but funded by Busch Agricultural Resources, Inc., a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch. At the center's dedication ceremony, WSU's president made it clear what interests the center would serve: "We are confident that this new facility will enable WSU to work closely with other universities in the region and with private industry and trade associations, both in this country and abroad, to continue developing the world's finest varieties of hops." 6

Similar centers exist at universities across the country: the Center for Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, which receives more than half of its funding from Chevron, Conoco, Mobil, and other oil companies; the Maguire Oil and Gas Institute at Southern Methodist University, underwritten by the CEO of Maguire Oil Corp.; and the Center for Defense and Strategic Studies at Southwest Missouri State University, which is supported in part by annual fellowships from Rockwell International and McDonnell Douglas.⁷

When associates of these centers are not producing opeds and sound bites, they are busy working on research of interest to their sponsors. The Center for Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering, for example, has studied ways to locate and produce oil less expensively — using federal and state grant money. Who said big oil couldn't use a little government assistance?

aren't." After he criticized university ties to corporations, Bradford's contract at the Humphrey Institute wasn't renewed.

Ties that Blind

Two changes in federal laws have helped cultivate the current relationship between universities and business: the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act P.L. 96-517), which was supplemented by a 1983 executive order extending the legislation to large corporations; and the 1981 Recovery Tax Act (P.L. 97-34). The 1980 law and the executive order allowed universities to sell corporations patent rights derived from taxpayer-funded research. The result is a covert transfer of resources from the public to the private sector. The 1981 law

made the arrangement even more lucrative for corporations by increasing the tax deductions they could claim for "donations" made to universities.

Corporations jumped at the opportunity. While federal tax dollars fund about \$7 billion worth of research, corporations — for a relatively small investment — can buy access to the results, at just a fraction of the actual cost. Given

^{1.} Ruth-Ellen Cohen, "Boiling a Lobster the Tasteful Way," Bangor Daily News, Aug. 22, 1994, p. 6.

Lobster Institute Web Page, http://www.lobster.um.maine.edu/lobster.
 In 1991, the Gannett Foundation changed its name to the Freedom Forum Foundation.

dation, prompting the Columbia University-based center to also change its name.

4. "MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," June 20, 1989; and Michael Fibison, "Freedom Forum's Ev Dennis Says 'Liberal Media Bias' Is a Misnomer," The Murphy Reporter (University of Minnesota publication), Winter 1997, p. 11.

Report of Operations 1990 (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1990), p. 4; Robert Pfaltzgraff, "An Unjustly Criticized Patriot," Washington Post, April 8, 1992, p. A20.

^{6. &}quot;Busch Gives WSU \$700,000 for Hop Research Facility," Lewistown Morning Tribune (Washington), May 20, 1993, p. 6A.

^{7.} Amy Strahan, "Corporate Pull on Colleges Questioned," Daily Texan (University of Texas publication), Nov. 19, 1996, p. 2; United Press International, "University to Offer Master's Degree in Defense," May 7, 1990.

^{8. &}quot;Texas," USA Today, Jan. 16, 1990, p. 8A.

this direct subsidy in taxpayers' dollars, plus the tax benefits, it is little wonder that corporate dollars going to universities almost tripled from \$235 million in 1980 to \$600 million in 1986. By 1991, the annual corporate investment had increased to \$1.2 billion, and by 1996 to around \$2 billion.²¹

The benefits to corporations from these investments is demonstrated by an agreement between Sandoz Pharmaceuticals and the Dana-Farber Institute, a Harvard University teaching hospital. Sandoz gave Dana-Farber a 10-year, \$100 million grant for research on cancer drugs. In return, Sandoz got the rights to any discoveries made by professors who had accepted Sandoz dollars, even if the actual discoveries weren't funded by the Swiss pharmaceutical giant. Under this agreement, Sandoz was given the commercial rights for a method of

government — that is, US taxpayers.²²
This windfall of corporate welfare does not come without some work by the corporations. In May 1996, after several Republican budget cutters suggested that funding for scientific research be scaled back, university

representatives and corporate CEOs


identifying a mutant gene linked to colon

cancer, even though the mutant gene re-

search was primarily funded by the US

Sandoz got the rights to any discoveries made by professors who had accepted Sandoz dollars.

met privately with House Speaker Newt Gingrich to lobby against cuts in biomedical research. After the meeting — which included representatives from universities and executives from Biogen Corp., Bristol-Myers Squibb, Chiron Corp., and Pioneer Hi-Bred International — Gingrich endorsed a \$655 million increase in federal funding



When corporations sponsor cancer research, they often own the results and can keep them secret from other researchers.

for the National Institutes of Health, \$175 million more than the agency had requested.²³ The success of the lobbying effort indicates the power and influence of the new university-industrial complex.

The biotech and pharmaceutical executives lobbied Gingrich because federal research funding represents a significant government subsidy for their industries, which receive the benefits of the work without paying

for it. However, government grants are just one method involving universities for transferring resources from the public to the private, forprofit sector. Another transfer occurs when universities use federal and state tax dollars

and tuition monies to build state-ofthe-art research facilities. Corporations then use them and save the cost of building their own. When the low pay of graduate students — who comprise the majority of research assistants — is added to the equation, universities can perform bargain-basement research tailored to corporate needs.

The high costs associated with conducting cutting edge research provides a plausible explanation for the soaring

23. Robert Pear, "Health Research Gets a Raise Instead of Threatened Trims: G.O.P. Listens to Biotechnology Companies," New York Times, Jan. 16, 1996, p. A10.

tuition fees of the last decade. Although universities have long claimed that grants and contracts for scientific research subsidize programs in the liberal arts and humanities, this is not the case, according to a financial analysis conducted by the *Chicago Tribune*. Using financial records obtained from the University of Rhode Island, the *Tribune* found that tuition dollars — including those from students in the liberal arts and humanities — subsidize scientific research.²⁴

Although the university's president disputed the study's methods, he nevertheless conceded that around \$400 of each student's tuition may subsidize research.25 While the subsidy is small, what corporations get from taxpayers through research grants and laboratory construction at universities points to a larger problem. What he didn't say is that this type of research has changed the purpose of universities, making them centers for corporate R&D rather than centers of instruction—servants of Mammon

rather than of Minerva. ■

24. Ron Grossman and Charles Leroux, "Research Grants Actually Add to Tuition Costs, Study Reveals," *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 28, 1996, p. 1.
25. Robert Carothers, "University Research Not a 'Loss,'"

25. Robert Carothers, "University Research Not a 'Lo Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1996, p. 20.

^{21.} Philip Stevens, "Universities Find a New Partner," World Press Review, Oct. 1986, p. F1; and Anthony de Palma, "Universities' Reliance on Companies Raises Vexing Questions on Research,"New York Times, March 17, 1993, p. B9; and OLS regression estimate.

22. David Golden, "Dana-Farber Pact with Corporation Questioned," Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 1993, p. 1.

Colombia's Gringo Invasion

Under the guise of fighting the drug war, the US has been consistently supplying Colombian forces with military equipment and training personnel involved in atrocities against the civilian population.

by Frank Smyth and Winifred Tate



Members of Colombia's elite counterinsurgency unit.

he US military boasts that its Army Special Forces or "Green Berets" are "the most versatile special operations soldiers in the world."1 While serving under the Department of Defense (DoD), members of these units, trained in unconventional warfare, psychological operations and other skills, sometimes work on temporary "attachment" to the CIA's Directorate of Operations. 2 Under CIA auspices, Green Beret advisers have been involved in both covert actions (never to be attributed to the US) such as Operation Phoenix, which set up death squads in Vietnam in the 1960s, and clandestine operations (secret only during their

Frank Smyth is a freelance journalist. Winifred Tate is a graduate student at New York University. Both have also long worked in collaboration with human rights groups in Latin America. They dedicate this article to Josué Giraldo Cardona, leader of the Meta Human Rights Committee, who was murdered in front of his two young daughters last October by an unidentified gumman.

1. US Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: US Defense Department, 1994), p. 10.
2. Interviews with senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials, Dec. 1995.

execution) such as the training of El Salvador's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols in the 1980s.³

In the 1990s, Green Berets and other US advisers have been deeply involved in Colombia, even though it has the worst ongoing human rights record in Latin America. Last year, at least 231 US military and intelligence advisers were sent there, according to the DoD's official deployment schedule. These include two teams with 52 US Green Be-

3. Douglas Valentine, *Phoenix Program* (New York: William Morrow, 1990); and Frank Smyth, 'Secret Warriors: U.S. Advisors Have Taken Up Arms in El Salvador', *The Village Voice*, Aug. 11, 1987. The US role in training these patrols first came out in testimony by Lt. Col. Oliver North during the Iran-Contra hearings. One of the CIA operatives involved, Felix Rodriguez, a.k.a. Max Gomez, also participated in the 1967 Bolivian operation which resulted in the capture and summary execution of Che Guevara.

4. See, among others, Amnesty International, Political Violence in Colombia: Myth and Reality (London: AI Publications, 1994); Javier Giraldo, S.J., Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1996).

5. "List of FY96 Deployments for USMILGP [US Military Advisory Group] Colombia." This document first appeared in Appendix 3 of Human Rights Watch, Colombia's

ret advisers each to train the Colombian Army in "junior leadership" combat skills. That official count is only three fewer than the congressionally-imposed limit (often violated⁶) on the number of in-country US advisers deployed in El Salvador during the peak of its war. Even more Green Beret advisers have trained Colombian Army Special Forces units outside Colombia at US bases in Panama. According to US officials involved, this particular training has taken place under the auspices of the CIA as part of a "Top Secret" counter-drug program.

Since 1989, all US military training, advice, arms and services to Colombia have been officially earmarked for the drug war. While most coca leaf is grown in surrounding Andean countries, Co-

Killer Networks: The Military/Paramilitary Partnership and the United States, Washington, D.C., 1996). 6. Interview with Anne Manuel, deputy director, Human Rights Watch/Americas, Feb. 1997.

7. Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 91.

8. Interviews with senior DoD officials, Dec. 1995.

lombia refines and exports about 80 percent of the world's processed cocaine. US anti-drug policy, by prioritizing law enforcement over prevention and treatment measures, puts considerable pressure on countries such as Colombia. All of Washington's \$169 million annual aid to that country is earmarked to counter drugs. Some has actually been used for this purpose. A Bogotá-based

"The CIA set up the clandestine nets on their own. They had a lot of money. It was kind of like Santa Claus had arrived." — Col. James S. Roach, Jr.

CIA team, for example, was instrumental in the 1995 arrests of the top leaders of the Cali cartel. But most US aid has been diverted to Bogotá's counterinsurgency war against leftist guerrillas. Since the 1960s, the Colombian military, with US backing, has been fighting the formerly pro-Moscow Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the pro-Cuba National Liberation 'Army (ELN), as well as other groups. In recent years, the conflict has heated up, with Amnesty International reporting more than 20,000 dead since 1986.¹⁰ While all sides have committed abuses, the military and allied (though illegal) rightist paramilitary groups are guilty of the vast majority. 11

Spooks Bearing Gifts

Human rights monitors have long accused Washington of complicity in these crimes. Now they have proof. Last October, Amnesty International released internal US military documents showing that the US had provided arms to 13 of 14 Colombian army units that Amnesty had cited for abuses. ¹² In November, Human Rights Watch released US and Colombian military documents, along with oral testimony, showing that in 1991, both the CIA and DoD advised Colombia before its Defense Ministry established 41 clandestine intelligence networks.

According to a classified (reservado) ministry order creating the program, the networks' only function was to target "the armed subversion," i.e., leftist guerrillas and their suspected supporters. Four former members of one network, based in the riverport town of Barrancabermeja, testified that it incorporated illegal paramilitary groups and was responsible for killing hundreds of civilians. ¹³

The CIA was directly involved in helping design and fund the intelligence networks, according to retired US Army Col. James S. Roach, Jr., then military attaché and Defense (Department) Intelligence Agency liaison in Bogotá. "The CIA set up the clandestine nets on their own,"

Roach says. "They had a lot of money. It was kind of like Santa Claus had arrived." CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield declined to comment. 14

These CIA-promoted intelligence networks enabled the Colombian military and illegal paramilitaries to expand the pattern of secret collaboration which began in the early 1980s. According to Javier Giraldo, a Jesuit priest and founder of Colombia's Inter-Congregational

Commission for Justice and Peace:

Avast network of armed civilians began to replace, at least in part, soldiers and policemen who could be easily identified. They also started to employ methods that had been carefully designed to ensure secrecy and generate confusion. Because of this, witnesses and victims of crimes are unsure of the exact identity of the individual(s) responsible for committing them. This problem with identifying the perpetrators is often insurmountable.

At the same time, members of the army and police began to conceal their identities, frequently wearing civilian clothes and hoods, to drive unmarked cars and to take their victims to clandestine torture centers, all in order to forego legal formalities in arrest. What has frequently followed these abductions is intimidation or torture, enforced disappearances and murder.¹⁵


SOA's Traditional Values

While DoD officials continue to deny complicity in human rights violations, the close ties between US intelligence and defense agencies and their Colombian counterparts are well documented. Last year, for example, the US Navy deployed 97 operations and intelligence advisers in-country. There they helped plan strategy with the Colombian Navy command and provided tactical advice to units based out of ports including Barrancabermeja. 16 Meanwhile, US Green Berets train the Colombian army in Cimitarra, a town that even Colombian police reports identify as a center of illegal paramilitary operations.¹⁷ Other US officials work closely with Colombia's top commanders. The US Military Advisory Group's office is inside the Colombian Armed Forces command compound, conveniently down the hall from the offices of the Colombian army commander.

As is the case throughout much of Latin America, many key human rights violators have received US training. Commander Gen. Manuel José Bonett Locarno is one of hundreds of Colom-

16. List of FY96 Deployments, op. cit.

16. List of FY96 Deployments, op. cit. 17. "Human Rights Watch," op. cit., p. 91.



The US Army was more concerned with covering its brass than stopping abuses.

^{9.} See "The Cali Cartel: New Kings of Cocaine," US Drug Enforcement Administration Drug Intelligence Report, Nov. 1994; and "The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report 1993: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States," Aug. 1994, pp. 2-6.

^{10.} Amnesty International, op. cit., p. 1.

^{11.} Ibid., pp. 67-74.

^{12.} See, among others, Reuters, "Amnesty calls for halt in U.S. aid to Colombia," Oct. 29, 1996.

^{13.} Human Rights Watch, op. cit., pp. 27-41.

^{14.} Telephone interviews, March 1996.

^{15.} Giraldo, op. cit., p. 22.



A Colombian woman protesting continuing human rights abuses testified: "The armed forces and [police] were formed to protect us and they've been converted into a bunch of hired killers." With the US footing much of bill.

bian officers who have graduated from the US School of the Americas (SOA). 18 He was later implicated in torturing and murdering trade unionists, community leaders, and human rights monitors. Bonett, who denies responsibility for these or any other crimes, reports to Gen. Harold Bedoya Pizarro, Colombia's Armed Forces commander, who studied military intelligence at the SOA in 1965 and was invited back to teach it as a guest professor in 1978 and 1979. A coalition of European human rights groups and others, have accused him of running death squads comprised of joint military and paramilitary forces. More recently, Bedoya has mapped out "intelligence planning regarding the country's internal political situation" through El Diario de Bedoya, a classified analysis with general orders from Bedoya himself, regularly sent to all division and brigade commanders.19

While Bedoya acknowledges that he has identified suspects for army sur-

18. Out of one list of 247 Colombian military officers implicated in specific human rights cases, 124 of them have received training at the US School of the Americas. Another seven Colombians, including Bedoya, have been invited to teach there. This alumni list was prepared by Fred Gaona and is on file at the Washington Office on Latin America. Profiles of both the known abusers and the evidence against them was compiled by a coalition of European human rights groups in El Terrorismo de Estado en Colombia (Brussels), Ediciones NCOS, 1992, pp. 71-72.

veillance, both he and Bonett deny that these targets include such legal entities as community leaders, non-governmental organizations, or political parties and their elected officials. But a July 1995 "reservado" division-wide order signed by Bonett instructs army intelligence networks to conduct "permanent surveillance of the municipal governments and the ways in which they are managing their funds."20 Another classified Colombian army document from March 1995 claims that the guerrillas have infiltrated an estimated 800 locally-elected municipal governments nationwide and an unknown number of non-governmental organizations, "especially leftist ones ... in Colombia, the United States, Canada, Europe." This activity has led the groups, the document goes on, to adopt positions favoring "the overcoming of impunity," "the vigilant and effective monitoring of human rights," and "the construction of a peace process."21

Within Colombia's tense climate, simply identifying an organization or individual as "leftist" is tantamount to authorizing anything from surveillance

to murder, and indeed, many Colombians so labeled have disappeared or been killed. Take the rural town of Aguachica in the northern Magdalena Valley, where the army's ability to process intelligence is made more efficient with computers. One classified printout, "Latest Information on the Enemy," was prepared by army Task Force No. 27 Pantera (Panther). It names dozens of alleged subversives, including leaders of the local Community Action Movement (CAM), a legal group which this printout identifies as a "political branch" of the guerrillas. Their crime? Community leaders "led a meeting of peasants where they espoused their political objectives and how they plan to achieve them as a movement."22

Among CAM's popular leaders were "Libardo Galvis, a.k.a. Lalo" and his brothers, Jesús Emilio and Luís Tiberio. On September 24, 1995, two months after the army printout, Jesús and Luís were abducted by armed men, "some wearing civilian clothes and others wearing army uniforms with the insignias of the Counter-guerrilla Unit Task Force No. 27." Witnesses quoted by the human rights group, MINGA, later said: "The brothers were brutally tortured. They burned the fingers of their hands, and then decapitated them." The same armed men then walked to a nearby village and killed a local police inspector, Emelda Ruíz, who had been investigating death squad crimes. According to witnesses: "The perpetrators announced that they would be back for other people whose names they had on their lists."23

There is also good documentation of abuses by the Colombian Navy, which has also been armed, trained, and advised by the United States. The US helped design its Riverine units to patrol rivers in search of trafficking boats. One of the ports the Riverines are based in is Barrancabermeja, also the site of one of the 41 intelligence networks promoted by the CIA. Four ex-agents of this network have testified about it. In a pattern used around the country, naval intelligence wanted to keep the network covert, so it incorporated retired military officers and other civilians to both gather intelligence and execute operations. One such clandestine operative was ex-naval Sgt. Saulo Segura.

^{20. &}quot;Asunto: Examinación de la Estrategia Divisionaria; Reservado," signed by Maj. Gen. Manuel José Bonett Locarno, when he was the Colombian Army Second Di vision commander, July 24, 1995.

^{21. &}quot;Asunto:Apreciación Coyuntural Situacion Na cional," signed by Lt. Col. José Domingo García García, second commander and chief of staff of the Colombian Army Fifth Brigade, March 2, 1995.

^{22.} Fuerza de Tarea No. 27 'Pantera, Ultimas Informaciones del Enemigo," April 8-July 11, 1995.
23. MINGA Urgent Action, "Political Genocide Continues in Aguachica, Cesar," Sept. 25, 1995.

He reported to Capt. Juan Carlos Álvarez, the network chief who served under Lt. Col. Rodrigo Quiñónez, then the Navy's top intelligence commander. ²⁴ Together these men identified targets for surveillance and decided which ones to hit.

One ex-agent testified:

[Lt.] Col. Rodrigo Quiñónez was told everything about the [surveillance] operations. And according to what was discovered, he would speak with Capt. Juan Carlos Alvarez, alias El Ingeniero ["The Engineer"], giving the green light if the operation was OK or not, in other words, to kill people or not. After that, Capt. Juan Carlos Álvarez would communicate directly with [our team leaders], who told us what to do. If it was by phone, they used the following codes: "There are some broken motors. I need you to repair them. They are in such and such a place." And they would give the address. "Take good mechanics and good tools." Mechanics meant sicarios [hired assassins], good tools meant good arms, and the motors meant the victims.25

According to the testimony of four ex-agents, early victims included the president, vice-president, and treasurer of the local transportation workers union; two leaders of the local oil workers union (another one of its leaders was killed last October); one leader of a local peasant workers' union; and two human rights monitors. ²⁶

These murders and others drew the interest of Ismael Jaimes, editor of *La Opinión*, Barrancabermeja's leading independent newspaper. After investigating for several months, he began writing columns alleging that the military was behind these crimes. Finally Jaimes was targeted too. One witness said: "After following him for several months, they established that he went every morning to drop off his son at school in the Torcoroma neighborhood, where he was killed one morning."²⁷

Soon the network attracted even more attention as many of its *sicarios* were also accused of robberies and other common crimes. To protect itself from exposure, the Navy began killing off operatives. On June 1, 1992, after four network *sicarios* were apprehended by a regular army unit over an authorized murder, military intelligence officers disappeared all four, according to a document signed by the regular unit's commander.²⁸ Later, sev-

The Clinton administration is now escalating aid to the Colombian military to a record \$169 million in arms.

eral more network personnel were killed. Unidentified gunmen eventually tried to kill Segura, wounding him twice.²⁹

This turned Segura against the Navy, and he joined three of his former colleagues who testified against their superiors. But instead of prosecuting the officers named by these ex-agents, the Colombian government charged and imprisoned Segura. Last year inside La Modelo, Bogotá's maximum security jail, he glanced about nervously before saying, "I hope they don't kill me." Two months later, on Christmas Eve, Segura was murdered inside his cellblock with a handgun left next to his corpse. His murder remains unsolved; the whereabouts of the other three witnesses remain unknown. Nonetheless, they provided solid and overlapping details about the murders of 57 specific political opponents and activists. Yet not one case has gone to court.³⁰

American Hand

The US bears complicity in Colombia's human rights record, having armed, trained and advised most of the military units and commands directly implicated in the killing. Still, the Clinton administration is now increasing aid to the Colombian military. This year, the

US is sending a record \$169 million in arms. They include 12 Blackhawk helicopter gunships, even though Amnesty International has already shown how US weapons have been diverted to the Colombian military's dirty counterinsurgency war.

Nonetheless, US officials insist that this time, the weapons will be used to fight drugs. "[W]e are very clear that the military assistance that we provide to Colombia must be used for the pur-

poses intended, counter-narcotics," said Nicholas Burns, the State Department spokesman.³¹ But human rights groups no longer believe it. Recent revelations by both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch "confirm what we expected," says Charles Roberts of the Wash-

ington, DC-based Colombia Human Rights Committee. "While trying to avoid the appearance of complicity in human rights violations, the United States has continued to provide training and materiel to the Colombian military irrespective of its horrendous abuses."³² ■

31. Transcript of State Department briefing, Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 1996.

32. Interview, Washington, D.C., Jan. 21, 1997.

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^{24.} Interview with Saulo Segura Placios, La Modelo prison, Bogotá, Colombia, Sept. 18, 1995.

^{25.} Testimony of Carlos Alberto Vergara Amaya to the Colombian attorney general, Feb. 11, 1994.

^{26.} Letter from Carlos David López to the Colombian attorney general, Dec. 7, 1993; Letter from Saulo Segura Palacios to the Colombian attorney general, Dec. 7, 1993; Testimony of Carlos Alberto Vergara Amaya to the Colombian attorney general, Feb. 11, 1994; and Letter from Felipe Gómez to the Colombian attorney general, Nov. 29, 1994.

27. Letter from Carlos David López, Dec. 7, 1993.

^{28. &}quot;Asunto: Informe desaparición personas," signed by Colombian Army Gen. Marino Gutiérrez Isaza, June 2, 1992, as quoted in Human Rights Watch, op. cit. 29. Interview with Segura, op. cit.

^{30.} See Human Rights Watch, op. cit., and Charles Roberts, "Rule of Law and Development: U.S. AID and the Public Order Courts of Colombia," Georgetown University Law Center manuscript, Spring 1995.

The New National Security Merger:

Law Enforcement and Intelligence

by Louis Wolf

n 1991, as the statues of Marx and Lenin toppled in Moscow, political leaders and media pundits in Washington and other Western capitals pronounced the end of the Cold War. Suddenly, the gaggle of 22 US intelligence organs - particularly the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the four military service intelligence arms, and the FBI1—all feared they had lost their raison d'etre. For decades, these agencies had devoted large portions of their budgetary and technical resources and personnel to surveilling and/or fighting "the Soviet menace." The last six years have seen their conscious, quite public effort to stake out new enemies

This effort gives special significance to the recent conference on "Law Enforcement and Intelligence," sponsored by the American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on Law and National Security (SCLNS)² (see box p. 54). There were some 160 attendees, mostly present or past law enforcement and intelligence officers, military personnel, lawyers, and a few journalists. Former

and new turf.

in Dec. 1994.

Louis Wolf is Director of Research at CAQ.

1. The other agencies with significant intelligence functions include the Drug Enforcement Administration; Defense Investigative Service; Defense Mapping Agency; Intelligence and Research Division at the State Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Immigration and Naturalization Service; intelligence components at the Energy, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture Departments; Customs Service; Secret Service; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Agencies (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989]).

2. Sept. 19-20, 1996, in Washington, D.C. The initial

Standing Committee conference on the issue was held

FILE

Louis Freeh (left) with John Deutch

CIA General Counsel Elizabeth Rindskopf set the tone: "Intelligence is not conceptualized as threatening the rights and liberties of a citizen such as law enforcement [does]."³

The mutual animosity and isolation between the FBI and the CIA that prevailed for decades has allegedly diminished. Since 1991, the game has changed. As the *Wall Street Journal* noted, "The distinction between spying and law enforcement has become increasingly blurred." Noteworthy therefore was a statement at the closing conference plenary by the powerful deputy attorney general, Jamie Gorelick,

3. Opening plenary, "An Overview of a Changing World," Sept. 19, 1996. A Clinton foreign intelligence adviser challenges Rindskopf's assertion, suggesting: "The blending of spying and law enforcement has implications for the civil rights of U.S. citizens that can't be ignored." (Zoe Baird, "When Crime and Foreign Policy Meet," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 24, 1995, p. A22.)

4 George Melloan "Global View: What Are Spies For.

4. George Melloan, "Global View: What Are Spies For, and Not For," Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1996, p. A19.

whose job as the second ranking Justice Department official is national security policy and domestic intelligence. "I am astonished that some Hill people want to give the CIA operational authority in the US in violation of the National Security Act of 1947... [and] am very surprised at how short policymakers' memories are,"5 citing the disgrace of Watergate in 1972, and the 1975-76 revelations by the Senate Church Committee and the Rockefeller Commission of numerous CIA misdeeds in preceding decades.

For many Americans worrying about economic and social concerns close to home, foreign policy and intelligence activities have taken a back seat. Zoe Baird, failed Clinton

attorney general nominee, and now member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, suggests a "solution": "By finding a new language and justification for many foreign policy initiatives rooted in domestic security, there is a chance that this tendency can be reversed."⁶

One of the three quasi-governmental commissions now rethinking the post-Cold War intelligence apparatus, set forth four new missions for US intelligence under the convenient umbrella, "countering activities abroad that threaten US interests." These are counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and countering international organized crime.⁷

^{5.} Closing SCLNS luncheon, Sept. 20, 1996. Gorelick was Pentagon General Counsel from 1993-94 where she oversaw 10,000 lawyers, before which she was at the Department of Energy.

^{6.} Baird, op. cit.

^{7. &}quot;Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S.

The CIA's Future

The primary issue on the table is the future of the CIA. The prospects for President Clinton's December nomination of his national security adviser Anthony Lake to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) are still unknown. His predecessor, John Deutch, maintained an extraordinary position in Washington. "Deutch's colleagues [have] heard him boast, on more than one occasion, 'I am a policy maker.' "8 He became DCI in May 1995, only after conditioning his acceptance on his being a member of the President's Cabinet, like William Casey had been — with disastrous results under President Reagan.

Though Deutch, deputy defense secretary under President Bush, denied it. for more than six months CIA colleagues and administration officials reported he was thinking of resigning, having repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, sought the top Pentagon post. A friend told the Washington Post: "He has never been comfortable with the CIA culture, and [he] misses the Pentagon where he really was happy."9 Deutch's spokesman Dennis Boxx joked, "I go over to the Pentagon and people ask me if I'm over there measuring for office space."10 Indeed, his long and close working friendship with former Defense Secretary William Perry gave Deutch vital institutional support and influence, even as the breadth of Deutch's authority was not authorized in law. "It is, I might say, very much an ad hoc process," he admitted. 11 One headline called him "a poster boy for the militaryindustrial-academic complex."12

Deutch turned some heads in Washington by creating a CIA deputy directorship to oversee military (and paramilitary) operations. Another indicator of the former DCI's military lean-

Intelligence,"Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, March 1, 1996), p. 24. A former CIA analyst called the report "too focused on its rear-view mirror to look ahead." (Melvin Goodman, "The C.I.A.'s Reason for Living," New York Times, March 15, 1996, p. A29.)

8. William Safire, "The New Casey," New York Times, May 6, 1996, p. 15.

9. Walter Pincus, "CIA Director Planning to Resign, Sources Say," Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1996, pp. A1, 14. Deutch's reply-denial from an undisclosed vacation spot appeared in a letter to the editor, Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1996, p. A21.

10. Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Chief Charts His Own Course," New York Times, Sept. 29, 1996, p. 33.

11. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Deutch Outlines Plan to Centralize Control of Intelligence Community," Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1995, p. A23.

12. Nick Kotz, "Mission Impossible," *The Washingtonian*, Dec. 1995, p. 60.

ing was pointed out by Lawrence Korb, former assistant defense secretary under Reagan and now at the Brookings Institute, who cites the fact that Deutch is an outspoken "advocate" of defense mergers — which have been dubbed "payoff for layoffs."¹³

But despite Deutch's influence, the Aldrich Ames scandal and the recent case of alleged CIA Russia collaborator Harold Nicholson, revelations of CIA



liaisons in Guatemala with a military officer implicated in torture and murder, secret arms transfers to Bosnia kept undisclosed to Congress, the inexplicably missing \$2 billion plus at the super-secret NRO, sexual harassment lawsuits by nearly a dozen past and present CIA women, the CIA's lack of foreknowledge of Israel's precipitous September 24 tunnel opening at Temple Mount with its ensuing violence, among other public failures, have combined to create substantial morale problems at Langley. To an extent, Deutch was able to cast himself to Congress and sectors of the media as a reform-minded DCI. Yet, one editorial published only five days before he announced his departure summed up his tenure well. "[F]or all Mr. Deutch's efforts, the CIA proved impervious to change in fundamental areas."14 Despite all this, Deutch's belief in his political clout was personified by his immodest 1995 comment: "I have never heard anybody, ever, question my intelligence judgement."15

13. Mary McGrory, "Blowing Up the Government," Washington Post, July 9, 1996, p. A2; also Thomas E. Ricks and Jeff Cole, "Pentagon Payments to Defense Industry To Cover Merger Costs Survive Challenge," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1996, p. B2.

Journal, Sept. 25, 1996, p. B2. 14. Editorial, "The Incorrigible C.I.A.," New York Times, Dec. 8, 1996, p. 14.

15. Smith, op. cit.

Still, Deutch was beaten down when he proposed to build a \$10 million "fitness and wellness center," complete with basketball, volleyball and racquetball courts and exercise room, as part of his five-year "quality of life" project to "improve morale and working conditions" at the CIA headquarters. Other features included ergonomic chairs, bridge and yoga rooms, lunchtime square dances, and a dry cleaning pickup store. A typical employee comment went: "I too am flabbergasted by the ... notion. It suggests to me just how distant the DCI and [Executive Director Nora Slatkin] are from the CIA rank and file."16

FBI On the Move

In 1993, President Clinton appointed Louis Freeh to a 10-year term as FBI director. But after the bloody siege at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and agent E. Michael Kahoe's willful destruction of Ruby Ridge FBI documents, the Richard Jewell Olympic bombing disaster in Atlanta, the October 1996 FBI seizure and quick release of ex-KGB officer Vladimir Galkin, and the December 1996 arrest of FBI veteran Earl Pitts for selling counterintelligence secrets to Russia. Freeh's luster in power circles has worn off. Even along his own corridors, formerly pro-Freeh special agents are grumbling. "There is little confidence anymore in him or his management decisions," said one. "I hate what has happened under his watch," allowed another. 17

A development still unfolding is the sharp and escalating overseas expansion by the FBI under its ambitious director. In June 1994, Freeh led 10 officials from FBI, State, Treasury, DEA, and the National Security Council on a nine-day trip across eight countries (Germany, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia). Freeh met with senior police and intelligence figures and addressed rank-and-file audiences. A reporter accompanying the delegation wrote that Freeh "spread the American gospel of electronic surveillance, police seizure of property, and undercover operations." In Budapest, in front of more than 500 police, Freeh

16. Walter Pincus, "Deutch Shelves \$10 Million Field House," Washington Post, July 31, 1996, p. A25.
17. Jerry Seper, "FBI agents mull end of 'unsettling' Freeh reign," Washington Times, Nov. 11, 1996, p. A12; also Roberto Suro, "FBI Chief Finds Himself Under Microscope," Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1996, pp. A1, 11.

called on his hosts to enact a wiretapping law.18

Freeh was more frank there than in Washington, speaking of such wellknown illegalities as Watergate and the FBI's six-year undercover investigation of the El Salvador solidarity group, CISPES. "Some of them [his audiences] seemed very shocked that the FBI had done things illegally, had broken our laws ...," Freeh admitted to reporters. 19 Only two months previously in Moscow, with strong US support, Boris Yeltsin decreed a suspension of civil liberties and handed the police broad powers to arrest and detain persons for 30 days without charges. Freeh was uncritical during his Russia sojourn, saying "the emergency decrees in our view are just symbolic of the desperate situation."20 In a July 4 speech, he spoke of the millions of Russians killed fighting Napoleon in 1812 and the Nazis during World War II. He then offered a new official US version of Russian history:

United Kingdom

"These battles were of epic proportions. Through it all, though, the indomitable spirit of the Russian people shone brightly." 21

After a tour of the Nazi concentration camp in Birkenau, Poland, Freeh met with Czech President Vaclav Havel, who asked him to set up an FBI office in Prague. Polish President Lech Walesa upped the ante, inviting him to establish an FBI presence "all over Poland."22

Front and center on the trip's agenda was the nearly out-of-control organized crime empire in Russia and in a number of the countries visited. According to former British intelligence legal adviser David Bickford, there are now 500 Russian criminal organizations, of which about 250 are already functioning cooperatively with organized crime in the US.23 In fact, the hotel in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius where Freeh's delegation stayed is "widely believed to be mob-controlled."24

At a February 1995 gathering in Switzerland, Freeh met with 15 foreign leaders to sell his agenda of creating offices, local liaisons, and training missions in their countries. 25 While the FBI expansion abroad was actively supported by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, there was some trepidation at Foggy Bottom. "The FBI is on a roll," a senior State official was quoted.26 Another person at State wryly nicknamed Freeh "Pac-Man," after the voracious video game figure. 27

Others are more blunt. Then DCI James Woolsey was angered because he only learned of the Freeh trip from a third source, not from Freeh. When the DCI asked for the CIA's inclusion in the delegation, Freeh refused. One CIA official said angrily that in the wake of the Aldrich Ames scandal, "Freeh and the FBI saw a hole they were going to drive a truck through. They made a power play."28 Another intelligence official close to the issue observed, "The CIA feels under siege now. People feel like Louis is planting the FBI flag on their turf." Freeh's retort? "It's not a question of taking over anybody's turf, it's now our turf because it's a law-enforcement arena."29 "Isn't this what we won the Cold War for? We didn't win it so we could cede sovereignty over that part of the world to the gangsters and fascists," blurted one FBI agent.30 A seasoned journalist reported, "The opening of an FBI office in Moscow, for example, was widely viewed inside the CIA as an FBI effort to poach some of the CIA's intelligence-gathering operations."31

Current FBI Overseas Presence

EUROPE	ASIA/PACIFIC	W. HEMISPHERE
Austria	Australia	Barbados
Belgium	Hong Kong	Canada
France	Japan	Chile
Germany	Philippines	Colombia
Greece	Thailand	Mexico
Italy		Panama
Russia		Uruguay
Spain		Venezuela
Switzerland		

Projected New FBI Overseas Offices

1997	1998	1999
Argentina China Egypt Estonia India Israel Pakistan Poland Saudi Arabia South Africa Ukraine	Brazil Czech Republic Denmark Kazakhstan Nigeria South Korea Turkey Uzbekistan	Georgia Peru Romania Singapore

From: "The FBI's Presence Overseas: The Need for FBI Agents Abroad to Better Protect The United States from International Crime and Terrorism, "Washington, D.C., FBI, June 5, 1995, pp. v, vi, 14,17.

24. Klaidman, op. cit., p. 12.

^{18.} Daniel Klaidman, 'How to Police an Ex-Police State," Legal Times, July 11, 1994, pp. 1, 12.

^{19.} Ibid.

^{20.} Ibid., p. 13.

^{21.} Louis Freeh, FBI speech transcript, Moscow, July 4, 1994. He twisted the knife an extra turn by officially opening the FBI's Moscow office the same Independence Day.

^{22.} Klaidman, op. cit., p. 13.

^{23.} Speech before SCLNS conference, Sept. 19, 1996.

^{25.} Ibid. The countries represented at this pivotal meeting with Freeh were Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Pakistan, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, and Uzbekistan.

^{26.} Walter Pincus, "FBI, CIA Try To Set Turf Rules As Bureau Branches Out; State Department Is Concerned About Possible Conflicts Between Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy Goals," Washington Post, March 18, 1996, p. A10.

^{27.} Interview, Nov. 27, 1996.

^{28.} Kotz, op. cit., p. 146.

^{29.} Daniel Klaidman, "Freeh Trip Sparks Debate About FBI's Role Overseas," *Legal Times*, July 18, 1994, p. 16. 30. Klaidman, "Freeh Trip...," op. cit., p. 16. Freeh's own rhetoric could choke a horse. The Bureau's work with foreign law enforcement is "another major addition to the needed bedrock of the rule of law for all, 'he crooned. ("The FBI's Presence Overseas: The Need for FBI Agents Abroad to Better Protect the United States From International Crime and Terrorism,"Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 5, 1996, p. vii.) 31. Paul Quinn-Judge, "CIA chief sees a rise in terror," Boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1995, p. 2.

Former Reagan chief-of-staff Alexander Haig bristled, "To pervert the mission of the FBI to become an external, international law enforcement agency is wrongheaded."32 "The FBI's setting up offices all over the world is a disgrace," stated Bush National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.33 Philip Heymann, deputy attorney general and State Department official under Jimmy Carter, was unusually candid. "If international law is going to be violated, it ought to be done by intelligence agencies, not because it's dirty work, but because it is very important to keep your law enforcement agencies within the tradition of obeying the law."34

In fact, since World War II, the FBI has maintained what were euphemistically called "Legal Attaché" offices or "legats" in American embassies, with particular growth during the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Nelson Rockefeller were erecting their parallel empires in Washington and Latin America respectively. By 1973, there were "legat" offices in 20 countries. Today, there are FBI Legal Attaché offices in 23 countries, each with responsibilities in neighboring countries lacking a "legat" presence. FBI agents posted

The parallel institutional empires, combined with the deeply ingrained secrecy and compartmentalization, known in spook circles as "stovepiping," has emerged as a major stumbling block in the new intelligence/law enforcement joint ventures.

abroad are usually accredited as diplomatic personnel, giving them diplomatic immunity — a factor always important to Americans who may get caught engaging in espionage.

One day after the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City bombing, the FBI and State Department inaugurated the International Law Enforcement Training



FBI and State Department-inaugurated International Law Enforcement Training Academy in Budapest at a former Communist police academy.

Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, housed at a former Communist police academy. In 1995 alone, during eight-week sessions with instructors from Canada, Ger-

> many, Ireland, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Hungary, the FBI trained 4,400 foreign law enforcement personnel, mostly in Budapest, but also in several other countries in the region, and at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. In 1996. police officers from Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,

Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine went through training. Personnel from other countries who have or soon will undergo training include India, Paraguay, Peru, Tunisia, and Uruguay.³⁵

CIA and **FBI** Join Forces

The parallel institutional empires, combined with the deeply ingrained se-

35. Louis J. Freeh, testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, March 12, 1996, pp. 4, 5; and ILEA informational brochure, n.d.

crecy and compartmentalization, known in spook circles as "stovepiping," has emerged as a major stumbling block in the new intelligence/law enforcement joint ventures. In February 1996, there was a closed meeting in Rome between Europe-based CIA chiefs of station and Europe-based FBI agents to fashion some ground rules for working with their police and intelligence counterparts. One State Department official involved in the process noted: "We have been at loggerheads over the interrelationship between law enforcement and foreign policy."36 "Not all the past tensions dissolved" after the meeting, FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro allowed.37

On the same subject, CIA General Counsel Jeffrey Smith modestly told the largely sympathetic SCLNS crowd that "the CIA is a wonderful organization," then listed the modes of new collaboration between it and the FBI: (a) biweekly meetings of general counsels; (b) biweekly cross-agency meetings of the so-called "Gang of Eight" on joint operations; (c) CIA-FBI meetings such as those in Rome and London; (d) CIA training of FBI and vice versa; (e) personnel exchanges at each others' headquarters; and (f) an exchange of

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^{32.} Klaidman, "Freeh Trip...," op. cit., p. 16. 33. Kotz, op. cit.

^{34.} ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, "Special Report: Law Enforcement and Intelligence, An ABA Presidential Showcase Panel," Chicago, Aug. 6, 1995, p. 9.

^{36.} Pincus, "FBI, CIA Try..." op. cit.

^{37.} Ibid. A second closed CIA-FBI meeting took place in London.

What is the Standing Committee?

The American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on Law and National Security (SCLNS) was founded in 1962 with an "initial goal ... to contrast the American system of government under the rule of law with the alternative vision being offered by international communism." The founders included ABA president (1964-65) and Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell (1972-87), together with four hardcore right-wing anticommunist figures: William Chamberlain Mott was a naval adviser to

Franklin Roosevelt (1942-43) and special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair (1954-58); Frank Barnett worked in 1951 with Office of Strategic Services Director "Wild Bill" Donovan and Reagan CIA Director William Casey in assisting anticommunist Soviet refugees exiting Berlin and Vienna, and with Casey, founded the National Strategy Informa-

tion Center (NSIC), also in 1962; Morris Leibman was a Chicago lawyer; and R. Daniel McMichael was with U.S. Steel Corp., and later with the Richard Mellon Scaife Foundation, a major financial SCLNS backer.² Both NSIC and Scaife had Cold War intelligence ties.

The McCarthy-era ABA Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives (SCCTSO) was a very active body. In 1962, as the SCLNS was founded, SCCTSO was cosmetically renamed the Special Committee on Education on the Contrast Between Liberty Under Law and Communism. Then, "supplied by Frank Barnett's conceptual guidance," Powell and Leibman went before the ABA and, "after a bit of spilled blood," SCLNS was formally established. William Mott acknowledged two decades later that he was "hauled before" the ABA Board of Governors "to explain certain things" about his activities, also positing that the Standing Committee is "much better balanced" today than it was³ — a rather disingenuous claim insofar as he was an architect of the organization. Mott edited the SCLNS house publication, Intelligence Report, which was subsumed in 1991 by the National Security Law Report.

With CIA help and direction, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) was formed in 1975. In 1980, its second president, CIA veteran and ex-general counsel John Warner insinuated himself and several other AFIO members into the Standing Committee as part of an Advisory Group on Intelligence Legislation to help ABA lobby Congress. He boasted at AFIO's October 1980 annual convention of "important success" inside the Standing Committee's deliberations by getting it to recommend

narrowing a Charter proposed by Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ken.) that would have imposed some "rules" on the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, NSA, and FBI. AFIO gloated that the Senate decided to "jettison 99 percent" of the Charter bill.⁴ In 1986 the Standing Committee produced a 119-page study urging consolidation of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, ostensibly to limit the number of members and staff with access to classified material.⁵

The 1996-97 Standing Committee's 11 governing members include three former CIA general counsels, two members from Justice/FBI, and one each from NSA, NSC, State, and the House Intelligence Committee.

During his self-indulgent 1987 appearance before the Senate/House Iran-Contra Committee, Oliver North testified that he had held "discussions with John Norton Moore of the ABA on several occasions." A rightwing international law professor at the University of Virginia, Moore told North that the National Security Council to

which North was detailed was not covered by the Boland Amendment which prohibited CIA support of the Nicaraguan Contras, and thus his Contra support operations were legal. "The ABA had no knowledge of any conversations that took place," pleaded ABA spokeswoman Nancy Cowger Slonin. During 1984-86, Moore was SCLNS chair.

The 1996-97 Standing Committee's 11 governing members include three former CIA general counsels, two members from Justice/FBI, and one each from NSA, NSC, State, and the House Intelligence Committee, as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Its corps of counselors include former FBI director and former DCI William Webster, former Attorney General Edward Levi, former Army head John Marsh, and former Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow. Recent past counselors include Warren Christopher, William Colby, and Henry Kissinger.

1. ABA, "About the Standing Committee," $National\ Security\ Law\ Report$, March 1996, p. 1.

2. Seventy-seven percent of the SCLNS's income is from private foundation grants; only 8 percent comes from the ABA. (bid., p. 6.)

3. These quotes are from Steven Pressman, "ABA Unit Reflects Changes in Tactics Over U.S. Security," Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 5, 1982, pp. 1, 16. On "spilled blood," see "Dan McMichael Salutes Frank Barnett at Conference Dinner," National Security Law Report, Jan. 1995, p. 4.

4. "Senate Approves Moderate Intelligence Bill; American Bar Association Also Counsels Moderation," Periscope [AFIO journal], Summer 1980, pp. 1-2; also Louis Wolf, "Old Soldiers Fade Away ... Old Spies Lobby," Covertaction Information Bulletin, n. 11, Dec: 1980.

5. Daniel F. Gilmore, "ABA finds oversight of covert ops inadequate," UPI, Jan. 28, 1986. The study was titled "Oversight and Accountability of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies."

6. Martha Middleton, "ABA and the Contras?" National Law Journal, July 20, 1987.

technologies (which is just beginning).³⁸

One critical facet of such cooperation involves the different agendas and methods of intelligence and law enforcement. While the FBI has historically often engaged in "fishing expeditions" during its domestic investigations, it is in theory supposed — as part of the Justice Department — to investigate within constitutional rules so that evidence of crime can eventually be used in court. The CIA, NSA, DIA, and other intelligence agencies operating abroad work outside such constitutional guarantees. "Foreign intelligence collection is a strategic exercise which normally does not involve the individual rights and liberties of US citizens."39

Meanwhile, the new FBI "legats" have been busy. "The growing FBI overseas contingent is establishing liaison relationships with foreign police and intelligence personnel that already have relationships with CIA personnel. The FBI agents also try to develop their own clandestine informants." According to one government official, "the FBI already has tried to recruit people the CIA dropped as untrustworthy."

Director Freeh testified to Congress that "FBI agents stationed overseas are not intelligence officers; they are not a shadow intelligence agency, and they do not engage in espionage." Yet, Freeh calls the new and future FBI overseas deployments "a sort of distant early warning system." And a joint government task force recommended to the attorney general and the DCI that "Law Enforcement should make more disciplined use of the US intelligence requirements system to ensure that its needs for strategic intelligence are considered and, where appropriate, met." "43"

Deutch also made conflicting statements and put inconsistent spins on the already advanced FBI thrust, even as the rival camps drew their lines over the is-



The spy game, circa 1967 from the movie Caprice.

sue. In July 1995, Deutch said the FBI-CIA marriage abroad "frankly isn't working," and the CIA should supply better data to the FBI so that it will be "less interested in going overseas and putting in place" a competing intelligence network. ⁴⁴ As seen by the CIA, "crime-fighting offers [the CIA] a way to try to justify its overseas networks and keep its budget intact in the post-cold-war world."

After the FBI and State Department delivered a 52-page report on June 5, 1995, outlining the FBI plan to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, Senate Intelligence Committee Vice-Chair Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) received a June 6 letter from Deutch, stating "there is no reason to recreate" an existing CIA chain of links to foreign law enforcement and intelligence organizations "with an extensive law enforcement presence outside the United States. Indeed, such a presence would be counterproductive because it would be confusing, duplicative, and [would] undermine" the CIA's numerous liaisons developed over many years with its overseas counterparts — "a rich environment from which information required by US law enforcement agencies can be gleaned," Deutch complained.46

44. R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA to Alter Its Priorities in Information Gathering; Deutch to Focus on Military, Criminals, Terrorists," Washington Post, July 13, 1995, p. A13. 45. David Johnston, "Strength Is Seen In A U.S. Export. Law Enforcement," New York Times, April 17, 1995, p. A1. 46. Deutch letter to Kerrey, June 6, 1996, p. 2; see also R.

CAQ

But Deutch went on to say, "This program was thoroughly vetted and agreed to by the CIA. ... I happily went and helped Louis [Freeh]."47 And his general counsel, Jeffrey Smith, remarked breezily, "Will we bump up against one another? Of course. The key is recognizing that what we do is different from what they do."48 An unnamed senior CIA official claimed relative indifference, saying the FBI moves are "tiny" in comparison to the CIA's clandestine service personnel assigned in most countries around the globe, 49 reliably estimated to number more than four thousand. Late last year, ranking Democratic House Intelligence Committee member Norman Dicks (Wash.) weighed in: "Everyone sees the dying carcass of the CIA. The DIA and the FBI - everyone is trying to get their piece."50

The disturbing implications of a growing CIA-FBI marriage are very real. Moreover, it seems clear that the CIA's role has not declined as the FBI's international involvement has grown. The merger of purposes has not led to shrinkage, but to expansion. The likely result: More meddling abroad, not less.

^{38.} SCLNS conference, Sept. 20, 1996. Previously, Smith was a law partner, Senate Armed Services Committee chief counsel, and State Department assistant legal ad viser for law enforcement and intelligence (1975-84). Named CIA General Counsel in May 1995, he abruptly left the position after 17 months, returning to private law practice.

^{39.} Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law Enforcement, "Report to the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence," Washington, D.C.: May 1995, p. A-3. 40. Pincus, op. cit.

^{41.} Louis J. Freeh, testimony before Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, March 12, 1996, p. 7.
42. Ibid., p. 1.

^{43.} Joint Task Force, op. cit., p. ii.

Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippmann, 'FBI Plans To Expand Overseas," *Washington Post*, Aug. 20, 1996, pp. Al. 14.

^{47.} Smith and Lippmann, op. cit., p. A14.

^{48.} Ibid. 49. Ibid.

^{50.} Kotz, op. cit., p. 146.

Social Engineering, Slavery and War

by Alex de Waal

hen there is news from Sudan, it is rarely good. While Western media focus on terrorism abroad and slavery within, Khartoum is quietly implementing a titanic program of forcible social transformation that dwarfs both of these problems. A comprehensive program of "Islamist social engineering," intended to reshape the political, social, economic, and religious life of the nation, is being carried out with a degree of violent ruthlessness that occasionally borders on the genocidal. Millions of people are affected, and as civil war spreads to eastern Sudan, the harshest measures are implemented there. And increasingly, the program is getting financial support from international aid agencies, including the United Nations.

At first look, such a program seems absurd in overwhelmingly Moslem northern Sudan. In fact, Islamic social engineering is a political program, not a religious one. The ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) is bent on imposing its narrow, chauvinist interpretation of political Islam on all Sudanese:

Christians, believers in traditional religions, and Moslems alike. In the 1986 elections — the last free test of popular political opinion in Sudan — NIF won only 8 percent of the vote. The vast majority of Moslems voted for other parties, some of them explicitly secular. One of

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1. E.g., the Sudanese Communist Party, the Sudanese



Man tortured for "refusing to convert to Islam."

NIF's aims since it seized power in the June 1989 military coup has been to "Islamize" these non-NIF Moslems. Since most Sudanese Moslems feel no need to be Islamized and reject NIF's claim to a monopoly on religious truth, the government has had to resort to extreme repressive measures to maintain power. It has hounded the civil opposition into silence or out of the country, dismantled all representative or independent insti-

tutions, detained thousands of people without trial, and tortured hundreds.² It is only outside the country that NIF's extremism is confused with Islam itself.

Islamic Social Planning is the brainchild of the No. 2 man in NIF, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha. In 1992 he inaugurated a new ministry, Social Planning, and was its first minister (he has since moved to Foreign Affairs). He has taken the philosophy of his mentor, Dr. Hassan al Turabi, to new extremes.3 In the last few years, NIF had implemented far-reaching changes. "Islamic" banks can no longer charge interest, and the zakat (Islamic tithe) is deducted by the state and paid into quasi-governmental foundations for "charitable" purposes (of which more below). The legal system is now based entirely on Turabi's interpretation of Islamic law. Strict "Islamic" dress and behavior codes are enforced for women. The supposedly "Islamic" form of democracy excludes multiparty elections in favor of shura, a form of consultative assembly that can advise but wields no power. Bookshops sell theological

tracts, but no modern social or political studies, and no independent newspapers or magazines.

At the center of Osman's ambitious plan is a nationwide system of Islamist

National Party, and the Beja Congress; others are based on well-established Sudanese Sufi sects, e.g., the Umma Party, based on the Mahdist organization, and the Democratic Unionist Party, based on the Khatmiya sect. 2. Amnesty International, Sudan: The Tears of Orphans (London: AI Publications, 1995).

3. See Alex de Waal, "Hassan al Turabi's Muslim Brothers: Theocracy in Sudan," *CAQ*, n. 49, Summer 1994.

education which has been successful in drawing in many. Other Moslem Sudanese — rejecting the suggestion that they only became proper Moslems after the NIF seized power have grown increasingly hostile to the NIF and its program. In 1996, the capital was shaken by unrest that included the first serious military actions by two northern opposition fronts, the Beja Congress and the Sudan Alliance Forces. In January, the offensives stepped up with the capture of a string of towns. For the first time in a century, there is a genuine prospect of major military action in the heartlands of northern Sudan.

Comprehensive Call

In the South and some areas of the North, such as the Nuba Mountains, violent resistance has been ongoing for more than a decade. There, Islamic Social Planning takes a far more drastic and violent form including forced labor and the abduction of civilians. These practices are not aberrations or the outcome of social decay in a war-torn society with a weak government. They are policy.

NIF calls its policy in the war regions the "Comprehensive Call" (Da'awa al Shamla). It is integrated into the government's military strategy and, as the name suggests, covers all aspects of social, economic, political, and religious life. Aspects of the program are presented by the government as "development" and "self reliance," but indigenous people see it as the forc-

Since most Sudanese Moslems feel no need to be Islamized and reject NIF's claim to a monopoly on religious truth, the government has had to resort to extreme repression.

ible seizure of land and destruction of villages, followed by the creation of large commercial mechanized farms using a captive labor force.

The government has been cannily reluctant to put NIF goals on paper, but occasionally key information is let

out. In January 1992, for example, when Khartoum launched a Jihad in the Nuba Mountains, accompanied by a fatwa (a statement issued by pro-government Imams that denounced rebel sympathizers — Christian and Moslem and alike - as infidels deserving death), it also issued the following definition of the Comprehensive Call:4

- religious indoctrination and the imposition of Islam on non-Moslems;
- political, social, and economic favoritism for Nuba Moslems and their instigation to head the campaign;
- Jihad against all those who defy the Call,

whether Moslems or non-Moslems;

• isolation of Nuba Christians and intimidation of church leaders, also isolation of the region from international

> human rights, humanitarian or solidarity organizations;

- resettlement in "peace villages" to help achieve the first two objectives;
 and
- crackdown on all Nuba, inside or outside the Nuba Mountains, who oppose the campaign.⁵


Islamization by Force

At the center of the NIF plan are the "peace camps." It is there that the government

camps." It is there that the government program of enforced acculturation (i.e.,

4. Mohamed A.M. Salih, "Resistance and response: Ethnocide and genocide in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan," *GeoJournal*, Spring 1995.

5. Here and below, much of the evidence comes from the Nuba Mountains. This is largely because the most thor ough research has been conducted there. The policies



UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Islamization and Arabization) will take place and the new social and economic order will be born. These are run by the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) — a paramilitary force, government departments, and sympathetic Islamic humanitarian organizations. At least 100 peace camps have been set up around army garrisons and near major cities and agricultural schemes. They range from small squalid settlements attached to army outposts to enormous "peace cities" in the desert outside Khartoum. Theirs is a long-term agenda: much attention is focused on children: the next generation of Sudanese will be educated in the NIF ethos.

In the words of one of its most prominent exponents, jihadist education aims at "the consolidation of religious values in society and effecting a comprehensive departure from the [current] reality of ignorance and illiteracy and the actualisation of total interaction with the Islamic project ... which

are implemented throughout the south, in the southern Blue Nile, and increasingly in eastern Sudan.

must engulf all sections and denominations of society." Islamic charitable organizations sponsor *khalwas* (Koranic schools), summer schools that recruit tens of thousands of students each year, and projects that Islamize prisoners.

While "peace camps" are more common in the South and the Nuba Mountains and have begun along the eastern border, enforced acculturation is also practiced in the capital. Since 1992, campaigns against "vagrant" children in Khartoum have swept unaccompanied non-Arab youths off the streets and into the seven or more camps outside the city. For non-Moslem children, especially in the war zones, the process of identity change can be extreme and extremely coercive. Children abducted to peace camps have their heads shaved and are given uniforms with "Abnaa al Sudan" (Children of Sudan) inscribed in red.8 They may be required to embrace the preferred culture of the NIF and to adopt a new name, religion, and language (Arabic). Life in the camps is

harsh and concentrates on Islamic instruction and military drill. Most of the internees are obliged to become Moslem; a few are discreetly released after their parents track them down.

Peace camps are also a central component of the Sudan government's coun-

terinsurgency strategy. A constellation of these camps — akin to the "strategic hamlets" used by US forces in Southeast Asia — is spreading in areas controlled by the army. They are tightly controlled and ringed by free-fire zones. Many boys and young men are forced to join the armed forces, especially the PDF, on pain of imprisonment, torture, or execution. While in the PDF, they are subjected to abuses, and then turned into instruments in the destruction of what remains of their communities.

Rape and Forced Marriage

Sudanese dissidents have long speculated another part of the NIF strategy of Islamization is to promote marriage between Moslem men (mainly from northern Sudan) and non-Moslem southern Sudanese women. If true, this is one of the best-guarded secrets in Sudan.

Sudanese newspaper reports and accounts from rural Sudan suggest that the strategy exists. The Islamic "popular voluntary organization" Nidaa al Jihad is one of the most prominent agents of Islamization in the country, publicly dedicated to combating "rebellion of all types and forms of conspiracy targeting the Umma [Islamic community] and its religion." It openly supports mujahidin9 — though it prefers to speak of the Jihad as "reconstruction" rather than war. Among its projects is "working for [inter]marriages between northern and southern Sudanese through the establishment of mahmiyat [a term that translates as protectorates or controlled settlements] in southern Sudan." The executive director of its subsidiary, the Abdel Rahman Ibn Auf Charitable Endowment Foundation, spoke publicly of the organization's aim of encouraging northern Moslems to move to the South and intermarry. 10 Carried to its logical conclusion, such a program could create, within a short generation,

The camps ---- akin to the US forces' "strategic hamlets" in Southeast
Asia ---- are spreading in areas
controlled by Sudan's army.

a large, relatively well-educated and well-connected Moslem minority that could dominate the political future of the region

The program of creating a new generation of Islamized children, torn from their social roots, combines with the brutality of army operations to give soldiers and militiamen carte blanche to abduct women and girls for "marriage" or rape. This practice goes well beyond the lawlessness of front-line soldiers and reflects government policy. The clearest cases of a widespread policy come from the Nuba Mountains where peace camps are the center of much of the persecution.

Fawzia Jibreel, a 17-year-old Nuba who was abducted, spoke to African Rights the day after her escape from a Mendi "peace camp" in the Nuba Mountains.¹¹ Her voice was very quiet and she held her head in her hands throughout the interview. Her village was attacked and burned at dawn on January 31, 1995, and the villagers rounded up:

Very early in the morning the enemy came and surrounded the whole village. Our family has two compounds; they took 16 people from just our family. The soldiers said, "You will come with us to Mendi. If you refuse, you will be killed." ... On the way they said, "something you have never seen before, you will see it in Mendi."

Fawzia went on to detail what life in a "peace camp" means. Some women and girls were forcibly "married" by soldiers who chose them. The others had only a few hours of peace:

After dark, the soldiers came and took the girls to their rooms, and raped them. I was taken and raped. ... When you have been taken, the soldier who has taken you will do what he wants, then he will go out of the room, you will stay, and another one will come. It continues like this. There is different behavior. Some lady, if she is raped by four or five soldiers, she will cry from pain. Then, if the soldiers are good, they will leave her. But others will beat her to keep her quiet, and they will carry on.

Every day the raping continued. ... It is impossible to count the men who raped me. It was continuous. Perhaps in a week I would have only one day of rest. Sometimes one man will take me for the whole night. Sometimes I will be raped by four or five men per day or night; they will just be changing one for another.

After three months of this ordeal, she managed to escape and describe a life in the peace camp in which every activity seemed designed so that the soldiers could exercise arbitrary power over the captives' bodies. The soldiers can force the women to work, control access to the water pump, and distribute relief items at whim. No women were spared, even girls as young as 9 years old were raped.

There are many such stories from the war zones of Sudan, north and south. ¹² Systematic rape carried out in this manner destroys the fabric of soci-

 ^{6.} Al Inqaz al Watani (Sudan), May 30, 1996.
 7. African Rights, Sudan's Invisible Citizens: The Policy of Abuse against Displaced People in the North, London, Feb. 1995, pp. 17-21.
 8. Ibid.

^{9.} Mujahidin are Holy Warriors and others engaged in the struggle for an Islamic state.

^{10.} Ibrahim Mohamed Ahmed Hassan, quoted in Al In qaz al Watani, Oct. 5, 1993.

^{11.} Not her real name. Interview in Kauda, Nuba Mountains, May 12, 1995.

^{12.} African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan, London, 1995, pp. 221-41.

The War's Many Players

In 1983, a mutiny by southern units in the Sudanese army led to the formation of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by Col. John Garang, which has been fighting against successive northern governments ever since. The SPLA originally stood for a "united, secular Sudan," but increasingly leans towards self-determination (read: secession) for the

South. Governments in Khartoum have been wedded to ever more extremist versions of political Islam, a program that reduces the non-Moslem, non-Arab people of the South and other peripheries to second-class status.

When the rebellion began, the then-president, Jaafar Nimeiri, tried to pretend that all was well. He told his Western donors (notably the US, which provided him with more than \$1.4 billion in aid) that he was facing only small and fragmented insurgent gangs, and he refused to expand the armed forces through conscription. Instead, the president turned to mobilizing local militias. After Nimeiri's downfall in April 1985, the successor governments continued this policy, concentrating on the Baggara tribes. These militias - known as Murahaliin - were particularly attractive to Prime Minister Sadio el Mahdi because they were drawn from the core constituency of his ruling Umma Party. As well as a cheap weapon against the SPLA, the Murahaliin were seen as a safeguard against a politically distrusted army (erro-

neously, it turned out — Murahaliin leaders rapidly declared their support for the June 1989 coup that overthrew Sadiq).

The Murahaliin had their own agenda: to get rich quick. Many of the young militiamen had lost their herds during the 1983-84 droughts; others had lost casual jobs in urban areas with the economic slump. They raided undefended villages for cattle and anything else they could carry away. The first big raids were in 1985; four years of near-continuous devastation followed. The raiders'work was facilitated by the reluctance of the SPLA to defend what it saw as militarily unimportant villages: only in 1989 did the Murahaliin encounter their first serious resistance. Some sections of the Baggara promptly signed local peace treaties with the Dinka.

The nature of the war in northern Bahr el Ghazal changed in 1990. For some years, the area was much quieter. Then the army itself — which had been quietly supporting the Murahaliin raids all along — began to take a lead role. Meanwhile, the Murahaliin had been formally recognized as part of the government's Popular Defence Force (PDF). They were aug-

mented by the defection of the SPLA Commander Kerubino Kuanyin, who set up a renegade pro-government militia in the area, and in April 1996 formally signed a "Charter" aligning himself with the government. The last two years have seen resurgent attacks and raids.



SPLA combatant in southern Sudan.

US Role?

Washington has labeled Sudan a terrorism-exporting state and accused it of helping plan a series of bomb attacks in New York City in 1993. There is evidence of Sudan's involvement in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on his visit to the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Sudan is friendly with both Iraq and Iran and lends support to violent dissidents in US-friendly countries of the region such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The US has every interest, it would seem, in hastening the downfall of the National Islamic Front in Khartoum and has certainly not shied from such interference in other countries. The much-publicized \$20 million in US military assistance to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda

— the "front-line states" which are hosting the Sudanese opposition — would seem to confirm this.

But that conclusion, based on extensive interviews and research on the ground, may be hasty. While the US clearly cannot afford not to have a policy on Sudan, it in fact has two. One policy — particularly favored at the Middle East and North Africa desks of the State Department — is to recognize that political Islam is here to stay, and push quietly for a peaceful handover of power from the NIF to conservative elements in the opposition. This "soft landing" scenario is fueled by worry that a war in northern Sudan will destabilize Egypt (the biggest prize in the region), and by a distinct lack of faith in the political skills and prospects of the opposition, specifically the

SPLA. The State Department also supported exempting Sudan from the ban on trade relations imposed by the April 1996 Anti-Terrorist Act. It was apparently the only one of the seven "rogue" states so favored by President Clinton, who quietly approved the exemption and thereby allowed the California-based oil company, Occidental Petroleum, to pursue its stake in a \$930 million oil deal with Sudan.¹

The second policy — held by some at Africa desks in the State Department, and in the NSC and Pentagon — is more assertive. To date, this approach has had remarkably little impact beyond modest assistance to the defensive capacities of the front-line states (most of which has yet to be received). For once, US policy is less than it appears.

This situation may change. After opposition offensives into northern Sudan last January, the Sudanese vice president received a humiliating rebuff from President Mubarak of Egypt, who rebutted the Sudanese charge that the attacks were an "invasion" from Ethiopia and Eritrea, and said that the war was solely an internal affair. Analysts are developing frightening pictures of what may happen as the opposition forces close in on Khartoum: "The Afghanistan scenario," the "Somalia scenario"; the labels say it all. Contingency planning for these eventualities is beginning, as policymakers realize they cannot afford to be caught unprepared by another humanitarian disaster.

1. David Ottaway, "U.S. Eased Law on Terrorism to Aid Oil Firm," Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1997.

ety; in extremis it is an instrument of genocide. ¹³ A former security officer from the Nuba Mountains who has since defected, Khalid el Husseini, said that "if the [Nuba] men and women are together and get married and have children, that itself is contrary to government policy. The members of the Arab tribes are allowed to marry them in order to eliminate the Nuba identity." ¹⁴

Peace Camps, Agricultural Development, Forced Labor

The peace camps serve not only to help create a new Islamized generation, but to provide cheap or unpaid labor where it is needed. Across the country, the camps are placed close to commercial farming schemes where internees are frequently required to work without pay. Throughout the war zones, captives held in garrisons are often compelled to work for soldiers as domestic servants.

Nura Kabia Chagul, a 17-year-old Moslem Nuba was captured in what the army calls a "combing" operation, which involves burning villages, looting all moveable property, and abducting the inhabitants. She was taken to a garrison at Heiban and put in the "care" of Idris, a soldier. 15

Idris has two wives. He showed me to his wives and told them that they should treat me as their servant. Idris told menot to go anywhere without his permission and I should only stay in the house. I spent seven days in Heiban in the house of Idris. I was working in his house and his farm. I get up every morning at about 4:30

 Amnesty International, It's About Time: Women's Rights Are Human Rights (London: Al Publications, 1995).
 Interviewed by the BBC in Switzerland, June 13, 1995.
 Interview in Kujur el Sha'abiya, Nuba Mountains, May 13, 1995.

60

a.m. I clean the compound and prepare breakfast, usually asida [sorghum porridge]. At 6:00 a.m. I go to the farm to either clear the weeds or keep the animals away from it. I stay in the farm up to 4:00 p.m. When I return from the farm, I go to fetch water from the Heiban water tanker. There I wait for long hours though I should come quickly to cook the supper. After the supper at about 8:00 p.m. I wash the utensils. Before I go to sleep in my rakuba [shelter] I will go to the elder wife of Idris, Aziza, and ask her as to what I should do the following day.

On my way to the farm every morning I meet many adults who are in the peace camp. They all go to work in the farms. The farms in Heiban belong to the army and the PDF. I can see many of these adults in the farms near to the one of Idris but nobody can talk to the other. I was always thinking of how to escape. I would always weep when I remember my mother, my relatives and my village.

Nura escaped. She is one of a fortunate minority who could run, and who had somewhere to run to.

As the program of establishing peace camps is extended, the Nuba and southerners are increasingly removed from their ancestral lands and reduced to the status of laborers on mechanized farms. At least half a million people are affected so far, and the numbers are increasing every month.

Charity Begins ...

Most peace camps are administered by the Peace and Development Administration (described without apparent irony by one aid worker as "the humanitarian wing of security"¹⁰) or by Islamic humanitarian agencies. They are registered as charities but many Sudanese perceive their activities as having crossed the line into direct support for the government's program of Jihad and Comprehensive Call.¹⁷

According to local people, it is hard to distinguish between some of these these agencies and the government, National Islamic Front, or security forces. One former resident of the Upper Nile region described an agency that worked in the town of Bunj: "All the [their] people are 100 percent NIF. [Their] members have their guns. They collaborate with security." The chief officer of the Mujahidin in Bunj, the resident reported, "is an NIF member; he also has a position an agency." 18

One prominent agency is Muwafaq al Khairiya whose publicity material boasts 23 peace camps in the South and the adjacent war-affected areas. The government values Muwafaq's work, and sometimes holds official meetings in its offices. ¹⁹ Col. Paul Kwanj, governor of the Upper Nile, where Muwafaq runs several peace camps, was reported as saying that the people there "have felt for the first time that there was a government with the advent of the social services and the grain mills provided by Muwafaq."²⁰

International Support


While the support of Khartoum for Islamic organizations operating in peace

^{16.} Interviewed in Khartoum, Feb. 1996.

^{17.} Muwafaq Foundation (Sudan), "From Dependency to Self Reliance," Khartoum, leaflet, n.d.

^{18.} Interviewed in Ethiopia, Aug. 1996.

^{19.} Ataul Karim, et al., Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review (UK: University of Birmingham, July 1996), p. 98. 20. Al Quwat al Musallaha, Jan. 10, 1993, p. 2.



This story of one Dinka boy is unusual in that he was sold to another owner in a furtive transaction; it is common for its misery:

66My name is Bol Deng. I am 16 years old. My home village is Mabior Nyang near Aweil in Bahr el Ghazal.

Early one morning in 1989 we, the neighborhood children, were playing in the vicinity when, all of a sudden, we saw a band of armed men on horseback. They went wild throughout the village, shooting live bullets at random.

Some of the grownup villagers escaped but many of them were killed while attempting to flee. My father Deng Baak was shot dead in the incident. My mother was beaten up until she dropped down unconscious, but later recovered. Those of us who could not escape were surrounded by the armed Arab bandits. They herded us together, men, women and children.

Then at gunpoint we were driven northwards. From our family four of us were captured: our mother, my elder brother, my sister and me.

We were journeying on foot and were worn out and very tired. On reaching Safaha, the border point dividing Dinkas from Rizeigat Arabs, our captors stopped us and divided us among themselves. A certain Husseini Mohiedin possessed me. I was the only one among the captives who was owned by Mohiedin. My elder brother and sister were owned by other Arabs.

Mohiedin's village where we were staying was called Fardos, south of ed Daien. Fardos in Arabic means paradise. But for me this was no paradise at all — it was hell.

I stayed with Mohiedin for one year. When I first went into his house he was still a bachelor but later married while I was there. He had a herd of cattle and we used to look after them. Mohiedin was a harsh man. He used to cane me whenever a cow or bull went astray. He and his wife insulted me and called me names which made me most unhappy.

Then gradually Mohiedin began to lose interest in maintaining me. One day he decided to sell me to a camel owner named Lagabi Suleiman Hassan. I don't know for how much I was sold, but the way the negotiations were conducted suggested that I was being sold to someone who was not related to Mohiedin in any way.

Suleiman was a Kordofani camel owner. However, he, unlike Mohiedin, did not beat me, but overworked me like a donkey. Day and night I kept a wakeful eye on the man's camels. In the grazing land I often met my fellow agemates from my Dinka tribe. We shared our troubles and suffering together.

Suleiman was a family man. His wife was not very rude like Mohiedin's wife. Although she gave me food I was not to share the same table with them. I was a lonely eater.

I stayed with Suleiman for two years until good people traced and retrieved me from slavery. After that I sojourned for a year in ed Daien camp for displaced people until finally in June 1993 arrangements were made for my departure to Khartoum."

Quoted in: Silent Tombs: Oral Testimonies from Southern Sudan (Copenhagen: DanChurchAid, 1996), pp. 31-32.

camps is predictable, the role of international organizations in supporting the NIF policy is unexpected. A recent official review of the huge United Nations relief program, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), put its shock in diplomatic language:

[T]he focus of some UN programmes suggests that there has been a fundamental failure to adapt programming to the fact of internal warfare and its associated risks for some populations. In this regard, it is difficult to understand how humanitarian assistance can be made to contribute to conflict reduction. UNICEF, for example, is supporting Child Friendly Village schemes in some 29 villages in Southern Kordofan. The fact that UNICEF is able to support such schemes, in a context where internal warfare has placed children at great risk, led the Review Team to question the extent of UN understanding of realities \dots ²¹

Southern Kordofan is home to the Baggara militias and the Nuba Mountains; all the first-hand testimonies in this article come from Southern Kordofan. Perhaps Bol Deng, Fawzia Jibreel, or Nura Kabia Chagul would be comforted to know that they were held in or near "child-friendly villages" for which UNICEF supporters rattle their collecting tins at Christmas.

A larger and even more disturbing program is the UN Development Program's (UNDP) Area Rehabilitation Schemes, one of which is centered on Kadugli, the largest town in the Nuba Mountains. The rehabilitation scheme aims to support the Peace and Development Administration to "resettle [returnees] in peace villages and then promote agricultural development to strengthen their attachment to land." "Returnees" is a government euphemism for captives and abductees, and it is improbable that the Peace Administration or UNDP can instruct Nuba farmers forced from their ancestral villages in the virtues of "attachment" to land. The OLS Review Team concluded that "this statement suggests a disturbing degree of ignorance of local realities. Moreover, the Review Team was concerned that such programmes reflect a de facto accommodation with disasterproducing policies of the government."22

Another agency "doing the government's work" is the Save the Children Federation (US), which is working in the eastern Nuba Mountains alongside the government and "Islamic" agencies. It has a program in Abu Jibeha, site of one of the largest and most notorious peace camps in the region. The rationale is that a Western agency either has to comply with government programs or withdraw. To date, no Western relief agency has chosen to withdraw from northern Sudan in protest over human rights abuses.

Turning a Blind Eye

Instead, humanitarians have directed most of their outrage against a resurgence of slavery. In doing so, they miss the point that as abhorrent as the practice is, slavery in Sudan is an issue, it is not the issue. There is simply no argument that slavery is wrong, nor is there doubt that there are slaves in Sudan today.²³ Those who stand up for the Sudan government and deny its complicity in slavery — including Louis Farrakhan, Lyndon LaRouche, and his Schiller In-

The war zones have become an ethics-free zone. Meanwhile, the government turns a blind eye to slavery and hostage taking and denies everything.

stitute — are defending the indefensible.²⁴ But at the same time, humanitarian agencies and anti-slavery campaigners who equate contemporary Sudanese slavery with its 19th century US counterpart are ignoring key differences.

Slavery began in earnest under the previous government of Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi (1986-89), whose electoral credentials and pro-Western foreign policy muted human rights criticism while he was in office. Since then, Khartoum has used the very same militias that take slaves as important military allies in their war against re-

bels in the South. Prominent architects of the militia policy have served in various administrations in civilian and military roles.

The vast majority of Sudan's estimated several thousand slaves²⁵ are members of the Dinka tribe living in the north of the Bahr el Ghazal region. Most were captured between 1985 and 1989 as a byproduct of raids by the militias. Relatively few have been taken since then, although the increase in militia raids since 1995 is an ominous augur. The militiamen responsible have enjoyed political support and military supplies from the government. They are drawn from the Dinkas'immediate neighbors to the north, the Rizeigat and Missiriya Arab tribes (part of the collectivity known as Baggara, "cattle people"). The Baggara-Dinka conflict is at once a microcosm of the 14-year Sudanese civil war, and a particular theme in the war played out to an extreme.

Although the present NIF government inherited rather than created the problem of militias and its offshoot, slavery, it has continued to support the

militias. Indeed, they have become part of the PDF, and now have the privilege of formal recognition and support. The Murahaliin militiamen still have carte blanche to wreak havoc in northern Bahr el Ghazal. Not surprisingly, the war zones have become an ethics-free zone: Some commanders take captives, occasionally other military officers; magistrates or gov-

ernment officials release them. Meanwhile, the government turns a blind eye to slavery and hostage taking and denies everything — or did until the international outcry forced it to set up its own commission of inquiry in 1996.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan, Dr Gáspár Bíró, is careful to demarcate governmental responsibility for the practice. He says:

the total passivity of the Government after having received information for years regarding this situation can only be interpreted as tacit political approval and support of the institution of slavery.²⁶

^{21.} Karim, et al., op. cit., p. 216. 22. Ibid.

^{23.} The first proof of slavery was provided by two lecturers in Khartoum University, Ushari Mahmoud and Suleiman Baldo, "El Diein [ed Daien] Massacre and Slaveryin Sudan," Khartoum, 1987.

^{24.} See Nat Hentoff, "Farrakhan's big mistake," Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 26, 1996, p. 31A.

^{25. &}quot;Slavery in Sudan," Sudan Update (Yorkshire), Jan. 1997, p. 2.

^{26.} ÚN, Commission on Human Rights, "Situation of Human Rights in The Sudan," Feb. 20, 1996, pp. 11-12.

Smallholder Slavery


Not all those seized in such militia raids become slaves; many perhaps most — are better described as hostages who are often freed after their family "compensates" the captors -- commonly by paying 8,000-13,000 Sudanese pounds.²⁷ Others escape or are released through the intervention of courts. Intertribal negotiations have freed hundreds of captives and slaves. But if no talks are opened up, hostage-captives can become slaves and, in any case, those who hold them are not prosecuted.

dozen acres of land or a score of cattle or camels holds one or two southern women and children, or in exceptional cases more. They are treated harshly: often beaten, given poor food and clothing, and may sleep in a flimsy shelter or in a cattle byre. Women and older girls are kept as concubines. ²⁸ There is no solid evidence for the export of slaves from Sudan to other countries — though there may be undocumented in-

Typically, a farmer with a few

though there may be undocumented instances. Nor are there slave markets in the 19th century image — although there are several dozen known cases in which individual slaves have been passed from one master to another for cash payment.

Nonetheless, overeager or misinformed human rights advocates in Europe and the US have played upon lazy assumptions to raise public outrage. Christian Solidarity International, for instance, claims that "Government troops and Government-backed Arab militias regularly raid black African communities for slaves and other forms of booty." The organization repeatedly uses the term "slave raids," implying that taking captives is the aim of government policy. Another Christian group - the right-wing South Africabased Frontline Fellowship — is also making a cause out of slavery. "Tens of thousands of Sudanese Christian men, women and children have been kidnaped and sold as slaves by government soldiers."29 This, despite the fact



NINA DUNCAN/SAVE THE CHILDREN

One of Sudan's many displaced persons.

that there is no evidence for centrally organized, government-directed slave raiding or slave trade.

Nor have the media been immune from supporting the sensational stereotypes. In May 1996, after Louis Farrakhan claimed that there was no slavery in Sudan, the Baltimore Sun sent two journalists to Sudan to prove him wrong.³⁰ Although they paid an exorbitant \$500 each for two "slaves" in the small town of Manyiel, it is most probable that they were in fact paying a ransom to a go-between in a scheme whereby families pay, through a middleman, for their hostage children to be redeemed. They were not in a slave market — the rebel authorities controlling Manyiel would never have tolerated such a trade in human beings.

Making Crucial Differences

The government of Sudan is guilty of enough crimes; its critics do not need to exaggerate or distort its record. Unfortunately, this is precisely what some of its opponents are doing in the slavery debate. Yes, slaves have been taken in Sudan, and it is a crime in which the government has been complicit through its cover-up and its failure to

30. Gilbert Lewthwaite and Gregory Kane, "Witness to Slavery," *Baltimore Sun*, June 16-18, 1996.

act.³¹ The Sudanese know slavery from their history, and cannot deny that it exists today. But the issue is a slippery one: slavery slides off into issues such as hostage taking. The difference between a hostage and a slave is important. It shows how Sudanese slavery must be seen in its local context, and how it is a mistake to impose stereotypes from elsewhere. It also points to solutions: intertribal negotiations rather than indiscriminate "buying back" - which runs the risk of inflating the ransom beyond what families can afford and, even worse, creating an incentive for further raiding and abduc-

Crucial too is the difference between a government condoning enslavement and promoting it. While irrelevant to the oppressed and enslaved, failure to make that distinction may spike campaigners if there is a rigorous independent inquiry. Meanwhile, the far more extensive crimes of the Sudan government — its gargantuan and brutal program aimed at dismembering traditional societies and subjugating those who survive the onslaught — is readily overlooked.

31. President Omer al Bashir and at least one other senior government figure have been publicly accused of holding Dinka slaves. They have replied that they are supporting destitute "students."

^{27.} One US dollar exchanges for 1,500-2,000 Sudanese pounds, *i.e.*, the payment is rather token: it does not reflect the 'market value' of a human being, should such an idea be relevant.

^{28.} Many female escapees have been assisted by the less-than-happy wives of slave owners.

^{29. &}quot;Slave Raiders Return," Frontline Fellowship News, n. 3, 1996, p. 7.

Off the Shelf:

CAQ'S BOOKS OF INTEREST

Colombia:

The Genocidal Democracy by Javier Giraldo, S.J.

COMMON COURAGE PRESS, 1996, INDEX, 125 PP., \$12.95 PB.

The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior

by Horacio Verbitsky

THE NEW PRESS, 1996, 207 PP., \$22.00 HB.

The Flight and Colombia deal with atrocity and its aftermath. They are chilling testimonies of the horrors from which the continent has yet to emerge. Under the Argentine military junta (1976-83), some 9,000 people "disappeared" - tortured and murdered by military officers. Although the rough facts of Argentina's "dirty war" have been known for a decade, the military cowers behind a shield of silence - and for good reason. "Let forgetfulness, silence, and forgiveness reign over past events," declared the navy, in whose Mechanics' School thousands of political dissidents (and outright innocents) spent their final days in unspeakable horror.

The first crack in the military's wall of silence came in 1995, when Argentina's leading investigative journalist, Horacio Verbitsky, published interviews with retired naval officer Francisco Scilongo. He admitted participating in drugging prisoners, transporting them on naval planes, and then tossing them, still alive, into the South Atlantic. Although Verbitsky is careful not to editorialize, Scilongo is no sympathetic character. He only came forward because he felt other, more notorious officers were being unfairly punished when the entire military was complicit, and ... only following orders.

More than a torturer's tale, *The Flight* picks at festering sores on the Latin American body politic, where imposition of national security doctrines—largely at the behest of the US—

still weigh on the peoples of the continent. With a handful of notable exceptions, the region's murderous militaries have escaped justice. Weak civilian successor governments chose amnesty and "reconciliation" over challenging the men with the guns. "Truth commissions" may uncover hidden horrors, but the perpetrators of atrocities remain in positions of power and the victims find no justice.

In Father Giraldo's Colombia, however, it is not the past that weighs like a nightmare upon the living, but the present. Hiding behind a fog of drug war rhetoric, the Colombian military (and its US backers) have unleashed a counterinsurgency campaign which has left some 30,000 dead since the late 1980s — the worst ongoing political violence in the hemisphere. But Colombia's contemporary dirty warriors have learned to keep their hands clean by using paramilitary death squads to do their dirty work. Giraldo does a great service for supporters of social justice and human rights by exposing these mechanisms of repression through proxy.

As the Colombian case makes clear, the era of dirty war in Latin America is not over. While the US crows about democracy triumphant across the hemisphere, its henchmen continue to torture and murder to prevent real democracy. And the leaders of repressions past and present sit in seats of power throughout the continent.

Millennial Rage: Survivalists, White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy

by Philip Lamy

PLENUM PRESS, 1996, ENDNOTES, INDEX, 295 PP., \$25.95 HB.

In this fascinating, if at times over-stated, survey, longtime fringe watcher Philip Lamy takes the reader on an eye-opening journey through the world of apocalyptic sects and End Times-oriented paramilitary groups. Lamy's beat includes survivalists, Soldier of Fortune types, Guru Ma and David Koresh, racist Christians, even the Unabomber. What ties them all together, writes Lamy, is their common adherence to one form or another of millennial, or apocalyptic, ideology. And we're not talking just any old millennial myth here, we're talking Book of Revelations: Armageddon, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, the Scarlet Whore of Babylon.

Lamy not only locates the sectarians, racists, and survivalists as part of reaction to rapid social change, he traces the longstanding evangelical traditions in US society from which they emerged. He also documents the ways the millennial myth has fractured so that its appeal reaches deep into secular culture as well as firing the brains of fundamentalist zealots. From eco-catastrophe to New Age spiritism, millennial ideas seep across the cultural landscape. Similarly, the average survivalist or wannabe mercenary may not hold the Bible literally true, but he has probably read Hal Lindsay and his Tshirt may feature the Grim Reaper.

So how dangerous is all this? Lamy points out that historically millennial movements have proven amenable to merging with radical nationalist movements. Remember the thousand-year Reich? Still, David Koresh is no Hitler, and his Branch Davidians could arguably have been left alone with no harmful consequences to anyone but themselves. The same holds true for the survivalists hunkered down on their isolated mountaintops. The folks who are not content to wait for Armageddon but wish to help it along are a different story. And they are out there robbing banks in the Midwest, planting bombs in Spokane, and sowing seeds of fear and hatred across the land. Millennial Rage will bring you further into their heads than you may want to go.

After Lives: Legacies of Revolutionary Writing

by Barbara Harlow

Verso, 1997, Appendices, Bibliography, 198 PP., \$17.00 PB.

Death Blossoms: Reflections from a Prisoner of Conscience

by Mumia Abu-Jamal

PLOUGH PUBLISHING, 1997, 158 PP, \$12.00 PB.

This Prison Where I Live: The PEN Anthology of Imprisoned Writers

Edited by Siobhan Dowd

CASSELL, 1996, APPENDICES, 192 PP., \$16.95 PB.

As a Western tradition of individual liberty emerged over the past two centuries, with it came a countervailing theme: the writer as dissident and threat to the health of the state. In self-interest, governments have routinely censored, imprisoned, tortured, and

murdered those who spoke for the voiceless. From Wobbly songwriter Joe Hill, executed after a kangaroo court trial in Utah in 1915, to Spanish playwright Federico Garcia Lorca, felled by Franco's firing squads in 1937, to Nigerian poet Ken Saro-Wiwa, hung by the Nigerian junta last year, dissident writers have too often paid for their words with their lives. Countless others have paid with their freedom.

It is from this latter group that PEN, the elite international writers' association, has drawn its anthology of prison writings. Through the eloquent voices of, for example, Breyten Breytenbach, Dashiel Hammett, Arthur Koestler, Dennis Brutus, and Milovan Djilas, the PEN anthology takes the reader on a harrowing tour of the prison experience.

True to its genteel nature, however, PEN shies from cases where the issues are not conveniently clear-cut. The organization has had very little to say about Mumia Abu-Jamal, the longtime black radical and journalist currently on Death Row in Pennsylvania. Fortunately, Abu-Jamal can speak for himself. In Death Blossoms, his second book from prison, he offers a series of vignettes

and reflections on the human spirit distilled from his own brutal experience.

The relatively contemplative (if not exactly serene) Death Blossoms may appear to some as a retreat from the urgently political Live from Death Row. But in a deeper sense, Abu-Jamal confronts jailers everywhere with the essential futility of their repressions: As Siobhan Dowd put it in her introduction to the PEN anthology, "By and large, anger with the prison lot is used to fuel the will to live and tell the tale." Prison is an evil thing, a place that all too often debilitates men's souls — one of its not-so-latent purposes - but Abu-Jamal, speaking also for countless voiceless prisoners, shows that even the jailer's best efforts to degrade can be defeated. For that, he is a dangerous man.

The authorities want Mumia dead, and until then, they want him gagged. He remains on Death Row, his well-justified demand for a new trial so far ignored. Meanwhile, Pennsylvania prison authorities are punishing him for his writings, using "unauthorized employment" as their excuse.

As University of Texas comparative literature professor Barbara Harlow

shows, however, the state is not the only danger dissident writers face. Harlow's After Lives tracks the intersection of politics and literature in the work, lives, and deaths of three writers killed for their efforts: Palestinian Hassan Ganafani, Salvadoran Roque Dalton, and South African Ruth First. Of the three, only First died at the hands of her own government; Dalton was executed as a "CIA agent" by his fellow revolutionaries, while Hanafani died in a car bombing for which the Israeli Mossad took credit.

Harlow does an admirably close reading of the trio's works, examining their critical engagement with the political ideas of their times, the personal consequences of that engagement, and the lasting legacies of their contributions. She is also to be congratulated on bringing the techniques of literary criticism to bear on revolutionary politics in a book that non-English professors can actually read. Instead of the post-modernist posturing that locates revolutionary practice in the analysis of phallic symbolism in the works of Jane Austen, Barbara Harlow is doing the real thing. ■

---- Phillip Smith

(Unionbusting, continued from p. 39)

their own march of workers opposed to the union. Understanding the importance of public opinion, growers hired their own PR agency, the Dolphin Group of Los Angeles, to manage their image.

Direct activity by anti-union consultants and law firms, and their strikebreaking guards, is a big obstacle to the survival and growth of unions. But in the long term, the new face of union-busting may prove to have an even greater effect. The newest and fastest growing industries — electronics, biotechnology, and others — have developed an anti-union structure which workers have yet to crack on a large scale. The use of chronic unemployment and social policies such as welfare and immigration reform pits workers against each other in desperate competition.

Fighting against unionbusting, therefore, is not simply a matter of using more intelligent and innovative tactics. Labor has to fight for a social agenda that includes the repeal of welfare reform, and supports racial and gender equality and equity between immigrant and native-born workers.

Organizing the unemployed may prove to be as important as organizing in the workplace. Just preserving the overall percentage of organized workers takes more than 400,000 new union members a year, a rate the AFL-CIO has yet to achieve. While trained, full-time organizers are necessary, as is a commitment to using more sophisticated

They projected a vision of social and economic change that went far beyond, and directly in contradiction to, the prevailing wisdom of the time.

and militant strategies, clearly the 15 million US union members must become more involved in union activity. That requires structural changes within unions, increasing the involvement of ordinary members in decision-making, and reducing the often-wide gulf that separates leadership from rank-and-file.

In US labor history, large-scale union organizing has always been part of a broader social movement fighting for the interests of all workers, organized and unorganized, employed and unemployed. The company unions, the violence of strikebreakers, and the lack of legal rights which faced workers in the 1920s were swept away a decade later.

The upsurge among millions of American workers, radicalized by the Depression and left-wing activism, forced corporate acceptance of labor for the first time in the country's history. That activism mobilized the power of workers to overcome obstacles not dissimilar to those of the present. They projected a vision of social and economic change that went far beyond, and di-

rectly in contradiction to, the prevailing wisdom of the time.


The current changes in labor may be the beginning of something as large and profound. If they are, then the obstacles erected by present-day unionbusters can become a historical relic as quickly as did those of an earlier era.

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